Black april, p.21
Black April, page 21
Although the diary found on 5 March was the clearest indicator yet that enemy forces were encircling Ban Me Thuot, apparently it was overlooked when the PAVN 25th Regiment attacked and cut Route 21 on the same day. Phu now had four brush fires going simultaneously: two on Route 19, a third one at Thanh An, and a fourth on Route 21. Phu organized a large task force to pry open Route 21 where it was blocked east of Ban Me Thuot near the Darlac–Khanh Hoa province border. Made up of “virtually every RF unit that could be spared from the coastal provinces,” it was assigned the mission of reopening the road.16 Commanded by the Khanh Hoa province chief, the counterattacks began on 7 March. Despite support from air, artillery, and armor, the RF failed to dislodge PAVN forces holding the high ground astride Route 21.
As for Phu, when the attacks came, he basically took up residence at corps headquarters, even eating and sleeping there. Ever the brave soldier, he raced to the scene of the fighting, managing each battle personally. It was the esprit de corps expected of a South Vietnamese Airborne officer. Yet while such action was required of a brigade or division commander, corps command was different. Courage alone was not enough. Phu’s style might have worked in the past, but in 1975, the war was vastly different. PAVN had committed larger, more mobile forces, with superior firepower and logistics, all synchronized by superb planning and enhanced control by commanders who had war-gamed in advance Phu’s every move. This situation required a leader who could simultaneously react and plan ahead.
Phu was good at reacting, but not at planning ahead. He countered the closure of Route 21 by ordering the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, to immediately leave Duc Lap and return to Ban Me Thuot. He also sent some artillery and the deputy commander of the 23rd Division, Colonel Vu The Quang, in a convoy to Ban Me Thuot to coordinate ARVN defenses in Quang Duc and Darlac. Colonel Quang was given complete authority over all forces in those two southern provinces. However, despite the injunction against revealing its presence, the 320th Division ambushed Quang’s south-bound convoy, destroying ten vehicles. Although Quang escaped, a captured major from the convoy revealed that the 45th Regiment, 23rd Division, was returning a battalion to Thuan Man to search for the 320th. The PAVN division commander immediately asked permission to cut the road in order to prevent the 45th from traveling south.
With Routes 19 and 21 blocked, Van Tien Dung next intended to interdict Route 14 between Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot, but the timing was critical. He wanted to capture Thuan Man and cut Route 14 at that location, but if he did it too soon, Phu might recognize that Ban Me Thuot was the main objective and reinforce the town. If Dung did not cut the road, and the 45th Regiment went to Ban Me Thuot, the town would be considerably harder to capture. It was a tough decision, and the 320th’s commander pressed him to make a choice. After reviewing Phu’s moves, Dung concluded that Phu seemed focused on Route 19 and had not changed his troop concentrations. Consequently, Dung made a critical judgment: he told the 320th to “remain silent, avoid exchanging fire with spy patrols, [and] not fight on Route 14 without orders.”17 It was a tremendous risk, but it paid off when the 45th Regiment remained near Pleiku.
After two nervous days, Dung decided the opportunity had finally arrived to cut Route 14. On 7 March he sent a unit of the 320th Division to seize an RF base south of Thuan Man. His intention was to draw the newly arrived 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, away from its patrols north of Ban Me Thuot. The ploy failed when the 48th Regiment, 320th Division, over-ran the RF position in forty minutes. However, even though the attack did not succeed in luring in the 3rd Battalion, the next day the 48th Regiment struck Thuan Man and a section of Route 14, and seized both in less than two hours. All three of the main roads in the Central Highlands had now been severed.
Meanwhile, the regiments that would assault Ban Me Thuot slid into position. Five separate columns would attack the town. Each was a combined-arms operation that would penetrate into the city to capture the command centers and major installations. In this way South Vietnamese control would be destroyed, and the outlying outposts would easily fall.
The initial assault into Ban Me Thuot would be led by the 198th Sapper Regiment. Its strike force comprised three sapper battalions. Two of the regiment’s other battalions would harass Pleiku, while the last one would support the 10th Division at Duc Lap. The 198th made three reconnaissance forays into Ban Me Thuot to determine infiltration routes and observe the defenses of its objectives. The sappers would attack in conjunction with a two-hour artillery barrage to paralyze four main targets: the city airfield, the 53rd and 44th Regiment base camps, the Mai Hac De ammunition storage facility, and the larger Phung Duc airfield east of town. The airfields were chosen so as to prevent escape or reinforcements, and Mai Hac De to foil any resupply efforts.
