Henry l stimson, p.14
Henry L. Stimson, page 14
As the crisis in Germany worsened, Stimson could offer no new proposals or aid. The ambivalent response to Adolf Hitler’s becoming chancellor on January 30, 1933, was clearly a reflection of Hoover and Stimson’s position as heads of a lame-duck administration. The president saw Hitler’s government as “monarchical and reactionary,” but also “bitterly hostile to the Communists” and “curiously enough committed to a very radical . . . program.” Stimson thought the Nazis were more “a protest” than a party, and that it was not clear in which direction they would go.23 Yet, given the state of affairs in Europe and his inability to get Hoover to assert American leadership to solve the economic crisis, Stimson was also full of foreboding about the future. He believed that the events in Europe were similar to an unfolding Greek tragedy, where one saw the march of events and knew what action should be taken, but was powerless to prevent “its marching to its grim conclusion.”24
Creating the Good Neighbor Policy
The negative impact of the Great Depression was not limited to Europe. Latin American nations, with their heavy dependence on the export of raw materials, quickly felt the impact of the spreading world economic crisis. In 1930 and 1931 alone, there were ten revolutions in the twenty nations of the region, creating growing concern in Washington about stability and order to the south. These numerous changes of government not only raised the question of recognition of the new governments, but also the best means for the United States to ensure its goals of stable neighbor nations friendly to the United States and open to American trade and investment. Stimson recognized that direct U.S. intervention in various nations had, “instead of promoting feelings of friendship ... initiated feelings of hate and hostility towards this country.”25 He believed that good relations with Latin America were hindered “by several historic sore spots,” such as sending the marines into Mexico, Haiti, and Nicaragua, “which have been obstinately interfering with the growth of good will and friendly relations between us and our neighbors to the south.” American actions were misperceived, Stimson stated, and “have all suffered from distortion in South America unwarranted by these events as we understood them. Each has been used by the enemies and critics of the United States as proof positive that we are an imperialist people prone to use our power in subverting the independence of our neighbors.” These accusations, which Stimson found “unjustifiable,” had nonetheless “damaged our good name, our credit, and our trade far beyond the apprehension of our own people.”26
Stimson asserted that the American interventions had been in the best interests of both the United States and these nations, and he declared in 1931 that American policy toward Latin America “has been a noble one.” He was confident that a “calm historical perspective” would refute the charge that American actions in the Western Hemisphere were a “manifestation of a selfish American imperialism” and demonstrate that the United States had respected the legal rights of all the other countries. The United States only intervened to uphold principles and international law in an area “where the progress of these republics has been most slow” and “where the recurrence of domestic violence has most frequently resulted in the failure of duty on the part of the republics themselves and the violation of the rights of life and property accorded by international law to foreigners.”27 Still, Stimson was forced to acknowledge the growing nationalism and criticism that these actions had engendered.
The secretary, therefore, sought to continue the policy he first developed in Nicaragua of removing American forces from the region, while finding indigenous means of maintaining stability and a favorable environment for American business. As he noted in regard to Cuba, it was necessary to develop policies so “that less and less pressure would be necessary on the part of the United States to keep matters straight.”28 Recognizing that American actions had aroused more anger than gratitude, Stimson officially overturned the Roosevelt Corollary with the publication, in 1930, of a memorandum prepared by J. Reuben Clark of the State Department. This statement rejected U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbors. Stimson explained that the change was warranted because “the Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of the United States versus Europe—not of the United States versus Latin America.”29
This, however, was not an easy step, as events in El Salvador would soon demonstrate, and it led to a greater reliance than ever by the United States on the military rulers in the region to enforce stability and protect trade and investments. Stimson continued to hold his paternalistic views of nonwhites and was unwilling to consider Latin American nationalists seriously. For example, at one point during negotiations between Bolivia and Paraguay in Washington, D.C., Stimson noted that he was trying to assist “in settling the irritating difficulties between those two little nonsensical republics.” 30 By 1933, dictators ruled fifteen of the twenty Latin American republics, most of them having come to power in the previous two years and enjoying the support of the United States. They were seen as necessary and useful rulers who served to protect American interests by preserving order, controlling radical reform movements, and protecting American investments while they obviated the need for direct U.S. intervention.
