Putins playbook, p.14
Putin's Playbook, page 14
From that point through today, every Russian policy, strategy, and doctrinal document repeats and amplifies such anti-American and anti-Western sentiments and goals. Convinced, however, that Russia has no other choice but to embrace liberal democracy after the fall of the USSR, America has missed every warning sign that Moscow did not see eye-to-eye with Washington and was going to put up major resistance to our agenda, even by force. The U.S. security establishment was willfully unaware that a future conflict was afoot and missed many opportunities to head off Russian aggression. Putin, therefore, was able to present the West with a fait accompli in Georgia, Ukraine, and Crimea, along with the disastrous roiling of our democracy with the 2016 presidential election intervention.
Washington’s naive and obtuse belief that liberal democracy is coveted by all has blinded our leaders, prompting them to reduce our intelligence and military resources targeting Russia. My question at a meeting during my initial days in the Intelligence Community about our inadequate satellite coverage over Russia was greeted with disbelief. I was viewed as a paranoid Russian when the real threat came from Middle-Eastern terrorism. At the time, Moscow was conducting a 2008 wargame in the North Caucasus. Another Russian defense analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, was in Moscow, where he expressed his concerns to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that the Russian wargame was providing cover for an impending invasion.69 The West, however, was not paying the right attention. Frustration as a new intelligence officer was gradually growing in me when a couple weeks later Russia invaded Georgia.
While Washington was pursuing unending wars in various parts of the globe and misreading Putin—by judging him to be an “honest man” as President Bush did or a “bored kid in the back of the classroom,” as President Obama called him—the Russian leader steadily and quietly crafted a deadly plan to undo America. The chapters that follow will describe the five main components of this plan: space warfare, cyberattacks, information warfare, sabotage by spies, and traditional military operations, including nuclear warfare.
The Playbook: Moscow’s Five-Point Plan to Defeat America
Gene P. explained to me that although candidates like me are extremely valuable for the Intelligence Community, they have the most difficult time becoming IC employees. Our strength, that we speak the languages and understand the thinking of America’s adversaries, is the very thing that IC security views as a vulnerability. Their thinking goes that if you speak a foreign language and have lived in a foreign country, you are subject to “foreign influence” and therefore are vulnerable to being recruited by foreign intelligence services as a spy.
This thinking is illogical. Most immigrants are American patriots who would not betray their country. They love America because it provides us rights, privileges, and even necessities we didn’t have in out places of birth—freedom, economic opportunity, justice, safety, security, and other things that Americans born in this country don’t even think about. Immigrants normally don’t bite the hand that feeds them. We want to serve our country and repay America for what it has given us.
Most U.S. intel security apparatchiks don’t understand this, or, as another mentor of mine, Ken D., put it, they “don’t want to do their job” of vetting naturalized American citizens for security risks. It is very time-consuming doing a background check for someone who lived in a foreign country or traveled a lot internationally. Ken D., a very senior former Pentagon official who had also served in the Reagan White House, explained that security bureaucrats are the most illogical and unreasonable people he had met. They prefer to stall the clearance process for candidates with foreign backgrounds and experience in hopes that the candidate will eventually drop out, because they simply don’t want to decide about clearing the candidate for intelligence work.
Gene P. said that the only thing that works to convince such bureaucrats to act is fear of involvement from their chain of command. Gene recommended that I write a letter to the Director of National Intelligence and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency about my case. So I did. I informed both heads of these agencies that after several years of trying to join the IC to serve my country, having actually received multiple job offers from several intelligence agencies, I had been neither granted nor denied a security clearance. I had also withdrawn from the CIA clearance process, because DIA had told me that they wouldn’t continue to work on my clearance unless I terminated my processing with the CIA.
I never got any replies from the DNI or the CIA director. Several weeks later, however, I received my DIA clearance and the “Entry on Duty” date. The entire process of joining the Intelligence Community from November 2001 to July 21, 2008, took almost seven years. My husband, although proud of my American patriotism and perseverance, said that he knew of no other person who would dedicate seven years of his or her life to go through such a formidable process. He also warned me that as a free spirit, I was not built for a government bureaucracy. Elated that I could finally serve my adopted homeland, I did not pay much attention to his words. Nor could I have possibly foreseen how prophetic they would be.
The Plan
Putin’s playbook for his battle against the United States includes five instruments of war: space warfare, cyber-attacks and information warfare, spy craft, special activities known as “active measures,” and traditional combat operations, including nuclear warfare. Putin routinely deploys these tools in his toolbox against America, except for the kinetic and nuclear options, which, however, he does often threaten to unleash.
It is critical that we understand Putin’s way of war and the different conception of peace that Russia has. Technically, there is never peacetime, according to the Kremlin’s doctrine. Russia views itself in a continuous state of struggle or confrontation with opponents, who are jockeying for a premium position in global geopolitics. And Putin is determined to grab one of the best spots.
