War and power, p.28
War and Power, page 28
The economic/technological strength of the US and China is far from identical, and these differences could make a significant, even determinative difference, in a war. The US has come to dominate world services, while China is a manufacturing powerhouse. The US would have an advantage in raising and spending money in any conflict, but China can make almost anything in a far greater mass than the US.
If these are the two largest economic/technological powers of the time, and it is assumed they will remain so for a number of decades at least, their leaderships are very different and these contrasts will play a role in their actions as global powers. The US, with its democratic system that changes leaders every four or at most eight years, has thrown up an uneven list of leaders in the last twenty-four years (and over the country’s history as a whole). Indeed, it could be argued that over the past quarter-century, American foreign policy has been a catalogue of bipartisan failure – whereas before that, the US had far more success (and in a bipartisan way). The foreign policies from George W. Bush through Obama, Trump, Biden and now back to Trump, have been uneven – prone to dramatic changes, often reflecting the personal prejudices of the sitting president – and mostly a failure. Getting far too enmeshed in areas that are not actually of great security interest, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, while failing to understand where the US could have supported allies that are willing to fight, such as in Ukraine, has revealed the capriciousness of American policies. The US policy towards Syria is a textbook case of this, with swings and inconsistency leading to instability. During the War on Terror, under George W. Bush, the US helped exacerbate the chaos in Syria. A growing civil war between the government of Bashir al-Assad and a range of different actors – including ISIS, Sunni groups, and Kurds – gripped much of the country. When Barack Obama became president, he then declared that the US had a clear red line in policy: that if Assad (and his Russian allies) used chemical weapons to assert their control, then the US would militarily intervene. When Assad and the Russians did just that, the Obama administration showed that its red-line claim was meaningless and did nothing. The US then watched on as Assad seemingly entrenched his power and, under Trump, actually ended up bombing other parties in the Syrian Civil War – such as ISIS. The US actually ended up improving the position of a regime that used chemical weapons. And then, when that regime fell in 2024, it was almost entirely a bystander.
Overall, leadership changes of opinion have also meant that the American preparations for any large war have been spasmodic. There has been talk about a realignment in the Indo-Pacific, but at the same time US leadership has allowed certain vital strategic capabilities – such as shipbuilding and other military manufacturing – to weaken dangerously.
The Chinese situation is not much better. There can be a tendency to overrate the ‘strength’ and purpose of dictatorial rulers, but the truth of the matter is that dictators are the sharpest of double-edged swords when it comes to exercising national power – and they become even more so the longer they are in office. Certainly, dictators like Chinese president Xi Jinping often get more intransigent and less willing to listen to counterarguments the longer they stay in power (and Xi has been in power for more than a decade).i Vladimir Putin is a salutary lesson. The disastrous invasion of Ukraine was based, it seems, mostly on his personal vision than any rational understanding of the risks he was taking. And this is the issue with the leaderships in both countries. The US has clearly shown how unstable leadership can lead to unstable policies, while China, with its predilection towards dictatorial rule, might ultimately opt for something far more dangerous.
The way the two states act towards Taiwan is a textbook example of this. The Chinese state under Xi has increasingly ramped up its pressure on Taiwan for many years now. It has steadily and threateningly increased its military preparations and military exercises – showing a growing ability to interdict trade on all sides of the island and even to attempt an invasion. The US, on the other hand, has been inconsistent, particularly recently under Donald Trump. The traditional US policy of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan (not making it clear whether the US would fight for Taiwan or not) has been replaced by statements that Taiwan is a threat to the US economy. So the Taiwanese are faced with a China leadership that has presented a consistent and growing threat, and a US leadership that has alternately been friendly or dismissive. It makes defensive planning a nightmare.
If leadership adds an air of unpredictability to both China and the US, the role of their different societies and political structures if anything amplifies instability. American society is probably the greatest advantage the country would have in any conflict with China: it has shown dynamism, is technologically conversant, and can innovate more than almost any other on earth at this time. You would have said around 2014 that it represented one of the most reliable pillars of US strength. At the same time, in the past ten years it has also divided against itself and has been unexpectedly influenced by outside forces that have been effective in feeding it different narratives – from anti-vaccine to anti-Ukraine/pro-Russian – and it has shown itself to be easily taken in by the arguments of its greatest enemies.
In comparison, the strength of Chinese society in supporting China as a power remains more under the surface. One-party or dictatorial societies are normally told to not express themselves, to let the state structure do their thinking for them, and to immerse themselves in either the material or distracting parts of the human experience. China is no exception. The Chinese people are encouraged to better themselves materially or distract themselves as much as possible, while leaving politics and international relations to the Communist Party. As part of this, the party has brought into being arguably the most comprehensive surveillance-state structure in human history, with almost all movements, physical or online, being watched.