The military’s overthrow of the government in El Salvador created a crisis for the Hoover administration at the same time that it was trying to respond to the economic collapse in Europe and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Events in El Salvador challenged the Republican adherence to the 1923 Washington Treaty of nonrecognition of governments that came to power by revolution in Central America and, in 1932, brought a reversal of that policy. Responding to what the State Department viewed as a Communist revolt in January 1932, the United States informally recognized the government of General Maximiliano Hernández Martinez because he was seen as necessary to stability and anti-Communism in the region. Martínez took power after the overthrow of El Salvador’s first democratically elected president, Arturo Araujo, in December 1931. In keeping with the 1923 Washington Treaty, the State Department initially refused to recognize Martinez. After a peasant revolt in January 1932, this policy came into conflict with the overriding desire for stability. The department’s interpretation of the domestic unrest in El Salvador as Bolshevist incited, and an assessment of the people of El Salvador as inferior and in need of a firm hand, led Stimson to ignore Martínez’s responsibility for the matanza [massacre] that killed thirty thousand El Salvadoreans and to accept the murderous Martinez as the ruler of El Salvador. As he had done in Nicaragua, Stimson relied on the military to enforce stability and order. The Roosevelt administration, acting under the Good Neighbor policy, accepted the policies of the Republicans in Central America and extended formal recognition to Martinez in January 1934.
El Salvador, because of the domination of the so-called forty families (the oligarchy), had been one of the most politically stable nations in Central America. Coffee, which had been introduced there in the mid-nineteenth century, was the dominant crop, accounting for over 90 percent of all exports by the 1920s. The oligarchy’s power rested in its control of the haciendas, which control had been solidified in the 1880s when the government abolished all town communal land holdings in the name of private property. The costs of these actions to the peasants were high. Tens of thousands were displaced from the lands they farmed, and the production of staple crops, such as maize and beans, was dramatically cut. During the 1920s, the amount of land devoted to coffee production increased 34 percent, and El Salvador became dependent on food imports from the United States. While most peasants had survived on seasonal work and subsistence wages, the price of maize increased 100 percent and beans 225 percent during the 1920s. Sporadic peasant unrest was met forcefully by the Guardia Nacional. In addition to selling staple foods to El Salvador, U.S. banks lent $21 million to the government and appointed a fiscal agent to supervise the collection of trade duties. The coming of the Great Depression only worsened the situation. Coffee prices had dropped from $15.75 per hundred kilograms in 1928 to $5.97 by 1932, a devastating blow to a nation that got over 80 percent of its national income from coffee. The income of plantation workers, which had barely reached subsistence levels in 1928, was cut in half by 1932. Life for the campesinos was reaching a point of starvation and desperation. These were the key factors in the peasant revolt of 1932.
The domination of El Salvador by the oligarchy had provided political stability there in contrast to the unrest in Nicaragua. The oligarchy had established the custom of having each president personally designate his heir, thereby preventing internal factions from contesting for power. The presidents were “thorough-going dictators who ruled with an iron hand” in the interests of the oligarchy and the military.31 In 1927, the candidate “elected” was Pío Romero Bosque. Romero Bosque, however, turned out to be a reformer who desired to open up the political process and hold free elections for the presidency. When the time came, he refused to name a successor. The American Embassy in San Salvador feared problems in Dr. Bosque’s attempt to broaden the political process, a step embassy officials did not believe El Salvador was ready for. Given U.S. support of the oligarchy and the stability it imposed on El Salvador, the economic advantages it provided Americans, and the paternalistic views of State Department leaders that portrayed Latin Americans as incapable of democracy, the department saw no reason for change.
