India since independence, p.33
India Since Independence, page 33
Believing that independence could not be achieved through negotiations, the Socialist Party had boy cotted the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission and refused to participate in the Constituent Assem bly or the interim governm ent or to accept m em bership of the Congress Working Com m ittee. It had stoutly rej ected the Mountbatten Plan for the independence and Partition of the country . Im m ediately after independence it had given the slogan of India’s developm ent into a socialist state and society . Most Socialists wanted Congress to m ake a definite program m atic and ideological com m itm ent to socialism . They believed that by refusing to do so, it had becom e a right-wing bourgeois party . In early 1948 Congress fram ed a rule that its m em bers could not belong to another party which had its own constitution and discipline. Since the Socialists were not willing to dissolve their own party , they decided in March 1948 to leave Congress and also declared that their obj ective was to establish a dem ocratic socialist society .
Leaving Congress proved to be a historic m istake on the part of the Socialists. Congress still retained its all-em bracing character and, therefore, tolerance for diverse views; it was im posing only organizational uniform ity and not an ideological one. Hence, there was no question of the Socialists being asked to give up their ideology or policies. The position was sim ilar to that prevailing in the European labour parties. Since there was no barrier in Congress to inform al organization of different trends, the Socialists could have continued to function in Congress as a loose group as the conservatives were doing, without form ing a separate organization and breaking discipline.
The Socialists had assum ed that with the achievem ent of independence, there no longer existed any com m on task to unite them with the non-Socialists in Congress. But, in fact, this was not so, as the m aterial, social and political foundations of a socialist India still needed to be laid through econom ic developm ent with equity , secular dem ocracy and consolidation of national unity . And Congress was still the m ain organization that could fulfil this task. As Hariharnath Shastri, a m em ber of the National Executive of the Socialist Party and a form er president of the All India Trade Union Congress, put it when resigning from the party for its refusal to j oin the Congress-sponsored Indian National Trade Union Congress: ‘The unfinished task of national revolution dem ands the full-fledged allegiance of all sections of the people and every progressive group in the country , including the Socialists and the Congress.’1
Political skill and leadership to function in a party that was practically a front lay precisely in com peting with other trends in it without breaking party discipline, so as to build a broad coalition for nation-building and social change and, ultim ately , socialism . True, the Socialists were a m inority in Congress and were facing resistance and organizational discrim ination at the party ’s local level. Political wisdom , as also the art of politics, lay in accepting this situation and then struggling to gradually change the balance of power between the right and the left within the Congress by pulling, inch by inch, the Centre towards the left. This is precisely what the right did throughout the period of Gandhij i’s and Nehru’s dom ination of the Congress. Instead of breaking away when Nehru com m itted Congress to a socialistic pattern of society , it continued inside Congress, representing an ideological and policy trend, though constantly feeling the pressure of losing out to the left. Neither the Socialists nor the Com m unists or the two together— an im possibility at the tim e—were capable of replacing Congress or bringing about socialism and social change on their own in opposition to Congress. Nehru’s political acum en and historical insight lay precisely in recognizing this. At the tim e of the Socialist split from Congress, a large num ber of Socialists stay ed in the parent organization perceiving itself and Jawaharlal Nehru as the m ore effective instrum ents of social change. Achary a Narendra Dev, the m ost erudite, m ature and level-headed of the Socialist leaders, was also opposed to the decision of leaving Congress but he decided to abide by it.
The Socialists’ departure from Congress seriously weakened the left inside Congress and led to Nehru being hem m ed in by conservative forces in his party . It, thus, did incalculable harm to the left trend in Indian politics. On the other hand, it initiated the process of the self-destruction of the Socialist Party , leading to repeated splits within it.
The Socialists’ optim ism regarding the popularity of their party was to be soon belied. The general elections of 1951–52 proved to be a near disaster for the party . All its national leaders were defeated and it won only 12 seats in the Lok Sabha, though receiving 10.6 per cent of the popular vote. In the states, it won 124 of the 2,248 seats with nearly 58 per cent of its candidates losing their deposits; and its winning tally in its strongholds of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Bom bay was 18 out of 390, 23 out of 240 and 9 out of 269 seats respectively .
