War and peace and war, p.8
War and Peace and War, page 8
“The mountains had an uneven surface broken by ravines, and the trees grew close together and very high. Hence the Romans, even before the enemy assailed them, were having hard time of it felling trees, building roads, and bridging places that required it. They had with them many wagons and many beasts of burden as in time of peace; moreover, not a few women and children and a large retinue of servants were following them—one more reason for their advancing in scattered groups. Meanwhile a violent rain and wind came up that separated them still further, while the ground, that had become slippery around the roots and logs, made walking very treacherous for them, and the tops of the trees kept breaking off and falling down, causing much confusion. While the Romans were in such difficulties, the barbarians suddenly surrounded them on all sides at once, coming through the densest thickets, as they were acquainted with the paths. At first they hurled their volleys from a distance; then, as no one defended himself and many were wounded, they approached close to them. For the Romans were not proceeding in any regular order, but were mixed in helter-skelter with the wagons and the unarmed, and so, being unable to form readily anywhere in a body, and being fewer at any point than their assailants, they suffered greatly and could offer no resistance at all.
“Accordingly they encamped on the spot, after securing a suitable place, so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain; and afterward they either burned or abandoned most of their wagons and everything else that was not absolutely necessary to them. The next day they advanced in a little better order, and even reached an open country, though they did not get off without loss. Upon setting out from there, they plunged into woods again, where they defended themselves against their assailants, but suffered their heaviest losses while doing so. For since they had to form their lines in a narrow space, in order that the cavalry and infantry together might run down the enemy, they collided frequently with one another and with the trees. They were still advancing when the fourth day dawned, and again a heavy downpour and violent wind assailed them, preventing them from going forward, and moreover depriving them of the use of their weapons. For they could not handle their bows and their javelins with any success, nor, for that matter, their shields, which were thoroughly soaked. Their opponents, on the other hand, being for the most part lightly equipped, and able to approach and retire freely, suffered less from the storm. Furthermore, the enemy’s forces had greatly increased, as many of those who had at first wavered now joined them, largely in the hope of plunder, and thus they could more easily encircle and strike down the Romans, whose ranks were now thinned, many having perished in the earlier fighting.”
Seeing no hope and unwilling to fall into the hands of their enemies alive, Varus and most of his officers took their lives, while the remaining soldiers lost their will to fight (and were either slaughtered on the field, or sacrificed later to German gods). The Roman army was obliterated.
We have a fair amount of information about the war leader of the Germans who destroyed Varus and his three legions in the Teutoburg Forest. Arminius belonged to the most illustrious family of the Cherusci, which itself was one of the largest and most powerful tribes inhabiting the Weser region. Prior to the events described by Cassius Dio, he had served with the Romans as a leader of auxiliary troops. Most likely, he commanded a contingent of his own Cherusci during the war between the Romans and the Suebi, a Germanic tribal confederation led by Maroboduus. (This war took place in A.D. 6 in the Danubian region of Pannonia.) Noble lineage and military experience made him a natural candidate for war leader of the Cherusci. His first-hand knowledge of the effect of the Roman conquest on the defeated tribes probably provided a motivation to resist the Roman subjugation of his homeland. Arminius was also an accomplished politician and a charismatic leader, an important factor because the military power of the Cherusci alone was, at best, a match for a single Roman legion (and at one point during the wars, the Romans campaigned in Germany with 11 legions). Arminius persuaded several other tribes to join his anti-Roman confederation. (As in the account of Cassius Dio, some of the waverers joined Arminius only when they saw that the Germans were winning.)
Confederations uniting many tribes under a charismatic leader such as Arminius or Maroboduus were a novel form of political organization for the Germans, which arose only when they came in direct contact with the Roman Empire. The first encounter between the Romans and the Germans occurred when the Cimbri, Teutones, and other tribes invaded the Roman territory about a century before the time of Arminius and were defeated by the great Roman general Marius (105-101 B.C.). This incursion had the character of multiple marauding bands rather than a powerful unified confederation of latter times. The first Germanic leader called rex in the Roman sources was Caesar’s opponent Ariovistus, the leader of a Germanic migration into Gaul in 59 B.C.
