A half century of occupa.., p.16
A Half Century of Occupation, page 16
Hamas’s da’wa (proselytizing for Islam) rests not only on moral education and the propagation of the faith but also on a wide array of social service and welfare institutions. The coexistence of religion and social support in the mosque—which serves as both place of worship and provider of social services—begets loyalty with benefits. Like other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas fills the demands for medical, educational, and social services that are unmet by states and, in the Palestinian case, fills them in the absence of a state. The Israeli Civil Administration permitted both extensive mosque building and da’wa institutions in Gaza and the West Bank before the First Intifada. One example is the al-Mujamma al-Islamiya (the Islamic Center), which by 1987 incorporated about half of the mosques in Gaza and would become Hamas’s major social welfare institution and a counterweight to the PLO’s activist nationalism. The range of charitable or welfare institutions that buttress Hamas and that the organization is able to finance and operate includes educational institutions; nursing schools; refugee, orphan, and poor relief bodies; women’s associations; organizations supporting the elderly; radio and TV stations; sports clubs; and so on. Hamas’s Scientific Medical Association, established in 1997, runs dental clinics, medical centers, and a blood bank. The Hamas-sponsored Association for Science and Culture offers education from kindergarten through eighth grade, and the al-Mujamma runs the prestigious Islamic University in Gaza. Given their extensive reach and breadth, these Hamas-run institutions cannot be replaced by the PNA. When some of these service providers were closed down at the beginning of the Second Intifada, they were usually allowed to reopen under a different name.60
The balance between social services and violence, including against civilians, is a key to the religious half turn in Palestinian society and consequently requires close examination. Western counterterrorism analysts focus almost exclusively on the role of these social service institutions—Hamas’s welfare network—as recruiters, supporters, and legitimizers of its terror activities.61 But the economist Eli Berman suggests in his book Radical, Religious and Violent that Hamas shares important characteristics with other tightly knit “clubs” that engage in collective activities, provide social welfare, and require devotion. When they turn to violence, these religious “clubs” have a significant advantage over other militant groups, since they have fewer free riders, cheaters, and shirkers.62 In contrast to Islamic Jihad, which does not have a network of social services and thus enjoys limited social support and sits out elections to the PNA, Hamas used its da’wa network of services to translate its social roots into political power in the January 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council. Hamas has also enjoyed support among secular Palestinians who believe that the organization’s promise of honest and effective government is an extension of the provision of such services. In other words, Hamas’s social service network allows it to become not just a terrorist organization but a political party, which can potentially negotiate agreements with Israel.
Lori Allen provides another comparison: attitude toward human rights. As a result of the Oslo process, the PNA and Palestinian civil society have become deeply dependent on funding offered by international NGOs, the World Bank, and foreign state agencies, all of which require the adoption of a professionalized human rights approach. The claims and practices of such an approach, including the human rights training of security forces, have produced, in Allen’s estimation, only “performances” of human rights. The PNA goes through the motions while simultaneously violating human rights in practice, even to the extent of torturing Palestinian detainees in Palestinian jails. Allen draws a sharp distinction between human rights as such and the “human rights industry” of the PNA, which she sharply criticizes. The alleged professionalization through human rights education moderates and depoliticizes Palestinian resistance and indirectly legitimates the corruption endemic to the PNA’s ministries, functionaries, and security apparatuses. In contrast, the absence of a human rights industry associated with and supportive of Hamas allows the organization to present itself as standing for sincerity and honesty while serving the Palestinian people, even if its human rights record is abysmal.63
The current falling out between the PNA and Hamas was the culmination of the opposing approaches taken by the two organizations and is a serious obstacle to a successful peace process. The surprising victory of Hamas in the January 2006 elections, due to popular trust in Hamas’s religious commitment to stay honest and to reject the PNA’s corrupt ways, deepened the division between the two. When Hamas rejected the demands of the Quartet (the United Nations, the United States, Russia, and the European Union) to commit to abstaining from violence and to recognize Israel as well as the previous agreements signed with it, foreign assistance was withheld, and Israel imposed crippling economic sanctions. The political division serves as a major excuse for Israel’s refusal—supported by most of the international community—to negotiate with Hamas and to proceed with effective negotiations.
VIII
The religious vanguards in Israeli and Palestinian societies have appeared against the background of, and filled in the gap left by, the ineffectiveness of the international community and IHL to push Israel forcefully for a concluding agreement along two-state parameters. Indeed, the last two forces that have prolonged the occupation are the direct enabling role played by US foreign policy and the indirect enabling leverage provided by IHL. Growing Israeli intransigence, indeed hubris, rides on the increasingly pro-Israeli US foreign policy under successive administrations since 1967. The United States transitioned from a position of relative neutrality—to the point of forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in 1957, and remaining ambiguous with regard to the Israeli decision to launch the 1967 War—to one of unbending support since the early 1970s.
