Third reich victorious, p.34
Third Reich Victorious, page 34
*23. From an interview with Johnny ‘Boy’ Griffen, survivor of the carrier engagement of 12 September 1939, by the author (English Ghetto, Marseille, France, 1971).
*24. Two battalions, some 96 tanks, of the SS Panzer brigade had been equipped with snorkels and special waterproofing, allowing them to be dropped offshore and to advance across the seabed to emerge from the sea alongside the landing craft of the infantry. {In reality, the German army designed such tanks for the never implemented Operation Sea Lion, and actually used them during the invasion of Russia.]
*25. Einstein-Raeder, Elise, Heavy Water, Deadly Fire (Finkle Press, Madgeburg, 1983), pp. 153-68. Professor Einstein-Raeder also defends the use of the first atomic bombs against Moscow, speculating that had the United States possessed similar weapons of mass destruction in 1945 it would have used them against Japan rather than incur the nearly 1,000,000 casualties necessitated by the invasion of that country.
2 Disaster At Dunkirk The Defeat Of Britain, 1940
1. Cull, Selling War, p. 34.
2. See Badsey, Stephen, ‘British High Command and the Reporting of the Campaign’, in Bond and Taylor, The Battle for France and Flanders.
3. Butler, Grand Strategy, Volume 11, p. 269; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume I, pp. 515–19
4. Deighton, Blitzkrieg, p. 244.
5. Bond, Chief of Staff p. 316.
6. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, p. 32.
7. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, p. 8.
8. Deighton, Blitzkrieg, p. 258; Colville, Man of Valour, p. 217.
9. See Badsey, in Bond and Taylor, The Battle for France and Flanders 1940.
10. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives p. 29; Legro, Cooperation under Fire, pp. 94–143.
11. Lindsay, Forgotten General, pp. 140–1.
12. Milligan, Adolf Hitler. My Part in His Downfall, pp. 24–40.
13. Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality, pp. 104–14; Roberts, The Holy Fox, pp. 231–6.
14. Calder, The People’s War, p. 93.
15. Glover, Invasion Scare 1940, p. 99.
16. Schenk, Invasion of England 1940, p. 25.
17. Deighton, Fighter, p. 262.
18. Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI, p. 460.
19. Calder, The People’s War, p. 194.
20. Cox, Operation Sea Lion, p. 155.
21. Long, To Benghazi p. 307.
22. Glover, Invasion Scare 1940, p. 114.
23. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, p. 593.
4 The Storme And The Whirlwind Zhukov Strikes First
1. Boog, Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, p. 318.
2. Ibid., p. 325. Estimate as of 20 June 1941.
3. Ibid, p. 343.
4. Ibid., p. 340; Haupt, Army Group Center, pp. 18–19.
*5. Hitler, Adolf, Germany’s Supreme Warlord, 22 volumes (Das Reich, Berlin, 1950), Vol. 2, p. 228. Unless otherwise cited, all references to Hitler are from this work.
6. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union, pp. 88–91. See also Suvorov, Ledokol and Den’ ‘M’.
*7. Taken from Zhukov, General of the Army Georgi K., Operation Storm, 2 volumes (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1954), Vol I, pp. 102–22. Unless otherwise cited all references to Zhukov are from this work. Zhukov survived twelve years in a Soviet prison camp before being released and allowed to publish this account.
8. Viktor Anfilov, ‘Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov,’ in Shukman, Stalin’s Generals, p. 343.
9. Glantz & House, When Titans Clashed, p. 41.
10. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union, pp. 88–91.
11. Hoffmann, Joachim, ‘The Soviet Union up to the Eve of the German Attack’, in Boog, The Attack on the Soviet Union, pp. 78–81 and Boog, Horst, ‘Military Concepts of the War with Russia’, in Boog, The Attack on the Soviet Union, p. 352.
12. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 66.