The Suebi led by Maroboduus was specifically a name for a tribal confederation rather than a tribe. Tacitus wrote that “the Suebi, unlike the Chatti or Tencteri, do not constitute an individual tribe: They occupy the greater part of Germania, divided among the nations with names of their own, although all are called Suebi in common. It is characteristic of the tribe to dress their hair on the side and bind it up tight in a knot. This distinguishes the Suebi from the other Germani, and their free-born from their slaves.” The distinctive hairstyle of the Suebi is found in numerous Roman representations (for example, on Trajan’s column in Rome). It is also present on some of the bodies found by archaeologists in bogs. The best preserved is the head of a Germanic warrior found at Osterby in Schleswig-Holstein. The hair knot is a wonderful example of how people use appearance to declare the symbolic boundary between “us” and “them.” In fact, the very name Suebi basically means “us” (“those belonging to our group”). Incidentally, the names of such modern nations as the Swedes and the Swiss have precisely the same origin. The name of the later Alamanni also expressed the same idea, but with a different means. Alamanni means “the (true, real) people,” clearly a variation on the “us” versus “them” theme. The origin of the name the Goths is more obscure, but some authorities think it simply meant “people.” The name for the other great confederation, the Franks, however, had a different logic: it means “the fierce,” “the brave.”
A tribal confederation, such as the Suebi, was still a fragile form of political organization during the time of Maroboduus and Arminius. The individual tribes could easily switch their allegiance from one leader to another. For example, the Langobards (who later played such an important role in Italian history) were initially part of Maroboduus’s confederation. After the battle of the Teutoburg Forest, however, with Arminius’s reputation at its height, they switched their allegiance to him. Furthermore, the institution of kingship was not yet rooted in the culture of the Germans. Individual tribesmen were suspicious of the royal pretensions of their war leaders, and wary of giving them too much power, which they might use to oppress the commons. Tacitus describes the process by which the tribal confederations fell apart and their leaders perished as follows.
“Now that the Romans had gone and there was no external threat, national custom and rivalry had turned the Germans against one another. The two nations [the Cherusci with allies led by Arminius and the Suebi led by Maroboduus] were well matched in strength, and their leaders equally capable. But the Suebi did not like the royal title of their leader Maroboduus, whereas Arminius was popular as champion of freedom. So in addition to his old soldiers—the Cherusci and their allies—two Suebian tribes from the kingdom of Maroboduus also entered the war on Arminius’s side [these were the Semnones and Langobards]. These additions looked like turning the scale. However, Inguiomerus and a group of his followers deserted to the Suebi, merely because the old man was too proud to serve under his young nephew.
“Each army had high hopes as it drew up for battle. The old German unsystematic battle-order and chaotic charges were things of the past. Their long wars against Rome taught them to follow the standards, keep troops in reserve, and obey commands.” Tacitus then describes the speeches that Arminius and Maroboduus gave to inspire their troops for the fight.
“Besides these speeches, the armies had motives of their own to excite them. The Cherusci had the glorious past to fight for, and their new allies [the Langobards] their freshly acquired freedom from the Suebi. Their enemy’s aim was expansion. Never had a result been so unpredictable. Both right wings were routed. However, instead of renewing the battle, as was expected, Maroboduus transferred his camp to the hills. This showed that he was beaten. Then, weakened by a series of desertions, he retreated....”
A year or two later, Maroboduus, deserted by all, crossed the Danube and requested asylum from his old enemies. The Romans kept him in Ravenna, “and whenever the Suebi became disorderly they were threatened with his restoration. But for 18 years he never left Italy, growing old, his reputation dimmed by excessive fondness for life.”