Meanwhile Congress dissidents led by J.B. Kripalani had form ed in June 1951 the Kisan Mazdoor Praj a Party (KMPP). Claim ing to be Gandhian, and being in basic agreem ent with Congress program m e and policies, the new party prom ised to im plem ent that program m e. Two of its leaders, P.C. Ghosh and T. Prakasam , had been Congress chief m inisters in their respective states, that is, West Bengal and Madras, while Kripalani was the Congress president till 1950 and had j ust lost his bid to be reelected. The reasons for their leaving Congress were personal rather than ideological.
The KMPP too entered the general elections with high hopes and was even m ore disappointed with the results than the Socialist Party . It won 9 seats in the Lok Sabha and polled 5.8 per cent of the votes; but won only 77 seats in the state legislative assem blies.
Subsequently , both the Socialist Party and KMPP, having grossly m iscalculated their electoral strength and being afraid of m arginalization by Congress and the Com m unists, decided to m erge and thus consolidate the Opposition forces. The leaders of the two parties felt that there were no ideological or program m atic differences between them . As Kripalani said: ‘We both want a classless and casteless society free from social, political and econom ic exploitation. The Socialists call it the Socialist society . We call it the Sarvoday a society .’2
The two parties m erged in Septem ber 1952 to form the Praj a Socialist Party (PSP), with Kripalani as the chairm an and Asoka Mehta as the general secretary . It becam e the largest am ong the Opposition parties and held the prom ise of being an alternative to Congress. Its two constituents had received 17.4 per cent of the popular vote in the 1952 elections. Its party organization covered the entire country and it had a large num ber of well-known and popular leaders at both the national and state levels. But the party could not m aintain its cohesion for long.
From the beginning it was racked by ideological and factional quarrels; and it regularly underwent splits. It also suffered from widespread indiscipline am ong its leaders and cadres.
From the outset, it was troubled by m aj or differences over its distinct role in Indian politics as an Opposition party . The issues that tore the party apart from 1953 to 1964 concerned the attitude that it should adopt towards Congress as also the m ilitant and extra-constitutional agitations, and the role it should play in nation-building activities. In June 1953, at the party ’s Betal Conference, Asoka Mehta offered his thesis that in a backward country the im portant task was that of econom ic developm ent and that, therefore, in a constructive spirit, the Opposition should cooperate with the ruling party in that task, though not uncritically . As the Congress and PSP
shared a com m on belief in nationalism , socialism and dem ocracy , he said, the PSP should look for areas of agreem ent with Congress and oppose it only when m atters of principle were involved. Mehta warned that non-cooperation with Congress and all-out opposition to it would m ake the PSP politically ineffective for a long tim e to com e.
The party conference, however, rej ected Mehta’s thesis in favour of Dr Ram m anohar Lohia’s approach. Lohia stood for determ ined opposition to Congress and a position of equidistance from both Congress and the Com m unists. He also advocated the organization of m ilitant m ass opposition m ovem ents even if they were not within the legal, legislative and constitutional fram ework. Lohia and his followers were also not easily am enable to party discipline.
From the beginning, the PSP suffered from ineffective and unstable leadership. Over a period of tim e, m ost of its leaders had ‘renounced, defected, or been expelled from the Party , each tim e leaving it a little weaker by taking with them their loy al supporters’. 3 Lohia and his group left the PSP at the end of 1955. Achary a Narendra Dev died in 1956. Jay aprakash Naray an withdrew from active politics in 1954 and announced that he would dedicate his life to Bhoodan and other constructive activities. After the general elections of 1957, he retired from politics, declared that party politics was not suitable to India and advocated, instead, ‘party less dem ocracy ’. In 1960, Kripalani left the party to play an independent role in politics. In 1963, Asoka Mehta agreed to becom e the deputy chairm an of the Planning Com m ission and, when expelled from the party , j oined Congress in the sum m er of 1964, taking nearly one-third of PSP cadres with him . Many state-level leaders also regularly defected to Congress—am ong them were T. Prakasam in Andhra, Pattom Thanu Pillai in Kerala, P.C. Ghosh in Bengal, Maham ay a Prasad Sinha in Bihar and Triloki Singh in Uttar Pradesh. Finally , in 1971, m ore than half of the party cadres j oined Congress.