What we don’t know, and can never know until a real crisis occurs – such as a war with the US in the Indo-Pacific – is to what degree Chinese society supports its rulers in their foreign affairs. This is a huge question. Probably, as in the case of Russia, Chinese society has been so shaped and cowed that it will do what its rulers say. That being said, there is a chance that – as with a number of dictatorial societies over the years, from Mussolini’s Italy to Bashir al-Assad’s Syria – when given the opportunity, many Chinese who seemed loyal to the state actually harboured serious doubts about the policies of their own rulers. The fact that the Chinese state has such strict surveillance is a sign that they know such hidden opposition is a possibility.
The two nations’ strengths, weaknesses and instabilities when it comes to leadership, society and structure have all interacted with their economic/technological strengths to create the two largest militaries in the world today. Looking at them, it is remarkable how much larger and more comprehensive they are than any other military on the planet.ii The US and China are the only states who maintain large forces in all four domains (land, air, sea and space). They have millions of military personnel under arms and, we assume, the ability to operate their equipment in complex operations.
It is here where some of the difficulties in assessment occur, particularly in relation to the human aspects of war and power. The US military has been at war for most of the last eighty-five years, and this has given it tremendous experience in the complex operation of its systems in times of war. It has, in that time, waged campaigns of all sorts, including the most difficult amphibious landings and complex air campaigns involving extensive SEAD (suppression of enemy air defences). It has also deployed large forces in numerous places around the world at relatively short notice, and it has practice in using its high-tech goods in combat conditions. The different branches of the US military all have their own traditions and experiential hinterlands, which generally prove an asset when they are utilized. All of this experience should continue to provide a significant leg-up to the US as its military undertakes its assigned tasks at the start of any war.
That being said, the US military is experiencing some worrying trends when it comes to the more human aspects. It is becoming increasingly reliant on, and in many cases reflective of, one particular part of American society. It now comes more and more from the parts of the country that support the Republican Party, and the US military as a whole seems far more religiously minded than the rest of the country – which is actually seeing a significant drop in religious practice. While this is extremely difficult to quantify, a military that is not representative of the society it serves as a whole can end up being distrusted by that society – with potentially corrosive results.1
The Chinese military, on the other hand, is about as inexperienced as that of a full-spectrum power has ever been, and has no meaningful experience operating its systems under wartime conditions. The last significant war it fought was against Vietnam in 1979, and during this conflict it performed very poorly. Of course, the Chinese military has also been remade into an entirely different beast since then – which in and of itself presents challenges. It has gone from a mass conscript force that relied overwhelmingly on land power of the more basic type, to a smaller (by Chinese standards), more professional military force with some of the most advanced equipment in the world. In this transition what has been entirely lacking is any real-world experience of waging a war.
What we also don’t know is just how much corruption has impacted the readiness of China’s military. While it is probably not as bad as for the Russian military, which was and is deeply affected by corruption, the Chinese government is acting as if it has been a problem. In 2024, the government instituted a very active crackdown on corruption and a number of very high-ranking officers, including the commander of China’s strategic rocket forces (amongst the most technologically advanced parts of the Chinese military), were arrested. Of course, this opens up another question – of leadership and political system. What we don’t know is to what degree this crackdown was inspired by a genuine desire to stop corruption, or whether it was staged to strengthen the Communist Party’s or even President Xi’s hold on power.
So, the US and Chinese militaries, emerging from the different factors that create national power, have their distinct strengths and weaknesses. Of course, neither of these powers interacts in the world alone. They both lead different groups of alliances or looser power groupings which, surprisingly, bear resemblance to the situation in Europe before World War I. The alliances then were not in many cases hard and fast commitments that obligated one power to fight for another – but rather larger diplomatic groupings that indicated likely fighting partners if a war did break out. The British, for instance, were in no way obligated to fight for France and Russia in 1914. They chose to in the end, but even then there were voices very much opposed to such action.
On the surface, the US alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific is considerably stronger than China’s. The US has defence pacts with Japan, South Korea and Australia, and has defence ties (but no obligation to defend) Taiwan. The US also has strong established relations with Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore, all of whom are uncomfortable with China trying to dominate the South China Sea. Even in terms of ‘neutrals’ the situation is not unfavourable to the US. India, a coming international power, shares a border with China that is the site of regular military clashes. If the US had the ability to coordinate relations with its different allies, find ways to have them work together, and reassure them of its strategic commitment to the region, this could help expand its influence in the area.
Alas for America, in this case, issues of leadership, society and structure seem to be working overtime to keep this from happening. The swings in US politics, the rise of populists such as Donald Trump, and the general unreliability that the US is projecting as an international partner undermine this American advantage. What the US is doing, particularly under Trump, is defining its relationship with its allies from a zero-sum perspective. What does the US pay versus the ally in terms of defence, and what is the trade balance between the US and the ally? In this version, even historic partners can be shamed as ‘public parasites’ who are shirking their responsibilities and taking advantage of American beneficence.