After the 198th hit its targets, the five attack columns would advance on the town. Their objectives were to seize the main six-way intersection in the town center, the 23rd Division headquarters, the Darlac province headquarters, and the 8th Cavalry’s base camp. The 316th Division would control three columns. One would hit from the northwest, another from the southeast, and a third from the southwest.18 Each column was supported by an anti-aircraft battalion. The northwestern and southwestern columns had a powerful additional punch—eight tanks and eight armored personnel carriers each.
The 10th Division formed a light headquarters to command the fourth and fifth columns, and to coordinate the return of the division from Quang Duc. The fourth prong was the 95B Regiment, the crack unit that had held the Quang Tri citadel for many days in 1972 in some of the toughest fighting of the war. The fifth spearhead was a lone infantry battalion from the 24th Regiment, 10th Division. Both of these columns were also strengthened with anti-aircraft battalions and armor. The 95B would smash from the northeast to secure the main six-way intersection, the city airfield, and the province headquarters. The 10th’s strike force would seize the 23rd Division headquarters in combination with the southwestern column. Two artillery brigades would fire in support of the attackers.
Dung and Thao staked everything on the initial assault. In essence, the plan was to commit virtually their entire force to a mad dash into the city, gambling that they could overwhelm Ban Me Thuot in one massive wave. Only one battalion from the 10th Division remained in reserve. If ARVN survived the first onslaught, and Phu was able to reinforce the defenders, Dung’s troops would be trapped in the open, cut off from any easy retreat.
The plan depended heavily on reaching the jump-off positions undetected. This was perhaps the most difficult aspect of the operation. The southeastern column marched for two days and nights, forded two rivers, and then crossed Route 14 undetected. The northern columns passed numerous settled areas and outposts. The armor units had a formidable task: depart from hiding spots some fifteen to twenty miles from the city without getting lost or stuck, cut through the thick forests, cross the wide and fast-flowing Srepok River on flotation devices, and then finally link up with their assigned attack columns. The artillery guns and the signal, engineer, and anti-aircraft units also had to maneuver into position undetected.
With Ban Me Thuot isolated, and Phu’s attention drawn to Pleiku and Route 19, the next phase of the Central Highlands campaign began in Quang Duc. On the afternoon of 7 March, the 10th Division command group met in the jungle west of Duc Lap to make the final decisions about the attack. Duc Lap was considered a formidable target. It was viewed as the southern flank of Ban Me Thuot. To protect it, ARVN had built five fortified strong-points around the town, with fighting positions, underground bunkers, and minefields. Defenders included an RF battalion, three artillery batteries, and the M-41 tanks.
Like Dung and Thao, the 10th Division commander, Senior Colonel Ho De, also decided to gamble everything on one great assault. Cognizant of his orders to win fast and return immediately to Darlac, Ho De made a plan similar to the one for Ban Me Thuot: bypass the strong-points on the outer perimeter and strike at three chief targets. They were the main military base, a 23rd Division tactical headquarters, and the district headquarters inside the town. Two battalions would strike each target. Division artillery would provide fire support. ARVN’s 24th Ranger Group in Quang Duc would be concurrently attacked by the B-2 Front’s recently formed 271B Regiment. After the 10th captured Duc Lap, the 271B would seize the rest of the province.
At 5:55 A.M. on 9 March, the 10th Division transmitted the attack order. For ninety minutes, the fifteen guns of the division’s artillery fired shells onto the three targets. As soon as the barrage lifted, the infantry was given the signal. At 9:30 A.M. the soldiers of the 10th Division overran the military base and the 23rd’s command post. The M-41 tank troop was also quickly eliminated. Only the assault against the district headquarters fared badly. The RF forces, supported by air strikes, fought back. Suddenly, however, the district commander broadcast an uncoded radio message that he was retreating. He requested air strikes to cover his withdrawal. Intercepting the message, the two PAVN battalions surged forward to catch the retreating RF.