All this was reflected in the steady decline of the PSP in the general elections. The party won 19 seats in the Lok Sabha with 10.4 per cent of the total votes in 1957; 12 seats with 6.8 per cent votes in 1962; and 13 seats with 3.1 per cent of the votes in 1967. The virtual dem ise of the party cam e in 1971 when it won only 2 seats with 1 per cent share of the votes. The rem nants of the party j oined the Socialist Party to form the Sam y ukta Socialist Party .
A reason for the failure of the Socialists was their inability to distinguish them selves from Congress, especially after the Avadi Resolution com m itting itself to a socialistic pattern of society . In fact, they could have play ed a m eaningful role only as a part of Congress, with which they shared a com m itm ent to nationalism , secularism , a polity based on parliam entary dem ocracy and civil liberties, and social change. Outside Congress they were bound to be m arginalized and splintered by a bigger party with a better and m ore influential leader in Nehru, having the sam e paradigm and therefore m ore or less the sam e appeal.
After leaving the PSP, Dr Lohia form ed the Socialist Party at the end of 1955. The hallm ark of the new party was political m ilitancy . It was unrem ittingly involved in agitations, civil disobedience m ovem ents, walkouts from the state legislatures and disruptions of their proceedings. The party and its m ain leader, Lohia, were anti-Nehru in the extrem e and also totally opposed to Congress. The two issues that they em phasized were first, the im m ediate abolition of English and its replacem ent by Hindi as the sole link language and second, reservation of over 60 per cent of j obs for the backward castes, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and wom en. They accused the Nehru governm ent of being dom inated by and serving the cause of the upper castes. In m any way s, they were the initiators of the casteist politics of the 1990s in so far as they started m aking appeals to caste as the basic feature of the party ’s ideology . Lohia, him self a brilliant intellectual, also encouraged a certain anti-intellectualism am ong his followers.
Later, in 1967, Lohia and his followers were also to seek cooperation with the Swatantra Party and Jan Sangh, on the one hand, and the Com m unists, on the other, in order to defeat Congress.
They clearly articulated and initiated the politics of anti-Congressism . The Socialist Party was also not free from dissidence, defections and splits, especially after the death of Dr Lohia in 1967.
It m erged with the PSP in 1964 to break free in 1965 and then to m erge with it again in 1971. But by then it too had been reduced to a rum p. The Lohia Socialists won 8 seats in the Lok Sabha in 1957, 6 in 1962, 23 in 1967 and 3 in 1971 when it polled only 2.4 per cent of the total votes.
The Communist Party
The Com m unist Party of India (CPI) was a part of Congress since 1936 but, unwilling to accept the Congress discipline, it left the party in 1945. From 1942 to 1945 it had a rem arkable growth, even though it got isolated from the m ainstream of the national m ovem ent and consequently suffered in term s of its hegem onic influence over the people. In 1947, the CPI started out with certain advantages: it had several able leaders and thousands of devoted, disciplined and hardworking cadres who were active am ong the peasants, workers, students and the intelligentsia.
But, as in the case of the Socialist Party , the CPI was plagued by intense factionalism in the post-1947 y ears and was engulfed by internal crises every few y ears till it form ally split in 1964.
Factions in the CPI were form ed, however, largely around political and ideological differences.
Put sim ply , the CPI could not agree upon a stand on the question which P.C. Joshi, the party ’s general secretary from 1935 to 1948, raised as early as 1950: ‘What is the political situation in India?’
The CPI had gone through a great deal of inner turm oil and division during 1947. Initially , it recognized that India had becom e free and advised all progressive forces to rally round Nehru against the reactionary com m unal and pro-im perialist forces. Later, under Soviet guidance, it declared in Decem ber 1947 that India’s independence was fake ( yeh azadi jhooti hai), 15 August was a day of national betray al, Congress had gone over to im perialism and feudalism , Nehru had becom e a stooge of im perialism , the governm ent was ruling in a fascist m anner, and the constitution that was being fram ed was a charter of slavery . The Com m unists had, therefore, to take up the anti-im perialist and anti-feudal tasks, fight for freedom and dem ocracy and initiate an arm ed struggle.