Arminius’s triumph was short-lived. “The Roman evacuation of Germany and the fall of Maroboduus had induced Arminius to aim at kingship. But his freedom-loving compatriots forcibly resisted. The fortunes of the fight fluctuated, but finally Arminius succumbed to treachery from his own relations.”
These passages from Tacitus are extremely telling (not to mention the poetry of “his reputation dimmed by excessive fondness for life”). As long as a powerful external force threatened the Germans, the tribes were capable of uniting and inflicting defeats on it. When the immediate threat went, however, so did the unity. Individual tribes (such as the Langobards) or even parts of tribes (such as Inguiomerus and his Cherusci followers) shifted from one leader to another. Individual tribesmen were wary of enormous power gathered by the leader, and when war was over, desired to limit this power or even to get rid of the leader himself.
THE BATTLE OF THE TEUTOBURG FOREST was, without question, a spectacular success for the Germans. One historian even called it “the battle that stopped Rome.” Yet, the Romans lost many battles in their long and illustrious career as imperialists, while always prevailing in the end. (That is, before they went into decline starting in the third century.) It is hard to avoid the feeling that, were the Romans really interested in annexing Germania, they would have been able to do so despite the German resistance. After all, the Romans had just won their “Four Hundred Years’ War” against the Gauls (discussed in Chapter 6), whose individual military prowess and social organization were very similar to that of the Germans. Beginning in A.D. 14, the Roman general Germanicus, with eight legions, conducted a series of campaigns into the lands east of the Rhine that culminated in a battle where Arminius and the Cherusci were soundly defeated. In A.D. 74, when the emperor Vespasian decided to optimize the frontier defenses, he annexed the territory east of the Rhine and south of the Main without any significant resistance from its inhabitants. The Romans, consciously or unconsciously, decided that northern Europe was not worth the trouble of conquering it. Children of the sunny Mediterranean, they heartily disliked the cold and humid climate of northern Europe. They could never be comfortable in a land of bogs and impenetrable forests in which “the trees grew close together and very high.” (This aversion comes through very clear in Cassius Dio’s description of the landscape through which Varus’s doomed legions struggled.) Very little profit could be extracted from this land, inhabited by backward and tumultuous people. The main thing the Romans wanted from it was security, and they gradually realized that it was easier to obtain it by means of a forward frontier policy rather than by outright annexation. Accordingly, the Romans began to “domesticate” the Germanic tribes. Their decision to pension off Maroboduus was just one element of this policy. As a result, the Rhine frontier became stationary.
Ironically, the decision to establish a stationary frontier was disastrous in the long run. During the next three or four centuries, the frontier transformed the social and political organization of the Germans. Small-scale tribes of the first century B.C., such as the Cherusci and the Chatti, gave way to powerful tribal confederations of the third and fourth centuries, such as the Franks, Alamanni, and Goths, who began expanding at the expense of the aging Roman Empire. Eventually one of these confederations, the Franks, evolved into the only state in European history that managed to unify most of western Europe—the Carolingian Empire.
The forces that the Roman frontier exerted on the incipient German nations were of several different kinds. The first, and most obvious, was the military pressure, which was particularly strong during the early centuries of the frontier’s existence. When Caesar led his forces into the territory of the Sugambri in 55 B.C., the Romans burned the villages and destroyed the crops in the territory they passed through. The inhabitants saved themselves by fleeing before the advancing Roman troops. The Chatti were less lucky when they were attacked by Germanicus in A.D. 15. “Germanicus completely surprised the Chatti. Helpless women, children, and old people were at once slaughtered or captured. The younger men swam across the river Eder ....” As Germanicus advanced into their territory, the tribesmen “evacuated their towns and villages, dispersed and took to the woods. Germanicus burnt their capital, and, ravaging the open country, started back for the Rhine.” The atrocities committed by the Romans were reciprocated. For example, after the battle of the Teutoburg Forest, the Germans selected 500 prisoners to be sacrificed to the gods. According to a reconstruction by Peter Wells, these unfortunates were killed in a variety of ways: Some were hanged from oak trees; others had their heads cut off and nailed to tree trunks. Yet others were taken to the marshes, their throats cut in such a way that their blood poured into the water. Their lifeless bodies were then flung into the pool.