The growth and acceleration of the pro-Israeli stance in American foreign policy have two main sources—international and domestic—and the nature of US-Israeli relations at any given time is determined by their balance. The former is an expression of national security considerations, while the latter is articulated in the form of a “special relationship.” So-called special relationships are a goody bag commonly filled with ill-defined and amorphous benefits that have been repeatedly added and subtracted over time. Though by their very definition special relationships should remain immune to the vagaries of crass interests, the record suggests that the specialness of the US-Israeli relations has been contingent on the salience and interpretation of US national security interests. In this section, I will survey the history of political and military ties between the two countries and will then turn to the evolution of their symbolic dimension in order to assess the role played by the United States in prolonging the Israeli occupation.
Though under President Truman the United States was the first country to recognize the newly declared state of Israel in May 1948, it trailed the USSR in recognizing Israel de jure. For most of Truman’s and Eisenhower’s administrations, Israel was viewed as “a major political and security liability,” to borrow the words of the political scientist Robert O. Freedman.64 Israeli-US relations thus began at a low point. The United States did not wish to support a new state that it expected to be defeated in the 1948 War. And if Israel survived it would be even less welcome, since US diplomats anticipated either that it would become a Soviet client state or that support for Israel would drive the Arab states to become Soviet clients. The United States, consequently, imposed an arms embargo on both sides. Following the war, the United States demanded that Israel allow the return of Palestinian refugees and cede a land corridor between Egypt and Jordan but was rebuffed on both counts. The Israeli military procured its arms and equipment from the Soviet bloc in the 1948 War and from France in the Suez War of 1956. Eisenhower condemned the French-British-Israeli invasion and compelled Israel to withdraw from the Sinai. In contrast to the lukewarm US support afforded Israel, the United States landed marines in Lebanon in 1958 and twice deployed the Sixth Fleet to express its support for the Jordanian monarchy.
In the context of the Cold War, the paramount US concern was to continue maintaining proper relations with the Arab countries as part of its overall effort to contain the USSR. Thus it kept Israel only in its peripheral vision. As the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine to shepherd the Arab countries into the Western camp became obvious, there was less fear that Israel would spoil US-Arab relations. During President Kennedy’s term, the United States finally agreed to supply weapons to Israel, starting with defensive Hawk antiaircraft missiles. Still, before the outbreak of the 1967 War, the United States remained cautious. Even as Egypt expelled the UN forces (stationed since the Suez War to separate the two sides), hastily moved its troops into the Sinai, and closed the international waterway of the Red Sea to Israeli shipping, the United States would not intercede to break the closure. It remained ambivalent with regard to the Israeli decision to launch the 1967 War. President Johnson stated that if Israel went to war alone it would remain alone, though it is believed that Johnson’s CIA director let his Israeli counterpart know that the United States had no objection to Israel going to war to lift the closure.
Israel’s initial fears that the United States would force it to withdraw again from the Sinai as it had done in 1957 were not borne out. In fact, the United States and the other Western countries stood solidly against the Arab demand, represented by the USSR in the Security Council, to condemn Israel for aggression and to demand its one-sided withdrawal without any diplomatic recompense. A hard-fought diplomatic struggle that lasted almost six months was concluded with Security Council Resolution 242, which affirmed the political independence and territorial inviolability of every state in the region. The resolution, in effect, recognized the Green Line as Israel’s border for the first time. The rest of the resolution was more ambiguous. While the preamble emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, the text itself called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces only “from territories occupied in the recent conflict”—a wording that evades withdrawal from all the occupied territories. Moreover, the resolution introduced a new, third consideration by affirming the right of the regions’ states to “live in peace within secure and recognized orders.” Both Lord Caradon, the British representative who drafted the final version, and Arthur Goldberg, the US ambassador to the UN, explained later that they had wished to leave the door open to the redrawing of borders through minor territorial adjustments.65 Such ambiguity—the assertion of the principle of territorial integrity combined with practical loopholes—was the consequence of Cold War rivalries. A country in “our” camp should be able to get away with what another country in the rival camp should not. Israel waited until May 1968 before assenting, and Syria rejected the resolution. Egypt accepted the resolution, and the peace treaty it ultimately reached with Israel is based on the principle of territorial integrity, thus requiring full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (but not from Gaza). Resolution 242 was adopted with a narrow focus on the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors; it still viewed the Palestinian question as a nonpolitical refugee issue. The PLO rejected Resolution 242 resoundingly.
