Safe for democracy, p.112
Safe for Democracy, page 112
111 “If you think you can run this operation without United Fruit”: Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit (New York, Doubleday, 1982), quoted p. 110.
112 “Preliminary Conditioning” et seq.: CIA, PB/Success Plan, November 12, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, p. 137.
112 is a top priority operation”: CIA, “Contact Report,” November 16, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954: Guatemala, quoted p. 140.
113 “public opinion” et seq.: Time, January 11, 1954, quoted p. 27.
114 “But Arbenz became president in a free election”: Phillips, Night Watch, quoted p. 34.
114 “supported and partially controlled by CIA”: CIA, “Proposed PP Program, Stage Two, FRUS PBSUCCESS,” January 25, 1954 (Declassified CIA Historical Review Program, 2003).
114 “in line so they would allow this revolutionary activity”: Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, quoted p. 140.
115 “would be projected”: CIA, Cable 45998, April 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954: Guatemala, p. 231.
115 “ridiculous”: Time, January 11, 1954, p. 27.
116 “for disposal by [the] Junta Group”: CIA, “Selection of Individuals for Disposal by Junta Group,” March 31, 1954 (declassified CIA/CSI July 11, 1995).
116 “Continue the good work”: CIA, Memo, “Director’s Visit,” March 31, 1954 (declassified CIA/HRP, 2003).
116 “the $64-question”: CIA, Memorandum, “Disadvantages and Damage Resulting from a Decision to Discontinue or Substantially Modify PBSUCCESS,” April 15, 1954 (declassified CIA/HRP, 2003). A marginal note on this document indicates it was presented by DDO Frank Wisner to Assistant Secretary of State Henry F. Holland. The money reference is to an early predecessor of a television quiz show of that era, “The 64,000 Dollar Question.”
117 “We have the full green light”: CIA, “Contact Report,” April 28, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954: Guatemala, quoted p. 262.
117 “Headquarters had never received” et seq.: ibid., p. 263.
118 “reign of terror”: Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 425.
118 “agents of international communism”: ibid., p. 424.
119 “outpost” of the “communist dictatorship”: Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 493.
119 “I think the State Department made a bad mistake”: Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Diary of James C. Hagerty (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 68. Hagerty referred to the principle of innocent passage, without foreign search or seizure, in the international law of the sea.
120 “What do you think Castillo-Armas’s chances would be” et seq.: Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, quoted p. 425–426.
121 “If you use my airfields”: Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, quoted p. 193.
121 “went beyond the established limits of policy”: Tom Wicker, et al., “A Plot Scuttled,” New York Times, April 28, 1966, quoted p. 28. In a September 1979 interview with Schlesinger and Kinzer, however, Bissell qualified his admission somewhat: “You can’t take an operation of this scope, draw narrow boundaries of policy around them, and be absolutely sure those boundaries will never be overstepped” (Bitter Fruit, quoted p. 194).
122 “ ”In Iran a Mossadegh, and in Guatemala an Arbenz”: Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York, New American Library, 1965), pp. 207–208.
7: ADVENTURES IN ASIA
131 “covert activity within China”: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, “Military Support to Anti-Communist Groups in China,” JSPC 958/15, February 16, 1952 (declassified April 19, 1976), Section L, Paragraph 1, Declassified Documents Reference Service.
132 “Yeah, and I’m going to be commandant”: Frank Holober, Raiders of the China Coast: CIA Covert Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1999), quoted p. 142. Much of the discussion of the offshore island campaign draws from this CIA memoir.
135 “this adventure has cost us heavily”: State Department Cable, [August 15, 1951] FRUS 1951, v. 6, p. 288.
136 “Mr. Ambassador, I have it cold” et seq.: David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York, Vintage Books, 1964), quoted p. 131.
137 “What could be more ridiculous”: Chester Bowles, Ambassador’s Report (New York, Harper and Row, 1954), quoted p. 233.
137 “nothing but difficulty” et seq.: White House Office of the Staff Secretary, “Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President,” May 29, 1959 (declassified October 31, 1985), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers (hereafter DDEL:DDEP): White House Office (hereafter WHO): Office of the Staff Secretary (hereafter OSS): Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, box 14, folder “Intelligence Briefing Notes, v. I (7).”
