The new spies, p.46
The New Spies, page 46
There are other reasons for caution. Public protestations aside, many of the old KGB have simply donned new uniforms and overnight become staunch democrats. It is difficult to believe that all these thousands of men and women are genuine converts, and there is ample evidence that at many levels in the current Russian political system the levers are still being pulled by ex-KGB operators. At the wish of their political masters, most Western spy agencies, such as those in America, Germany and France, have been forced publicly to embrace the new KGB, exchanging delegations and declaring their chief spies in each other’s capitals. The single holdout has been Britain where the country’s obsession with secrecy has given the politicians greater freedom to act on evidence rather than impulse.
The revelations about the current state of Russia’s biological weapons programme suggests that Britain is right to be careful. Instead of obeying the orders of the democratically elected Russian President and shutting the programme, senior Russian military officers have continued to research and develop new genetically engineered weapons that can only be used in offensive operations. Yet Russia has officially disavowed any offensive military operations. Clearly, both the military and the intelligence services wish to retain independent options separate from political leaders. That suggests they retain military ambitions which have yet to be revealed.
Aside from Russia, the end of the Cold War has had the most dramatic effect in Britain. In the space of four years, the secrecy that surrounded the three principal intelligence organizations, SIS, the Security Service and GCHQ, has ended. Two new acts of parliament have brought the agencies out into the light, complete with a visible parliamentary oversight system. For a country like Britain, where the overwhelming majority are tolerant of a secret society in a way that would be illegal and unacceptable in America, these changes have been little short of revolutionary. They have been driven not by the political process, but by the intelligence agencies themselves, who believed that by being shut away they were losing touch with political reality. They recognized that if public confidence in what they do was to be maintained, they must be visible to defend themselves. There was a pragmatic side to this argument in that there was serious concern that if parliament had no understanding of their work and, presumably, no appreciation of how valuable that work is for the national interest, then the appetite for continuing to vote more than.£800m a year for their budget would disappear. Rather than be emasculated in the shadows, the intelligence services preferred to come out and fight their corner in the public gaze.
Some adjustments have been made to make all the British intelligence organizations more effective. The night of the long knives in SIS in December 1992 brought to power a new generation of younger leaders not so imbued with the rigidities of the Cold War era. SIS hopes that this younger blood will produce a more dynamic organization, better able to deal with the challenges of the future. SIS has adopted the same set of new priorities as the CIA or the SVR, but in Britain the Security Service has managed to gain more power and influence while SIS has been forced to reduce the scale of its operations.
Twenty years ago, the divisions were simple: SIS would gather intelligence abroad, including Ireland, while the Security Service would counter espionage and subversion at home. Today, MI5 is responsible for countering terrorism in Ireland and the rest of the world which involves actively gathering intelligence. The Security Service is also trying to gain a share of the proliferation action from SIS. Underlying these arguments is Box’s (MI5’s) conviction that where there is overlap, the Security Service should have precedence.
In the past, SIS had an enormous operation spread across the globe with a presence in nearly all the embassies the Foreign Office kept open. This was justified in part by the argument that SIS could recruit Eastern bloc spies in these far away places. In part, too, the British were anxious to maintain knowledge and influence in the remnants of the British Empire. Today, neither of these arguments holds true. There is still some need to recruit Russian spies but there is arguably more opportunity to do that in Russia itself or in the industrialized nations than in the developing world.
Interest in the former British Empire is declining as the countries that were once close to Britain go their ways and British dependence on traditional trading links is replaced by new relationships, particularly with the EC.
Inevitably, the influence of SIS will reduce, with officers being withdrawn from countries of marginal interest and redeployed to gather intelligence on the new threats. Already, SIS has shut stations in South Asia, Central and North Africa, Latin America and the Far East, and concentrates almost entirely on Europe, Southern Africa, the Middle East, China and Hong Kong.
This declining role means the divisions that currently exist between SIS and the Security Service will become ever more meaningless. With MI5 controlling the counter-terrorist effort, and the world of money laundering and drug trafficking becoming increasingly intermingled with terrorism, it makes sense for a single agency to control those three areas. Counter-espionage has always been an MI5 strength and, despite recent mistakes, continues to be so.
It seems clear that there are strong arguments to merge the two organizations. At a stroke, this would bring immediate economies of scale, eliminate the rivalry that still bedevils both organizations and produce a more efficient intelligence apparatus tuned to the needs of tomorrow rather than those of yesterday. The question then is, which organization survives. There are strengths in both operations. SIS has an outstanding record in recruiting and handling sources in the Eastern bloc; MI5 has a good record in countering Soviet espionage in Britain but has been much less effective against the modern IRA; neither body has done well against drugs or proliferation, but that is in part the fault of the policy makers.