13. Radzievskiy, Tankovyi Udar, p. 8.
14. Ibid, p. 9.
15. Ibid., p. 22. Sovetskie Tankovye Voiska 1941–1945, p. 22.
16. Andreev, Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941–1945, Volume 1, p. 475.
17. Spick, Luftwaffe Fighter Aces, p. 78. Schiess scored 67 air victories during the war.
18. The Soviet Air Force in World War II, p. 38; See also Horst Boog et al., Volume IV, Maps.
19. The Soviet Air Force in World War 11, p. 39.
20. ‘Single Engine Fighters 28.06.41’, in German Order of Battle—Statistics as of Quarter Years 1938-1945, HRA 137.306-14 on microfilm roll A 1128, US Strategic Bombing Survey, Military Analysis Division, USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
21. Spick, op. cit., pp. 78–9.
*22. Danilov, General of the Army VI., Official History of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II, 12 volumes (Voenizdat, Moscow, 2000), Vol. 2, p. 114. Unless otherwise cited all references to Red Army operations are from this work.
23. Boog, p. 93.
24. Ibid.
25. For the organisation and order of battle of Soviet airborne forces on the eve of the German invasion, see Glantz, David M., Research Survey No. 4 The Soviet Airborne Experience (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, November 1984), pp. 21–2, 26.
26. Based on an actual experience of the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division during World War II. See Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers, 101–03.
27. For an English translation, see the edition of Schlieffen’s Cannae cited in the bibliography above.
*28. Rommel, General Field Marshal Erwin, ed., Official History of the German Armed Forces in World War II, 10 volumes (Das Reich, Berlin, 1960), Vol. 3, p. 98. Unless otherwise cited, all references to German armed forces operations are from this work.
29. Stoves, 1st Panzer Division History, 1939–1945, p. 882.
30. This is the actual number of tanks in the four Panzer formations, which, in reality, arrived in the Eastern Front after the beginning of Barbarossa. See Jentz, Panzer Truppen, Vol. I, pp. 212–3 ‘Panzer Units Sent to the Eastern Front After the Start of the Campaign’. For the number of horses in the 1st Cavalry Division, see Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry 1939–1945, pp. 238–40.
*31. Extracted from Rommel, General Field Marshal Erwin, Rommel hat nach Gomel gegangen! (Das Reich, Berlin, 1942), pp. 99–224. Unless otherwise cited all references to Rommel or the operations of his Panzer group are from this work.
*32. Extracted from Schulenberg, Count Friedrich Werner von, Victory in the East: The Second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Das Reich, Berlin, 1942), p. 302.
5 The Hinge1 Alamein to Basra, 1942
1. ‘If Egypt had fallen, the hinge of three continents would have snapped’, Nicolson, Alex, p. 152.
2. Quotation taken from Nicolson’s summary of the Alexander/Montgomery view in late August, ibid., p. 158.
3. On 1 July 1916 the British Fourth Army on the Somme had suffered 58,000 casualties killed and wounded in less than a day.
4. Barnett, The Desert Generals, p. 198.
5. The daily ‘WC’ reports, sent from 20 July onwards, Richardson, Flashback, p. 104.
*6. The day would become popularly known as ‘Palm Sunday’, from the many hands that began to be raised to the sky in surrender, although in statistical fact far more prisoners would be captured on the following day, Monday 6th.
*7. The codename ‘Locust’ was the inspiration of some bright spark from GHQ who had read his Bible around Exodus 10, shortly after dining well in Shepheard’s Hotel.
6 Into The Caucasus The Turkish Attack on Russia, 1942
1. Statistics drawn from Ziemke & Bauer Moscow to Stalingrad, pp. 283–95.
2. Actual quote cited in Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945, p. 506.
3. Actual quotes taken from ‘Decisions Affecting the Campaign in Russia (1941/1942)’, US Army, European Command Historical Division, MS #C-067b; and Ziemke & Bauer, p. 296. Both are from Halder, but the second actually dates to November 1941, before the great defeats of the winter.
4. Actual quotes from May and March 1942, cited in Kershaw, pp. 513–14.
5. Hitler on 5 August 1942 quoted in Boog, et al., Der Globale Krieg, vol. VI of Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg, p. 117.
6. Actual Jodl assessment quoted in Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 225. The Bulgarian Army was seen as keeping Turkey in check.
7. An actual incident from early 1941 recorded by the Sicherheitsdienst officer in the Ankara embassy, in Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, pp. 7–9.
8. On Papen’s recommendation, Hitler did write a letter to Inönü in February 1941 and the Germans hosted General Erden on a tour of the Eastern Front in November of that year.