141 “we are already making [a] contribution”: State Department Cable, Heath to Dulles, February 15, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, v. 13, p. 1048.
142 “that would tend to keep our participation in the background”: Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, quoted p. 364.
143 “such a unit will always be useful as a ready striking force” et seq.: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), “Outline Plan for the Activation of an International Volunteer Air Group,” April 26, 1954 (declassified February 18, 1986). DDEL:DDEP: WHO: Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (hereafter OSANSA): Special Assistant series, Name subseries, box 3, folder “I-General.”
8: “ACCEPTABLE NORMS OF HUMAN CONDUCT DO NOT APPLY”
147 “Alternative C” et seq.: Solarium Study, July 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, v. 2, Pt. 1, pp. 416, 419, 418.
147 “a departure from our traditional concepts”: Eisenhower quoted in Washington Post, December 7, 1984.
147 “who gets it and who gets hurt”: Minutes of the NSC Meeting of July 30, 1953, FRUs 1952–1954, v. 2, Pt. 1, p. 439.
148 “equate the costs of the overall efforts to the results achieved”: Letter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to James H. Doolittle, July 26, 1954, DDEL:DDEP: Ann Whitman File (hereafter AWF): Administration series, box 14, folder “Dulles, Allen W. (4).”
149 “As long as it remains national policy” et seq.: White House, “Report of the Special Study Group on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency” (Doolittle Report), September 30, 1954 (declassified April 1, 1976), pp. 1, 2, Declassified Documents Reference Service, Fiche 78-139(c).
149 “like topsy” et seq.: Eisenhower-Doolittle Meeting, October 19, 1954, Ann Whitman Notes, October 19, 1954. DDEL:DDEP: AWF: Administration series, box 14, folder” Dulles, Allen W. (4).”
150 “I’m not going to be able to change Allen”: Leary, Central Intelligence Agency, quoted p. 74. Leary reprints the excellent study of the history of the intelligence community written by Church Committee staff analyst Anne Karalekas, from which this is drawn.
150 “shall be the normal channel for giving policy approval” et seq.: NSC, “National Security Council Directive on Covert Operations,” NSC5412/1, March 12, 1955 (declassified March 6, 1977), p. 3, DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSANSA: Special Assistant Series, Presidential subseries, box 2, folder “President’s Papers 1955 (7).”
150–1 “The NSC has determined” et seq.: NSC 5412/2, December 28, 1955, reprinted in Leary, Cental Intelligence Agency, pp. 146–147.
152 “Well, I guess I’ll have to fudge the truth a little” et seq.: Tom Braden, “What’s Wrong with the CIA,” Saturday Review, April 5, 1975, quoted p. 24.
152 “It’s not a question of reluctance”: Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970), quoted p. 169.
153 “Fellows, tell me this”: quoted in a talk by former NSC staffer Karl G. Harr, transcript in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed., The Eisenhower Presidency (Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 1984), p. 108.
153 Eisenhower Policy Papers: NSC-143 series; NSC-158, “U.S. Objectives and Actions to Exploit Unrest in Eastern Europe;” NSC-5505/1, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” February 1955; NSC 5505/1, Progress Report, December 14, 1955; NSC-5608/1, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, July 18, 1956. All are available in DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSANSA: NSC Series, Policy Papers subseries.
154 “I have always regarded it as one of the major coups of my tour”: Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, p. 80.
154 “Wisner says you think we ought to release” et seq.: Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington, D.C., Acropolis Books, 1976), p. 164.
154 “pending a decision as to what”: Letter, Allen Dulles to Dillon Anderson, May 31, 1956 (declassified September 10, 1984), DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSANSA: Special Assistant Series, Subject series, box 10, folder “USSR (1).” In his Craft of Intelligence, Allen Dulles says no more than that the speech was printed by the State Department. Eisenhower’s memoir is entirely silent on the matter.
155 “All hell has broken loose in Budapest”: Cord Meyer, Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA (New York, Harper and Row, 1980), quoted p. 127.
156 “no RFE broadcast”: CIA Memorandum, “Radio Free Europe,” November 20, 1956 (declassified March 15, 1982), DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSS, Subject Series, Alpha subseries, box7, folder “CIA v. I (4).”