To counter Russia’s strategy and doctrine, first the United States must understand where Russia focuses its attention when challenging America. Russia is all about exploiting the opponent’s vulnerabilities—which will vary from culture to culture—and indirectly influencing the adversary and his mind, rather than about the methods employed. The methods and level of conflict intensity will vary depending on the adversary and anticipated outcome.
In areas where Russia fights proxy wars with the United States, such as Ukraine and Syria, Putin eagerly shows off his military’s prowess, new weaponry, and modern tactics. His intent is not only to prevent the United States from securing its influence in these areas, but also to showcase to Washington what kind of combat arsenal Moscow would bring to bear should kinetic warfare break out. Putin displays Russia’s military preparedness to wage an all-out war with the United States if Washington crosses Moscow’s security redlines. He believes America understands these redlines “telegraphed” in multiple Kremlin doctrinal papers but is willing to test his resolve, such as through NATO expansion.
Sanctions or not, Putin has shown during the past decade that he will invade or destabilize Russia’s former republics—as he did in Ukraine and Georgia—rather than let them switch sides to NATO and the European Union. He will continue to unbalance America through cyber warfare and other tools in his playbook rather than let Washington democratize the former Soviet Eurasian countries. He understands well that he is playing a risky game that can lead to an escalation of tensions. But risk is something that Putin is accustomed to; it is a way of life for a former KGB officer. Bred as an intel operative, he plans for contingencies. Therefore, he has a plan in his playbook for an all-out war with America.
CHAPTER 4 Putin’s Star Wars: Lasers, Jammers, and Satellite Killers
“Space operation will…precede air, sea, and land offensive operation.… The main task of this operation is to destroy the key elements of the adversary’s space infrastructure and to disorganize his military’s command and control.… This will enable [the Russian military] to achieve information superiority [over the U.S. military] by commanding and controlling the adversary’s weapons and troops, reflexively.… Mass [space-enabled] missile strikes will target the key elements of the adversary’s state and military command and control, critical infrastructure of the economy, and troops.”
—Aerospace Defense (a Russian professional military journal)
On July 21, 2008, the day of my “Entry on Duty” (EOD), I walked through the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) gate, located in what seemed to me a sketchy area of Washington. It was the beginning of my service at the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Analysis (or DI, as we referred to it), as a space threat intelligence analyst, to scrutinize and report on foreign threats to U.S. space systems.
The day I became a U.S. intelligence officer was one of the happiest days of my life. I was not deterred by an arduous process that had lasted close to seven years. Nor was I discouraged by mountains of paperwork, countless polygraphs, some of which included hostile interrogations and polygraphers testing me with accusations that I was a Russian spy, or my husband’s warnings that I was not the type who can tolerate government bureaucracy.
Having recently given up a senior position at one of the prominent defense contractors that D.C.-area folks sarcastically refer to as “Beltway Bandits, and a nice, windowed corner office in Crystal City, I was quite unsettled by my tiny cubicle and the shabby looks of my new workspace at the Naval Research Lab, one exit on Route 295 away from DIA. I was surprised that well-paid senior professionals with specialized skills required to solve complex national security problems would work in conditions I had not seen since I left the Soviet Union. My initial disappointment was soon replaced by the excitement of receiving my new and shiny IC “blue badge,” getting “read-in” to Top-Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) and signing non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), which allowed me to read the most secret intelligence reports, attend classified meetings, and carry highly sensitive documentation in a specially designed “courier” bag.
This special feeling of doing important national security work never left me, being privy to the nation’s most sensitive secrets and being entrusted with information, some of which was obtained by people risking their lives. It helped me to get through long and busy days, deal with the exhausting government bureaucracy, and leave my crying small children at dawn. The little ones, often messing up my white, starchy shirt and black suit with their tiny hands, had trouble understanding why Pentagon generals, who needed to be briefed by mommy on an important issue, had made them get up so early before daycare.
Space Armageddon for America
Space will serve as the primary battlefield in Putin’s war with America, should the conflict escalate into the kinetic realm. For such a contingency, Russia is developing and fielding weaponry to deliver a space Armageddon.1 Russian military planners have watched American warfighters’ tactics in conflict zones very closely across the globe for over twenty years. What the Russians have learned is that U.S. space capabilities were the primary reason for the American military’s superior performance in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. Of course, I am speaking about U.S. military victories in these conflicts, not the quagmires and disorder that followed. America’s ability to put “iron on target” with speed and precision is unprecedented in the history of warfare, minimizing civilian loss of life. So is our intelligence services’ ability to track down and help remove from the battlefield individual combatants and malignant actors like Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, and Qassem Soleimani. American intelligence can nearly always find the needle in a haystack, even if it takes us several years.