The solution is to abolish both organizations and to create the British Intelligence Organization, a single body responsible to the cabinet office. This suggestion will be strongly resisted. The SIS worries that a merger with MI5 would bring with it all the counterculture of that organization. They argue, with some justification, that the Security Service tends to be plodding and unimaginative while SIS is allowed considerable latitude in its operations abroad. A merger, they say, would stifle the initiative that is the lifeblood of a successful spying agency. Both agencies also argue that they employ very different people for different tasks.
For their part, the Security Service would prefer to take over SIS by-stealth rather than lose its identity. But a new organization would be a sensible use of the smaller amount of money available from the taxpayer, would produce a coherent organization to combat the threats into the next century and would eliminate an inefficient and often incompetent bureaucracy which remains embedded in a culture of secrecy that should have been buried with the Cold War.
Such blueprints, whether they be for Britain, America, Russia or anywhere else are a tough call, if action is really expected on any of them. Whatever legal barriers or oversight systems are in place, the only people who understand intelligence are the people who work inside the intelligence services. To the outsider it remains a mysterious world, where a few extraordinary individuals armed with strange gadgets and often great courage can achieve miracles. This is a myth that has been perpetuated over the years by the community who, by careful leaking of the odd exciting tidbit to the politicians, have embraced the policy makers into their world. It is hardly surprising that it is the intelligence community that has inspected itself, pronounced itself in need of minor surgery and then given itself a clean bill of health. No outside body or group of individuals really understands what goes on in the closed world and so the intelligence community has been able to allow the end of the Cold War (an end none of them predicted) to slide by as if it was a small blip in their otherwise ordered lives.
The end of the Cold War should have produced a massive upheaval in the intelligence community, not just a shifting of priorities or a scaling back of budgets. The rationale behind whole areas vanished along with the Soviet Union and with their disappearance, such agencies or directorates should have been swept away as well. It is not too late, particularly under the impetus of a Democratic administration in Washington. True reform will produce a leaner, more efficient and responsive intelligence community which will enable the policy makers to take the right decisions based on the right information. The status quo leaves too many of the old practices intact with little evidence that the intelligence community is ready to face the fast changing, frightening world that lies ahead.
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APPENDIX I – Intelligence Agencies
GERMANY
Militarischer Abschirm Dienst (MAD)
5000 Koln 1
Postfach 10 01 06
Telephone: 0221 37 00 26 57
Facsimile: 0221 34 13 61
Director Dr Rudolf von Hoegen
Staff of approximately 1,500. MAD is in charge of internal security of the armed forces and is under the control of the Federal Ministry of Defence.
BundesNachrichten Dienst (BND)
Bonn
82-042 Pullach
Postfach 120
Telephone: 089 793 0190
Facsimile: 089 793 0620
President Konrad Porzner
Vice President Dr Paul Munstermann
Staff of approximately 6,000. BND collects information on international developments outside of Germany. It is supervised by the Federal Chancellery and under parliamentary control.
BundesKriminal Amt
PF 18 20
Thaerstrasse 11
6200 Wiesbaden
Telephone: 0611 511
Facsimile: 0611 552323
President Hans Ludwig Zachert
Spokesman Brunhilde Spies-Mohr
Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV)
Merianstrasse 100
W-5000 Koln 71
Telephone: 0221 7920
President Dr Eckart Werthebach
Staff of approximately 2,000. The BfV (Office of the protection of the Constitution) is an internal intelligence organization which is subordinate to the Minister of the Interior.
CHINA
International Liaison Department (ILD)
Head Zhu Liang
Deputy Head Li Shuzheng
Deputy Head Jiang Guanghua
Deputy Head Zhu Shanqing
Deputy Head Li Chengren
Secretary General Li Beihai
Advisor Tang Mingzhao
Advisor Zhang Zhixiang
Advisor Ou Tangliang
Advisor Liu Zinquan
Advisor Zhang Xiangshan
Advisor Tian Yiming
Spokesperson Wu Xingtang
Asian Bureau Director ?
Deputy Director Duan Yuanpei
African Bureau Director Xu Qingshan
European Bureau Director Zhu Dacheng
Research Centre Director Wu Xingtang
Develops relationships with communist revolutionary groups and Socialist labour parties worldwide. Engages in both overt and covert activities.
Military Intelligence Department (MID)
Subordinate to General Staff. Emphasis on order of battle, foreign military capabilities, foreign weapons systems. Politico-military and military-strategic emphasis. Photographic reconnaissance.
Ministry of State Security (MSS)
14 Dongchangan Jie, Dongcheng Dist.
Beijing
Telephone: 01 553871
Minister Jia Chunwang
Director (Foreign Affairs Division) Guan Ping
Emphasis on counter-espionage, prevention of ‘leaks’ to foreign press. Founded in 1983, is known to be overzealous, conspicuous, and has had several setbacks.
New China News Agency (NCNA)
Collects and disseminates news in China and abroad. Also used as cover for espionage.