156 “fairly clearly implies” et seq.: Jane Perlez, “Archives Confirm False Hope Fed Hungary Revolt,” New York Times, September 28, 1996, quoted p. 2. British journalist Noel Barber, who covered the rising and would be wounded in Hungary, considers RFE to have been highly damaging to Imre Nagy’s cause. Barber cites a constant stream of criticisms of Nagy’s efforts to forestall Soviet intervention, quoting an RFE military expert who declared the cease-fire accommodation a “Trojan Horse” gambit, as well as other broadcasts advocating rejection of Nagy’s cabinet, rejecting the leadership of the defense and foreign ministries (which were loyal to Nagy, not to the Soviets), and instructing listeners on how to make Molotov cocktails at a time when Nagy was trying to calm the situation. Noel Barber, Seven Days to Freedom: The Hungarian Rising of 1956 (New York, Stein and Day, 1974), pp. 62, 128–30. Of the ninety RFE personnel involved in the Hungarian broadcasts, only the individual responsible for the Molotov cocktail episode is known to have been dismissed.
156 “Where are the Americans?”: Jeffrey Blyth, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, October 3, 1996, p. A22.
156 “In the Western capitals”: Perlez, “Archives Confirm.”
156 “an excess of exhuberance”: Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983), pp. 91–104.
156–7 “Radio Free Europe was regularly sending guidances”: Frances S. Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Art and Letters (New York: New York Press, 1999), quoted p. 303.
157 “as inaccessible to us as Tibet”: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: White House Years, 1956–1960 (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1965), p. 95.
158 “exactly the end for which the agency’s paramilitary capability was designed” et seq.: Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, p. 134–135.
158 “it was clear that the steady barrage”: Rositzke, CIA’s Secret Operations, p. 158.
158 “I am satisfied that RFE did not plan”: Meyer, Facing Reality, p. 125.
158 “a few of the scripts reviewed do indicate”: Letter, Allen Dulles to Andrew Goodpaster, attaching CIA memorandum, “Radio Free Europe,” November 20, 1956 (declassified March 15, 1982), paragraph 4, pp. 3–4, DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSS: Subject series, Alphabetical subseries, box 7, folder” CIA, v. I (4).”
159 “whatever doubt may have existed in the Agency”: Colby, Honorable Men, p. 135.
159–60 “brutal” and “was in truth a saturation effort”: Lyman D. Kirkpatrick, The Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 147–148.
160 “buccaneers” and “informality”: Thomas, The Very Best Men, quoted p. 149. Also see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York, Ballantine Books, 1979), pp. 490–492.
160 “as far as we have been able to determine”: Memorandum, James R. Killian to Dwight D. Eisenhower, December 20, 1956 (declassified October 30, 1996), DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSANSA: NSC Series, Subject subseries, box 7, folder “PBCFIA First Report (1).”
160–1 “increasingly concerned about the security” et seq.: NSC Memorandum, “Discussion at the Special Meeting in the President’s Office on Thursday, January 17, 1957,” January 18, 1957 (declassified August 11, 1997), DDEL: DDEP folder “PBCFIA First Report (2).”
161 “The President replied facetiously”: NSC, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 352nd Meeting of the NSC, January 22, 1958,” January 23, 1958 (declassified July 18, 1989), p. 4, DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSANSA: NSC Series, box 9, folder “352nd Meeting of the NSC.”
39: ARCHIPELAGO
162 “that plans to undertake a coup”: Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand (New York, W. W. Norton, 1980), p. 180.
165 “Mossadegh example”: Douglas Little, “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 5 (November 2004), quoted p. 694.
165 “We came to power on a CIA train”: Said K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge (New York, Bloomsbury, 2000), quoted p. 59.
165 “I spent most of my time”: Miles Copeland, The Game Player (London: Aurum Press, 1989), p. 168.
167 “I think it’s time we held Sukarno’s feet to the fire”: Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, quoted p. 205.
168 “if some plan for doing this were not forthcoming”: ibid.
168 “I think it’s fair to say”: Richard M. Bissell interview, Eisenhower Oral History no. 382, p. 16.
169 “the breakup of Indonesia”: Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (Melbourne, Mandarin Australia, 1990), quoted p. 70.