The wealthy and civilized society on the Roman side of the frontier produced many things that were coveted by the “barbarians”: bronze, silver, and gold ornaments and vessels; fine weapons and cloths; coins; pottery; and wine and olive oil. These items were prized not only for their intrinsic value, but also for the prestige they bestowed on the owner. Thus, drinking wine was not only pleasurable because wine tastes good—it was also an act of “conspicuous consumption” that demonstrated the high status of the wine drinker. A beautiful golden wine cup reinforced the message. Anthropologists postulate that prestige goods played an extremely important role in state formation. Of course, a chieftain aiming to become king could reward his loyal retinue with, say, cattle. Taking care of a cow, however, is a pain in the neck for a professional warrior (and not a particularly prestigious occupation), whereas a golden arm-ring of the same value is portable, maintenance-free, and a visible symbol of status.
Whereas military pressure is a “push” factor, obliterating the weak and further strengthening the strong, a source of prestige goods is a “pull” factor. Its effect, however, is the same: to increase the selective pressure for increased military strength. The Germans could obtain prestige goods from the Roman Empire by raiding, trading, or subsidies (rewards for good behavior). Raiding was an increasingly feasible option beginning in the third century, as the Roman Empire started declining. Even then, only very large tribal confederations had any chance at securing a significant amount of booty. Trading was a peaceful way to obtain goods, but it also led to increased conflict. Tribes that controlled the cross-frontier trade (because they were better situated on the frontier, or perhaps secured a trading agreement with the Romans) were resented by those who were cut off from directly dealing with the Roman traders. The obvious remedy was to defeat and displace the lucky intermediaries. Imperial subsidies caused conflict by the same logic. As a result, both push and pull factors worked to establish a highly conflict-prone band of territory extending 100 miles from the frontier in both directions. Within this band, it was a “dog-eat-dog” morality, and the strong dogs became even stronger as they ate the small ones.
The frontier also exerted more subtle influences on the Germanic societies. The Empire was not only the source of prestige goods, but also of ideas, techniques, and other kinds of cultural elements. Recollect the comment of Tacitus about how rapidly the Germans learned from the Romans the value of discipline. By the time the Franks began expanding into the Roman territory in the fifth century, they already realized the value of records and bureaucracy, so they employed the Roman administrators and accepted them as members of the nascent imperial aristocracy.
It is interesting that the Romans sometimes inadvertently helped the process that eventually resulted in their succumbing to the Germanic conquest. Roman frontier administrators encouraged several small tribes to band together under one leader. It was much simpler to control (by gifts or intimidation) one “kinglet” than a bunch of chieftains or, worse, to deal with many tribal councils. The side effect of this policy, however, was to acculturate the Germans to the institution of kingship, with dire consequences for the later empire. Another mechanism that inadvertently promoted cooperation among Germanic chieftains was their frequent meetings with each other in the capitals of frontier provinces, such as Cologne, Mainz, or Augsburg.
Although the Germans learned a lot from the Romans and adopted many Roman cultural practices, the cultural difference between them and the Romans did not become blurred. If anything, it actually intensified with time. The clearest evidence for this polarization comes from the religious changes on each side of the frontier. During the first centuries of contact, both peoples followed polytheistic religions that were fairly tolerant of other peoples’ beliefs. However, beginning with the reign of Constantine (306-337), the Romans converted to Christianity—a monotheistic religion that treated all other beliefs as (at best) an error, and (at worst) devil worship. The religion of the Germans also evolved, and in a direction that increased the distance between them and the Romans.