At its Second Congress held in Calcutta in February 1948, the party chose B.T. Ranadive in place of P.C. Joshi as its general secretary . It declared that the m asses were disillusioned with Congress because of the deteriorating econom ic situation and the betray al of the anti-im perialist cause and were ready to revolt. The party , therefore, gave a call for an im m ediate arm ed uprising. The CPI organized several adventurist actions, two proving to be particularly disastrous.
It decided to continue the arm ed peasant struggle in Telangana, which had been going on against the Nizam of Hy derabad since 1946, but to direct it now against the Indian governm ent. The result was the death of thousands of heroic party and peasant activists in the unequal and unpopular fight against the Indian arm y . The second m aj or disastrous step was to declare a national railway strike on 9 March 1949 in the hope that it would lead to an all-India general strike culm inating in a general, country wide uprising. The strike was, however, a com plete flop. The party also indulged in several terrorist acts. As a consequence, the CPI was banned in several states. It gradually got isolated from Indian opinion and was organizationally decim ated through expulsions and resignations, its m em bership declining from nearly 90,000 to about 18,000 in 1951.
Near the end of 1951, when Aj oy Ghosh becam e the general secretary of the party , a new program m e and a new tactical line were accepted under the direct guidance of Stalin, leading to the tem porary unification of the party . But this still did not represent a new understanding of the Indian social and political reality . India was still seen as essentially a colony , the transfer of power in 1947 as ‘betray al’, the Indian governm ent as subservient to im perialism and as representing landlords, princes and the reactionary big bourgeoisie collaborating with British im perialism , and the Indian political sy stem as basically undem ocratic and authoritarian with the governm ent having established a police state. The political task was still seen to be the eventual overthrow of the Indian state through arm ed struggle. The new elem ent in CPI’s policy was that the overthrow of the state was to be part of the future agenda because the people were not y et ready for the task: they still suffered from ‘illusions’ about Congress and Nehru. Im m ediately , the party was, therefore, to turn away from revolution-m aking, to withdraw the arm ed struggle in Telangana, and to participate in the approaching general elections. The party was helped in m aking the change by the fact that Nehru was by now in full com m and of the governm ent. He accepted the Com m unists’ credentials and cleared the way for the CPI by legalizing the party all over the country .
The CPI participated enthusiastically in the first general elections. It concentrated its efforts in only those areas where it had recognizable strength, that is, in what were to becom e Andhra and Kerala. Along with its front organization, the People’s Dem ocratic Front in Hy derabad, it contested only 61 seats for the Lok Sabha and won 23 with 4.6 per cent share of the votes and em erged as the largest Opposition party , doing better than expected by any one. It was to do even better in 1957 when it won 27 seats and 8.92 per cent of the votes. It won a m aj ority in Kerala and form ed the first dem ocratically elected Com m unist governm ent any where in the world. It also won representation in alm ost every state legislature. In 1962, it won 29 seats in the Lok Sabha and 9.94 per cent of the votes. By this tim e it had em erged as a strong political force in Kerala, West Bengal and Andhra and am ong the working class and the intelligentsia all over the country .
The 1952 elections prom ised that the party would in tim e be considered as the political alternative to Congress. The prom ise did shine bright for a few y ears, as it had done for the Socialists in the early 1950s, but it rem ained essentially unfulfilled. The truce within the party proved to be quite tem porary . Alm ost im m ediately after the elections differences in the party surfaced again. Despite arriving at an agreed program m e in 1951, the party was not able to m aintain a consensus on such m aj or issues as the nature of the Indian state, the role of different social classes and strata, especially the Indian bourgeoisie, the nature of the class alliance which would m ake the Indian revolution, the very nature and m eaning of revolution in India, as also the determ ination of the principal enem y against whom the revolution would be directed, the attitude to be adopted towards the Congress, the governm ent and Jawaharlal Nehru and their reform ist, nation-building activities. Regarding the class alliance, there was agreem ent on one point: the national bourgeoisie was to be allied with—but there was no agreem ent on who constituted the national bourgeoisie and who represented it in Indian politics and the state. The party was torn by controversies and conflicts as it tried unsuccessfully to com e to grips with the actual course of social developm ent within the confines of the 1951 program m e. It was thrown into confusion at every fresh turn of events. Gradually , the differences hardened into factions, even unity on tactics broke down and the party organization tended to get paraly sed.