9. Quotes paraphrased from Weber, The Evasive Neutral, p. 146 citing exchanges between the German Foreign Ministry and von Papen in May 1942.
10. Fall Gertrud was actually the German contingency plan for military occupation of Turkey, Schramm, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, vol. III, pp. 1349-50.
11. Actual quote cited in Oender, Die türkische Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 150.
12. Hitler quote from 23 November 1940 in Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War, p. 112.
13. Von Papen quote from 13 May 1941 in ibid., p. 117.
14. The quote refers to Inönü’s attitude toward the briefing he received from Erden after the latter’s tour of the Eastern Front in 1941. Cited in ibid., p. 131.
15. Papen, Memoirs, p. 479.
16. Actual quotes from Turkish officers in Deringil, pp. 38–9. Thanks to Mr. David Ryan for invaluable assistance with order of battle data, and to Mr. Rudi Garcia for concept review. Thanks also to Ms. Kate Flaherty, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives, for prompt and courteous help with the photos.
17. The second quote is actually from a historian, the first is from a British air attache’s report in 1937. Both in ibid., pp. 33–5.
18. Actual quote in Schultz, Reverses on the Southern Wing, p. 145. The German corps was actually organised as indicated under General de Angelis.
19. Quotes are actual. Hitler quote in Lucas, Hitler’s Mountain Troops, p. 133. Actual assessment of the British Chiefs of Staff, March 1940 in Deringil., p. 94.
20. Quotes from Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. III, pp. 83–103.
21. Though little known, the Allied units mentioned here and later actually served in the Middle East, Iraq and Iran during the second half of 1942, though often at reduced strength. Of the British forces, only XXII Corps and ‘Northern Iraq Force’ arc invented. The Soviet 71st, 72nd and 73rd Armies are invented, but represent likely command arrangements in the face of an invasion. The Transcaucasus Front and 12th Army were real, but had been disestablished by October 1942; they are retained here for command and control purposes. The Soviet 53rd Army was in Central Asia.
22. Quotes from actual reports in Border Troops in the Great Patriotic War, pp. 450ff.
23. First quote is actual, cited in Schramm, vol. II, p. 617. Second quote is fictional.
24. Actual Stalin quote on 12 September 1942 cited in Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, p. 189.
25. The planning for an American armoured division and for a major US air presence in the Middle East or Persia/Iraq are actual.
7 Known Enemies And Forced Allies Sicily and Kursk, 1943
1. The Italians were not the only German ally to lose armies on the Eastern Front. The Romanian Third and Fourth Armies were destroyed in the fighting around Stalingrad as well.
2. Unlike Italy, Romania and Bulgaria, Finland was not Germany’s ‘ally’. The small country was a ‘co-belligerent’ and had joined the war to redress the results of the Winter War of 1939 with the Soviet Union. Finland called its participation the ‘War of Continuation’.
3. The 1943 Soviet tank army was an organisation consisting of two tank corps and one mechanised corps, plus supporting units. It totaled 37-45,000 men and 6-700 tanks. It was the equivalent of a German Panzer corps and capable of sustained independent deep operations.
4. The Italians lost 319,000 tons of shipping from February through May 1943. Over 60 per cent of the losses occurred in port from allied air attacks. Ultra intercepts also tracked and targeted tankers making sure that the mobility of the Axis forces was limited. See Sadkovich, The Italian Navy in World War II.
5. Roberto Farinacci had once been the Secretary of Italy’s Fascist Party, when, in 1924, he had led a purge of the government. He clashed openly with Mussolini, who considered him too violent and extreme. Mussolini had him removed from office and, although still a party member, Farinacci had not held any other high position. See Deakin, The Brutal Friendship.
6. ‘Werther’ was thought to be Major General Hans Oster, the second in command of the German military intelligence and counter-intelligence organisation, the Abwehr, under Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. The other spy reporting the cancellation was ‘Lucy’, Rudolf Rössler, an anti-Nazi German working out of Switzerland with senior Wermacht sources. See Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War.
7. This was, of course, because Hitler had not officially cancelled the offensive.
*8. Churchill discusses his thoughts in some detail in his memoirs, The Broken Crusade (HMSO, London, 1948).