What makes America’s science fiction–like way of war possible is the world’s best and largest satellite constellation. This U.S. space arsenal is launched and operated by a combination of private industry and such military and intelligence entities as the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), located in Chantilly, Virginia, the very existence of which was classified until 1992.2 The non-profit organization Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) estimates the number of American satellites at 1, 425 as of July 31, 2020, although the exact figure is classified and unknown to the public. By comparison, Russia’s constellation, which is the third largest in the world, is assessed by UCS at 172, behind China’s, which is estimated at 382.3 These space birds provide critical military and civilian functions, including missile warning, communications, command and control, reconnaissance (imagery and signals intelligence), and weather data.
The Russians concluded that while superior space capability is the greatest force multiplier in America’s way of war, it is also our greatest vulnerability, because of the U.S. military’s near absolute dependence on it. This is just like in our civilian lives: before embarking on a long distance trip, we launch our favorite GPS-powered app (my husband and I often bicker about Waze, which is my preference, versus his Google Maps), instead of trekking to the nearest AAA office to obtain maps. Our troops rely on the same constellation of thirty-one GPS satellites for tasks like synchronizing operations, pinpointing targets, locating personnel, and doing myriad other things in a war zone. Even during wargame simulation exercises, I always had trouble finding physical maps to show moves by the United States’ Red Team against the Blue Team, especially if the move involved a geographic area other than the conflict zone. I remember trying to get my hands on a world map at one of the war games conducted at a prominent U.S. military base to help a colleague, who must have slept through his geography classes, locate some places in Eastern Europe. Frustrated by not being able to find a map, I innocently tried to bring in my handbag, which contained a small paper map of the world—I usually carry one on me—into the wargame room during the break and was promptly stopped by a surly security guard who swiftly confiscated my alternative tools, insisting that these objects presented a security threat.
This is how former STRATCOM Commander General John Hyten described the American military’s reliance on space when giving a public talk called “U.S. Strategic Command Perspectives on Deterrence and Assurance.” Space, he said, “is fundamental to every single military operation that occurs on the planet today.” General Hyten admitted that every drone, fighter jet, bomber, ship, and soldier is “critically dependent” on space to conduct its operations.4 He also revealed that Russia is building space weapons to threaten U.S. assets in the heavens and “create havoc for humanity” on earth.5
Having found American space superiority is also our Achilles’ heel, Russian strategists set out to deafen and blind U.S. forces in a conflict.6 By attacking American satellites, Russians will look to offset, if not negate, American superior conventional firepower. They also hope to paralyze U.S. forces psychologically by taking away what they perceive as the technological “crutch.” Russian military theorists often write about the importance of targeting both the technical capabilities and the mind of an adversary, planning to disorganize his troops and weaken their will to fight. Crippling our satellites, in Russia’s view, would enable them to disrupt the U.S. forces’ “kill chain” and stymie the American way of war.
This is the essence of Putin’s asymmetric warfare—that of a weaker opponent versus a stronger one, which is how Russia considers itself vis-à-vis the United States. He looks to defeat a stronger adversary by removing or degrading its strategic advantage and thus leveling the playing field. Moscow believes that in an all-out space war, America—whose entire society, from ATMs to gas pumps, is wired up through space—stands to lose more than Russia.
Even our ultimate deterrent, the nuclear forces and weapons operated by the Strategic Command, is reliant on space, because missile-warning satellites are an integral part of the nuclear command and control architecture (NC2).7 America’s missile warning constellation, called the space-based infrared system (SBIRS), is designed to detect and track incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and provide warning to U.S. leadership about an impending attack.8
An example of how our missile-warning satellites protect our forces occurred during the Iranian strike with sixteen short-range ballistic missiles on American military personnel stationed at two Iraqi bases on January 7, 2020. Iranian leaders ordered the strike in retaliation for the United States’ elimination of prominent Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, who had a history of running operations that killed Americans. With one or two hours of warning time, provided by a combination of early-warning satellites and other intelligence, American forces were able to invoke dispersal protocols and take cover in bunkers that used to belong to Saddam Hussein’s military. Some even contacted their loved ones in the United States, just in case.9 President Trump announced the next day that one of the reasons that no Americans were killed by Iranian missiles was because “the early warning system worked very well.”10 Imagine if it hadn’t worked well because the early warning satellites were messed with!
Built by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman at a cost of around $1.7 billion a pop, American early-warning space birds pre sent attractive sitting ducks for U.S. adversaries like Russia with advanced space and counter-space capabilities. Expressing his concern for the U.S. military’s ability to protect these critical assets when he was STRATCOM commander, General Hyten described them in 2017 as “big, fat, juicy targets.”11 He advocated for a shift in the Pentagon’s procurement strategy from acquiring large, costly space systems that are “exquisite” but “fragile and undefendable” to getting ones with smaller, cheaper, “more resilient and distributed capabilities.”12 Whether large or small, our satellites will be at risk in an armed conflict with Tier-1 adversaries like Russia and China. The American space industry must make newer satellites with built-in protections and have enough of them in inventory to be able to quickly reconstitute our mission-critical constellations in wartime.