Science and Technology Department
Director Wang Tongye
Signals intelligence from ships, submarines and stations. Department is subordinate to Ministry of Defence.
FRANCE
Direction des Affairs Strategiques (DAS)
Director Jean Claude Mallet
Staff of approximately 25. Follows international negotiations related to defence and also carries out defence planning work.
Direction du Protection et de la Securite de la Defense (DPSD)
Deputy Director Claude Menard
Emphasis on military intelligence, formerly Securite Militaire.
Direction du Renseignement Militaire (DRM)
Director General Jean Heinrich
Staff of approximately 500. Emphasis on military and space intelligence. The DRM is supposedly based in Creil (Oise), where the Satellite Imaging Interpretation Centre is located. Structurally, the DRM is divided into 5 subdirectorates: Research, Operations, Arms Proliferation, Techniques, and Human Resources/Administration.
Directorate for Strategic Evolution
Director Jean Claude Cousseran
Most likely located in the prime minister’s office, but not sure. The Directorate is responsible for DRM’s political forecasting.
Directorate for Surveillance of the Territory (DST)
Staff of approximately 2-5 thousand (1988 figure). Emphasis on counterespionage, counter-intelligence, surveillance of embassies, protection of classified information. The DST is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior.
Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE)
141, Boulevard Mortier
75020 Paris
Telephone 40 65 30 11
Director General Jacques Dewatre
(Appointed recently following a debacle in Central Africa)
Director of Cabinet Andre Boix
Director Michael la Carriere
Director Jean Claude Tressens
Director Jerome Ventre
Staff of approximately 3,500. Emphasis on industrial/economic intelligence, terrorism, human intelligence.
Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale (SGDN)
51, bd de Latour-Maubourg (7e)
75700 Paris
Telephone 45 55 30 11
SGDN is a military intelligence agency that serves the prime minister, and is in charge of civil defence.
Traitement du Reseignement et Action contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins (Tracfin)
Created in 1990, Tracfin is responsible for the fight against drug money laundering. Hopes to increase powers to include working against organized crime. Not responsible for legal operations or making arrests. The office is most likely located in the Ministry of Interior, but not sure.
JAPAN
Cabinet Research Office (Naicho)
1-6-1 Negate cho Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100
Telephone: (81 3) 3581 2361 (number for the prime minister’s office)
Staff of approximately 122 (1986 figure). Naicho provides the prime minister with analyses and studies to aid in making foreign and defence policy. Budget in 1986: $25 million.
Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2-2-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100
Telephone: (81 3) 3580 3311 (number for Foreign Ministry)
The Bureau collects, distributes and analyzes information on foreign affairs.
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
1-3-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100
Telephone: (81 3) 3501 1511
Minister: Yoshiro Mori
MITI has a staff of approximately 15,000 (1983 figure). Collects and analyzes information on trade, commerce, markets and technological developments; it has management, organizational and technical knowledge. Also, Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) is part of MITI, and collects information worldwide. It has 270 employees in 81 cities, 59 countries, 1,200 analysts, and a budget of $130 million annually (1986 estimate).
Japan Defence Agency (Boeicho)
9-7-45 Akasaka Minato-ku Tokyo 107
Telephone: (81 3) 3408 5211
Bureau of Defence Policy
Director, 1st Defence Intelligence Division: Shigeaki Ishikawa
Extension 2044
Director, 2nd Defence Intelligence Division: Takehiko Shimaguchi Extension 3175
Joint Staff Council
JSC is equivalent to a Defence Staff in other countries’ MODs with the chairman of the JSC reporting directly to the Minister of State for Defence.
Director, Intelligence: Rear Adm. Tadashi Satoh
Ground Self-Defence Force (Nibetsu)
7-45 Aksada 9-chome
Minato-ku
Tokyo 107
Telephone: (81 3) 3408 5211
Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force
9-7-45 Akasaka
Minato-ku
Tokyo 107
Telephone: (81 3) 3408 5211
Intelligence Department
Director: Rear Adm. Makoto Ikari
Chief, 1st Intelligence Division: Capt. Yasuo Wakabayashi
Chief, 2nd Intelligence Division: Capt. Gentaro Hiraga
Produces naval intelligence on countries of regional importance. May supervise monitoring of naval movements near Japan.
Japan Air Self-Defence Force
9-7-45 Akasaka
Minato-ku
Tokyo 107
Telephone: (81 3) 3408 5211
Intelligence Department
Director: Maj. Gen. Goroh Kondo
Chief, 1st Intelligence Division: Col. Norimasa Nishida
Chief, 2nd Intelligence Division: Col. Tegsusaku Takechi
Produces intelligence on air forces or regional powers. May supervise imaging for Japanese military. Airborne operations conducted by 501 Flight Squadron (Hyakuri Air Base).