In the Indo-Pacific, this could be particularly destructive. What the US has in the Indo-Pacific is a group of bilateral relationships with its allies, and it is not clear which, if any, trust the US enough to fight for any other US friend in the region. Japan, for instance, is not pledged to fight for Taiwan, nor is Australia committed to defend South Korea. And the more the US turns under its populist politics to view its relationship with these countries from a financial cost—benefit basis, the less these countries will trust the US to lead them as a group. Even South Korea, which is the site of the second-largest deployment of US forces outside of the United States (to Japan), has serious concerns about US commitment. The South Koreans, because of their worries, are wondering if they should start constructing their own nuclear deterrent. Needless to say, Taiwan, which is operating with no firm US defence commitments, is even more concerned. This is being made worse by Donald Trump, who is turning the US relationship with Taiwan from one of friends and allies into one between economic competitors.
If the US has a potentially powerful group of allies staring it in the face, the situation is not so comforting for the Chinese – though they at least seem to be able to get more concrete support from theirs. Chinese policy in its region, which has been heavy-handed and aggressive in the assertion of Chinese rights, has left the PRC with only a small number of possible defence partners in its area – primarily Russia and North Korea. Russia, it is now clear, has been terribly overrated as a power, and has suffered grievously during its bloodthirsty invasion of Ukraine. North Korea is likewise an economic basket case. Even adding in more distant states, such as Iran, provides China with allies whose standing lately has been damaged or weakened.
And yet, what China does have through this group are a number of states that are reliant on China for their existence and provide at least more stability than the far wealthier and more powerful group that the US could – but has failed to – organize. Russia is absolutely reliant on China for its continuing ability to function economically, and has basically stripped the long Russo-Chinese border of all defensive forces. It has and will continue to support all Chinese claims in the area. North Korea likewise is to a great extent reliant on China for its continuing existence. So China has fewer and poorer partners than the US, but structurally can ask a great deal from them.
War in the Indo-Pacific Tomorrow
Overall, the power balance between the US and China is finely weighted, so much so that any war between them would almost certainly metastasize into an event with dramatic global repercussions. They are both full-spectrum powers, with the ability to act around the world and possessing military forces capable of doing a great deal of damage. That being said, it is the differences in the elements of their full-spectrum power structures that could prove decisive in any war.
In the opening stages of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific involving the US and China, the US should have some noticeable advantages. Its real-world experience of war-fighting and its probable technological advantage should allow it to exert its influence over the Chinese in certain areas. This could be amplified by ongoing developments or Chinese action. If the US, for instance, could leap ahead in the race for autonomous systems (as it is attempting with the Replicator Initiativeiii), there is the possibility of a step-change advantage in targeting speed and accuracy.2
If the Chinese were rash enough to attempt an amphibious assault on Taiwan, the US would also have the ability to work with the well-armed Taiwanese, who have access to stocks of anti-ship and anti-air missiles, and so could make such an operation as difficult and destructive as possible for the inexperienced Chinese military. A decisive mass Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan is one of the most common war scenarios proposed by western war-gamers (as it fits with the battle-centric view of conflict that they prefer). One of the most reputable US think tanks has run a series of war games of this initial action, and in most the Chinese lose to a combined US-Taiwanese force.3 The difficulty of launching an invasion into the teeth of US-Taiwanese defensive firepower, including anti-ship and anti-air missiles and UAVs, means that Chinese vessels and aircraft, which would have to work with an extremely high level of complex operational success for an invasion to succeed, would be lost in very high numbers.
It is probably safe to assume (for now – but not in the medium term) that the US would maintain a technological advantage at the start of any war. The Chinese are in many ways building up a replica force (with aircraft carriers and fighter aircraft such as the Chinese J-35) that seem to be ‘bootleg’ versions of US equipment – though with what are assumed to be inferior capabilities.iv The US also maintains a suite of more advanced technological systems that it won’t share even with its closest allies. If properly organized and coordinated with its allies, the US military with its advanced equipment should have the ability to deal heavy blows to China’s front-line military forces at the start of any war – to such a degree that the Americans should probably hope for an aggressive Chinese opening to any conflict, as that would play into its operational advantages.
That being said, the Chinese might choose not to be so rash early in the conflict, and instead play to their strengths in a long-war scenario. China’s ability to regenerate military force, in mass, is much superior to that of the US. It is in this area that the economic differences between the two very much favour the Chinese. Though the US economy might still be larger and arguably more technologically advanced, it is much smaller than the Chinese economy when it comes to the ability to manufacture goods. The US is primarily a service-based economy, and it has seen a collapse in many crucial, strategic areas over the last few years – such as ammunition production. The Chinese, on the other hand, even as they are experiencing economic difficulties today with a bankrupt real-estate sector and a declining working-age population, can manufacture goods in a manner that is entirely superior to what is possible in the US. For instance, while the US basically has no domestic production of civilian shipbuilding left, the Chinese are the world leaders by a long way – making almost half the world’s new shipping.4