8 The Luftwaffe Triumphant The Defeat of the Allied Bomber Offensive, 1944–45
1. On the timeframe, see Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 239.
2. Murray, Strategy for Defeat, pp. 103, 134.
3. Price, Luftwaffe, p. 94
4. Quoted in Galland, The Luftwaffe Fighter Force, p. 215.
5. See generally: Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change; Rosen, Winning the Next War; and Zisk, Engaging the Enemy.
6. On strategic airpower theory in general, see: Overy, The Air War 1939–45, pp. 5-25; and MacIsaac, David, ‘Voices From the Central Blue’, in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy.
7. See generally: McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing, especially pp. 182–6.
8. Konvitz, ‘Bombs, Cities and Submarines: Allied Bombing of the French Ports 1942–43’, pp. 40–3
9. The USAAF was less likely—or able—to fall into this type of problem than its successor, the USAF, which has been the subject of several case studies on this type of bureaucratic behaviour. See generally: Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower.
10. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 50.
11. See generally: Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, in Miller, Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War; also Van Evera, ‘Why States Believe Foolish Ideas’.
12. On the tendency to look at tonnage rather than results, see the Spaatz quotation in Werrell, Who Fears?, p. 83.
13. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, p. 61.
14. Overy, p. 15. Murray, ‘The Influence of Pre-War Anglo-American Doctrine on the Air Campaigns of the Second World War’, in Boog, The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War, pp. 238-40.
15. On the ‘Big Blow’, see Galland, op. cit., pp. 176–80.
16. On the competition between German industrial hardening and the Atlantic Wall, see Overy, ‘World War II: the Bombing of Germany’, in Stephens, The War in the Air, 1914–1994, pp. 123–5.
17. Gooderson, ‘Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Tactical Close Support Role During World War II?’
18. Gooderson, p. 367
19. On the impact of bombing on German morale, see Overy, p. 208, and Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 300. While some sources hold that the bombing stimulated German morale, the weight of the evidence is that it took a considerable toll.
20. Price, The Last Year of the Luftwaffe, May 1944 to May 1945, p. 176.
21. Isby, Fighter Combat In The Jet Age, see chapter 1 generally.
22. Weber, ‘Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation’, in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, pp. 164–88.
23. Quoted in Evans, In Defense of History, p. 118.
9 Hitler’s Bomb Target: London and Moscow
1. Heisenberg met with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in 1941, ostensibly to assure the senior physicist that Heisenberg would not pursue bomb development. Bohr was not convinced.
2. In actuality, the Allies went even further: General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Project, even went so far as to forward suspected atomic research targets to Washington to try to kill Heisenberg and all those around him. A remarkable man, that Gen. Groves!
3. As spoken to MajGen Dornberger, Commander of the A-4 (V-2) project, 1942.
*4. Herr Figge, Reich Director of the Supply Committee for Special Projects stated that sufficient material for the third and fourth weapons was scheduled to be available by October 1944 but, ‘This was not achieved, due, chiefly to the interruption of processes and the destruction of transportation as a result of air raids.’
5. See Dornberger, V-2, for details of that takeover.
10 Rommel Versus Zhukov Decision in the East, 1944–45
*1. Stauffenberg, Claus von, Saving Germany (Verlagshaus Hindrichs, Potsdam and Leipzig, 1949), pp. 49–53. Von Stauffenberg’s account of Rommel at Dachau owes nothing to the postwar Rommel myth. If anything, other eyewitnesses state that von Stauffenberg understated Rommel’s rage.
*2. The fate of the death camp staffs is treated well in Eva von Bartelsmann, A Reckoning With Shame: Germany’s Hideous Secret (Collins, London, 1963), pp. 132–50.
*3. Peter G. Tsouras, Disaster at D-Day: The Germans Defeat the Allies, June 1944—the definitive work on the Allied defeat in Normandy and the roles of Rommel and Speidel in Hitler’s assassination.
*4. By July 1944 there were 173,980 German prisoners interned in the continental United States. Most of these were men captured in North Africa. See Lewis and Mewha, History of the Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army 1776–1945, pp. 90–1. Large numbers of prisoners were also kept in the United Kingdom who were quickly returned in response to the immediate release of British prisoners by the Germans. The most useful of these were the several thousand aircrew captured mostly in the Battle of Britain.