It was a trap. As the North Vietnamese moved in, the RF troops ambushed them, inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing soldiers. By noon, the two battalions were forced to pull back and regroup for a strike the next day. The division engineers were ordered to build a road to the top of a nearby hill so that the PAVN troops could move two 85-mm guns to fire directly into the town. Working all night, the engineers successfully dragged the two guns to the hilltop. Attacking at first light, the 85-mm guns poured shells onto the RF defenses, crushing many bunkers. At 8:30 A.M. on 10 March, Duc Lap fell.19 Ban Me Thuot stood alone.
INTO THE STORM
On Route 19, the soldiers of Le Cau’s 47th Regiment withstood furious assaults by 3rd Division shock troops and artillery fire. Cau’s troops were strung out holding platoon- and company-sized positions along both sides of the road near the pass. Savage fighting occurred on many hilltops. PAVN artillery would blast away, followed by human-wave assaults. Once a position fell, Cau had to counterattack to regain it. Often, he personally led his troops to reclaim the lost positions. While his courageous efforts were inflicting heavy losses on the North Vietnamese, his casualties were also high. Outnumbered three to one, the attackers were slowly pushing him out of his positions. By late afternoon on 5 March, only one ARVN strong-point remained at the eastern entrance to the pass. If it fell, the pass would belong to the People’s Army. Cau now could only dig in and wait for reinforcements.
Using excellent close air support, the ARVN 42nd Regiment at Binh Khe had stymied the PAVN efforts to occupy the town. With the 47th Regiment unable to dislodge PAVN from the pass, Brigadier General Niem dispatched his 41st Regiment to replace the 42nd, sending that regiment to help Colonel Cau. That left Niem with only one regiment and RF/PF to cover hundreds of square miles along the heavily populated coast.
With the 41st Regiment occupying Binh Khe, on 7 March the 42nd Regiment moved to help Cau’s men wrest back control of the lost ground. The 42nd attacked to clear the area north of the eastern entrance, but was soon bogged down in the tough terrain. Fearful of the 22nd Division’s new efforts, on 8 March the 3rd Division attacked to destroy Cau’s remaining position. It changed hands several times, but after two days of ferocious fighting, Cau’s troops remained in control.
Despite heavy losses, the North Vietnamese would not relent. On 10 March, under orders from Dung to intensify the fighting and tie up the 22nd Division, PAVN threw an entire regiment at Cau’s forces. His 2nd Battalion was overrun and its commander killed. Brigadier General Niem had no choice; he pulled his 41st Regiment out of Binh Khe and raced it into the breach to replace the 47th Regiment. Cau’s troops had sustained 40 percent casualties while holding the pass area against the 3rd Division. Niem sent the 47th to defend northern Binh Dinh and recuperate. Before departing, he promoted Cau to colonel.
Meanwhile, on the morning of 9 March, Phu flew into Ban Me Thuot to see Colonel Vu The Quang, the deputy commander of the 23rd Division, and Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, the Darlac province chief, to discuss the city’s defenses. Luat was a career armor officer, and one of Nguyen Van Toan’s fair-haired boys. Luat had commanded the 2nd Division’s armor unit when Toan was the division commander, and he led the 1st Armor Brigade’s spearhead into Laos in February 1971 during the abortive Lam Son 719 incursion. Toan made him Darlac province chief shortly before Toan was relieved of command.
Luat met Phu at the airport, and took him to the 23rd Division headquarters in Ban Me Thuot. They were joined by Colonel Quang, Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong, and the Quang Duc province chief. The chief informed Phu that during the battle for Duc Lap, a document was captured identifying the 10th Division as the unit assaulting the town. After discussing the situation, Phu decided against attempting to recapture Duc Lap. He reviewed the defense plan for Ban Me Thuot, and ordered the city to be placed on 100 percent alert. Phu also sent the 21st Ranger Group (minus one battalion, which was supporting Thanh An) to reinforce the village of Buon Ho in Darlac province, twenty-five miles north of Ban Me Thuot on Route 14. If Duc Lap was Ban Me Thuot’s southern flank, Buon Ho was its northern flank. Phu expected it to be the next Communist target.