The United States was determined to take advantage of Israel’s defeat of Egypt and Syria, since by the late 1950s and early 1960s those countries had signed up with the Soviet bloc. Following the 1967 War, regional and global interests became deeply intertwined, and from then on the Israeli-Arab conflict played out within the framework of the Cold War. President Johnson was keen to ensure Israeli air superiority by furnishing Israel with Skyhawk planes and, later, with Phantom jets. Israel was welcomed into the American Cold War bloc. Under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States began viewing Israel as a strategic partner in countering Soviet influence in the Middle East.
The proof of Israel’s value as a pro-American Cold War warrior was established during the September 1970 Jordanian crisis. As King Hussein was fighting to put down a Palestinian attempt to topple his regime, a Syrian tank unit invaded Jordan. Following speedy three-way negotiations, Israel threatened to use its air force against Syria if it were to deploy planes against the Jordanian ground forces. Meanwhile, the United States promised to protect Israel from possible Soviet intervention. The Jordanian forces were now able to prevail, and the Syrian tanks withdrew. The US-Jordan-Israel bloc had acquired the upper hand over the USSR-Syrian-PLO partnership, and a strong perception of common interests was established between the United States and Israel.
The clearest demonstration of the new strategic alignment came during the 1973 War, in which the Israeli forces were surprised by a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack into the territories Israel had conquered from them in 1967. The United States not only undertook a massive airlift to resupply the Israeli forces fighting on two fronts but also raised the US military’s state of readiness when the USSR appeared ready to dispatch combat units.66 After the war, the United States was able to move Egypt into its own column of supporters. Egypt became one of the rare defectors of the Cold War, and the United States played a key role in bringing Egypt and Israel together to reach their peace treaty in 1979, in the process pressuring the Begin government to agree to full withdrawal from the Sinai. Since then, Israel (like Egypt) has been the recipient of advanced US military weaponry and foreign aid equaling approximately $3 billion per annum. In 2016 a new ten-year agreement was signed to provide Israel with about $4 billion a year. During the Reagan presidency, the United States and Israel also signed a free trade agreement and a Memorandum of Agreement on US-Israeli strategic cooperation.67
The convergence of the national interests of the United States and Israel helped elevate their relationship to a symbolic level. The United States has two circles of special relations: the first includes the United Kingdom and the countries of the Anglosphere, with which the United States shares a historical trajectory as settler colonies, cultural similarities, and language; the second, a looser circle of countries, deemed “special” because they serve as “model nations,” includes Israel. The claimed specialness commonly reflects the sway of US domestic religious and ethnic groups to give the relationship with their country of origin or affiliation a political and cultural salience. The rise of Israel’s importance and the growing influence of the Jewish community in the United States are closely related.
At the core of the American Jewish community’s support for Israel have been two factors: that community’s extraordinarily centralized and nondemocratic structure and the internalization of Israel as a core component of modern Jewish identity. Israel was nowhere near as important to American Jews prior to the 1967 War as it became afterwards. A cautious US Jewry played only a small role even in seeking the assistance of the US government to save the Jews of Europe during the Second World War. Though laboring under the prevalent anti-Semitism in American society and government, the frantic campaign of the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe was established by a small Revisionist group outside the American Jewish leadership. Henry Morgenthau Jr., then secretary of the Treasury, played an important role in setting up the War Refugee Board to assist European Jews, but this was done as late as January 1944. Only the US shift from the ambivalence of the Eisenhower years to the Nixon-Kissinger administration’s explicit support in the 1970s removed the stigma of dual loyalty and created the space for American Jews to find Israel.
The contemporary public unanimity of American Jewish voices and the harsh rejection of public criticism of Israeli policies are contingent on a unique set of organizational structures. There is a plethora of Jewish community organizations, running the gamut from social service bodies such as B’nei B’rith and Hadassah, through the organizations of synagogues of the major denominations, to legal associations such as the Anti-Defamation League. These are brought together under the aegis of a single body—the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations—making “official” Jewry an organization of organizations. There is little democracy in the community. As this body’s presidents have recognized, they represent not all Jews but those who are willing to be involved, often by providing financial support. This hierarchical and oligarchical structure is situated to the right of the majority of US Jews. Though Prime Minister Rabin had harsh words for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—the main Jewish body lobbying the US government—it has been singularly effective in enlisting bipartisan congressional support for the proposition that strong US-Israeli relations serve the interests of the United States. Until 2016, measures supported by AIPAC were opposed by less than a few dozen members of Congress.
According to Dov Waxman’s recent study, there have been and still are cracks within the Jewish community, but this dissent is not well known. As he points out, the rise of the Likud to power in Israel in June 1977, and events such as the massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Israeli-backed Maronite Falange militias in September 1982, have sown discord between Israel and American Jewry. This contention finds its expression, as Waxman demonstrates, in the relations between different portions of American Jewry. Arrayed against each other are two relatively small groups—the “peace camp” versus the donors, activists, and bureaucrats who make up the establishment and enjoy the unconditional support of a large segment of Orthodox Jews.