169 “Then you got the green light” et seq.: Allen Dulles to Foster Dulles Telephone Notes, September 16, 1957, 4:11 P.M. DDEL: John Foster Dulles Papers (hereafter JFDP): Telephone Series (hereafter TS): box 7, folder “September–October 1957 (3).”
169 “continue the present pattern of our formal relations”: NSC, Agenda Note, September 21, 1957 (declassified August 6, 1982), paragraph 6 (c). DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSANSA: Special Assistant series, Chronological subseries, box 5, folder “September 1957 (2).”
170 “We’ll drive Lebanon off the front page”: Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, quoted p. 240.
170 “extremely significant” et seq.: Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles Telephone Notes, November 29, 1957, 10:58 A.M. DDEL: JFDP: TS, box 7, folder “November–December 1957 (2).” Although Ambassador Allison strove to contain Washington adventurism, he relented in this cable cited by Foster. Allison apparently refers to the same cable in this passage of his memoirs: “We told the State Department it would be necessary to give these people active encouragement if their efforts were to bear fruit. We did not believe, as Washington seemed to, that it would be sufficient to indicate that if a satisfactory new regime was formed, the United States would promptly open negotiations on aid programs. . . . I said we believed it was essential to determine in advance what we were prepared to do for such a government and if this was known, it would give those working for a change added leverage to bring it about.” John M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 336.
170 “Probably the failure to do so would look suspicious”: Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles Telephone Notes, December 1, 1957, 12:51 P.M., DDEL: JFDP: TS, box 7, folder “November–December 1957 (2).”
170 “If this thing goes on the way it is”: Allen Dulles to Foster Dulles Telephone Notes, December 8, 1957, 10:10 A.M., ibid.
171 “what he would like” et seq.: Foster Dulles to Christian Herter Telephone Notes, December 8, 1957, 10:16 A.M., ibid.
171 “will get the British with us”: Foster Dulles to Hugh Cumming Telephone Notes, December 12, 1957, 10:46 A.M., ibid.
171 “having some amphibious equipment”: John Foster Dulles, Telephone Memo, December 7, 1957, 5:57 PM. A.M., DDEL: JFD Papers, Telephone series, box 7, folder “November–December 1957 (1).”
171 “Everything is going all right”: Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles Telephone Notes, January 8, 1958, 5:26 P.M., DDEL: JFDP: TS, box 8, folder “Memoranda of Telephone Conversations—General, February 1, 1958–March 31, 1958 (4).”
171 “Padang Group” et seq.: CIA, “Probable Developments in Indonesia,” TS-141712-d, January 31, 1958 (declassified October 1985), pp. 1, 3, 4, 10, DDEL:DDEP: WHO: OSANSA: ANSC Series, Briefing Notes subseries, box 11, folder “U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia.”
172 “During the stalling period”: Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles Telephone Notes, February 4, 1958, 9:58 A.M. JFDT: TS, folder “January–March 1958 (3).”
172 “the subject of Archipelago came up”: Allen Dulles to Foster Dulles Telephone Notes, February 5, 1958, ibid.
173 “disgusted” and “you should know” et seq.: Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, p. 336.
173 “The great problem confronting us”: Editorial Note on February 27, 1958, NSC Meeting, Department of State, FRUS 1958–1960, v. xvii, Indonesia, p. 49.
173–4 “The Secretary said he does not know”: Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles Telephone Notes, February 27, 1958, 4:20 P.M. JFDP: TS, folder “January–March 1958 (2).” I have substituted the name “Allen” for “A” in these notes, as well as the word “Secretary” for the abbreviation “Sec” where they appear in this quotation.
174 “without intrusion from without”: New York Times, February 21, 1958.
175 “the Boss’ deep interest” et seq.: John Foster Dulles, Telephone Memo, April 15, 1958, 2:40 P.M. FRUS, 1958–1960, v. xvii, pp. 108–109.
176 “has happened with far greater efficiency and speed”: Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles Telephone Notes, April 17, 1958, 12:31 P.M. JFDP: TS, box 8, folder “April–May 1958 (3).”
177 “the East is boiling”: Foster Dulles to Allen Dulles Telephone Notes, April 28, 1958, ibid., folder “April–May 1958 (2).”