The 21st Rangers were led by Lieutenant Colonel Le Qui Dau, who had commanded one of the Ranger battalions that fought at An Loc in 1972. By late afternoon of 9 March, the Rangers had completed the helicopter lift into Buon Ho. From there they could move to recapture Thuan Man, or they could support Ban Me Thuot if needed. Additionally, Luat ordered one of his RF battalions at Ban Don to pull back to defend Ban Me Thuot. Despite the reinforcements, ARVN forces around the Darlac capital were thin. Regular Army units consisted of the 23rd Division Reconnaissance Company, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 53rd Regiment, and one M-113 troop from the 8th Cavalry. The rest were rear-echelon soldiers. Darlac sector forces included two RF battalions and local police. VNAF personnel were stationed at the two airfields.
At the same time Phu was discussing the city’s defenses, Dung was finalizing the last details of the attack. On the afternoon of 9 March, he sent a cable to Giap. In it he outlined the preparations for the Ban Me Thuot attack and reported the Duc Lap victory. In closing he noted that his troops and equipment were in good shape, and that the men’s morale was high.
On the afternoon of 9 March, Dung’s armor began to move to the Srepok River. The 316th Division engineers constructed wooden boats and bamboo rafts to cross the 250-yard-wide, crocodile-infested river. Cables were strung across the river to pull the rafts to the eastern bank. The armor was forbidden to cross the river until the artillery began firing, making the timetable very tight. At the same time, the sappers moved in close to town.
As the minutes ticked down to H-hour, Dung picked up the field telephone and called Thao at his campaign headquarters five miles west of Ban Me Thuot. The PAVN signal troops had just finished stringing the wire across the Srepok River. Dung asked for a status report. Thao replied that all columns reported they were ready. Dung told Thao to maintain close communications with him so that they could make decisions quickly and decisively. Finishing the call, Dung exclaimed, “I wish you victory!”20
“WE HAVE WON A GREAT VICTORY”
At 2:45 A.M. on 10 March, the sappers were in position. Three companies were right next to the barbed-wire fence at the city airfield on the north-eastern side of Ban Me Thuot. Another company totaling thirty-eight men slipped close to the Mai Hac De supply depot located in the southwestern corner of the city.
At 3:00 A.M. all the months of planning and debate, and the sweat and labor of thousands of soldiers, were realized when an officer shouldered his AK-47 at the city airfield and shot out its main searchlight. Immediately, a wave of satchel charges, mortar rounds, and rocket-propelled grenades exploded onto various sections of the airfield. At a second signal, 122-mm rockets began to rain down on the province headquarters and the 23rd Division command post. Sappers then swarmed onto the airfield, firing at guard positions. The Air Force technicians and RF troops manning the base fought back, but by 6:00 A.M. the sappers had secured one part of the airfield from the outgunned South Vietnamese guards. Shortly thereafter, one sapper company set out for the adjacent city center to capture the important six-way intersection. Meeting little resistance, the sappers quickly surrounded the crossroads and hunkered down to wait for the arrival of the tanks and infantry of the 95B Regiment.
While the attack on the city airfield was going on, the small sapper company at the Mai Hac De supply depot opened fire on the depot’s command center. The depot sat on a piece of land 1,300 yards long and 750 yards wide. Over sixty-four warehouses and open-air dumps holding ARVN’s largest ammunition supply in the Highlands were contained within the barbed-wire fences. Local Route 429 ran from the city alongside the depot to the Srepok River. After a sharp firefight, by 6:00 A.M. the depot commander had been killed and the depot captured.
Colonel Luat sent an RF company to counterattack. When the sappers beat off the first assault, the RF regrouped for a second wave, this time from two separate directions. Thao ordered the sappers to blow up several open-air ammo dumps to block one of the RF assault prongs, enabling the sappers to concentrate their firepower against the second prong.
The tactic worked. After three hours of fighting, the Regional Forces had not succeeded in recapturing the depot. Fortunately for the exhausted sappers, a battalion from the 316th Division’s southwest deep-penetration column arrived at that very moment to assist them. After several more hours spent cleaning out the remaining guards, the entire complex was theirs. Only eighteen of the thirty-eight sappers who began the attack were still alive.