The onset of the Great Depression and the fall of coffee prices, coupled with the now open presidential race, brought about rising and widespread vocal opposition to the oligarchy’s rule and the status quo in El Salvador. Most of the opposition came from unorganized peasants and the trade unions in San Salvador. In addition, the Partido Comunisto de El Salvador (PCS), headed by Agustín Farabundo Martí, was founded in 1929. This party, however, never grew much beyond the students and intellectuals in the capital. The crash of coffee prices set off a series of protests in the nation. Eighty thousand people marched in San Salvador on May Day, 1930, demanding a minimum wage for agricultural workers, an end to unemployment, and better working conditions. Smaller demonstrations followed in both the capital and small towns, particularly around Izalco in the San Sonate Province. The government moved quickly to put an end to these protests. President Bosque banned all demonstrations and the distribution of “leftist” literature. Mass arrests were made, and in the four-month period leading up to the election, twelve hundred people were jailed. The government’s actions curtailed the number of demonstrations but did not eliminate unrest in the nation.
In March 1930, the new American charge, W. W. Schott, wrote to Stimson to report on the first upsurge of protest. Although there was some cause for concern, he believed that prompt government action would quickly return calm to the nation. He did not think “radicalism extends widely in the capital nor that the Government, by prompt and decisive measures, could not eradicate it entirely.” Unfortunately, “it has not seen fit” to do so. Ignoring the conditions that prompted the protests or the demands being made, Schott laid the blame at the feet of “agitators” who were “spreading subversive doctrines.” Even after reporting cases of violence on the large estates, the charge stated that the ordinary Salvadorean “does not incline toward change.” The danger was that, given their ignorance, they could be aroused by the PCS toward actions they did not understand. Still, the “situation could be controlled by no great energetic action.”32
By August, the chargé’s reports indicated that El Salvador’s problems had passed.33 Given such reporting and the prevalent views of American officials, it is no wonder that the State Department concluded in 1931 that El Salvador’s political situation was the best and most stable in the region, and would remain so as long as no one tried to institute too much change. The president needed only to maintain the support of the army and the oligarchy. The key to El Salvador’s stability was that the Assembly was under the complete control of the president and approved whatever he wanted. This meant, the Division of Latin American Affairs concluded, that “in general the Governments of Salvador have been fairly good, not oppressive to the people and with very little danger of being overthrown by revolution.”34 The Secretary of State agreed. Stimson noted in his diary that El Salvador’s stability made it the “second best” of the Central American republics.35
In this climate of unrest and repression, the first genuinely free elections were held in El Salvador in January 1931. Six candidates entered the race, three from the now-divided oligarchy, two generals, including General Martínez, and Arturo Araujo. While the other five represented the status quo and the interests of the oligarchy, Araujo campaigned as a liberal reformer. Even though he was a large landowner, he was known to pay his workers twice the normal wage. Labor and the peasants, lacking any political organizations of their own, supported Araujo. After a bitter campaign, and a last-minute withdrawal by Martinez to become Araujo’s vice president, Araujo led all the candidates with over 100,000 votes to 62,000 for the second candidate and 53,000 for the other three combined. Lacking a majority, the election went to the Assembly where Araujo’s election was ensured when the third-place candidate supported him.36 Araujo’s promises of land reform and legalized trade unions proved popular with the masses and indicated that many people in El Salvador desired change more than American officials had believed.
Inaugurated on March 1,1931, Araujo’s government lasted only nine months. The new government was ill-fated from the outset. On the one hand, the oligarchy went on “strike.” Unwilling to accept the election results, El Salvador’s elite refused to allow their supporters to take any government jobs. This deprived Araujo of most of El Salvador’s experienced professionals. On the other hand, having raised the expectations of the poor, Araujo found he could not satisfy his supporters. By July, martial law was declared and Araujo was relying on traditional methods to maintain his authority. In the fall, Araujo lost the support of the army, and on December 2, 1931, the army ousted him and established General Martinez as the new president.37 Because he was vice president and minister of war in Araujo’s government and was thought to have played a role in planning the coup, the State Department, in the midst of the Manchurian crisis, invoked the 1923 Washington Treaty and denied recognition to Martinez.
From the outset of the army rebellion, the actions of the new American minister, Charles Curtis, frustrated Stimson. Curtis had failed to inform the leaders of the revolt that the United States would uphold the “Hughes doctrine,” as Stimson called it, of not recognizing any revolutionary government. “This was a lost chance,” Stimson wrote in his diary, “because we have often been able to prevent a revolution by notifying the conspirators that even if they were successful, they wouldn’t get any recognition.”38 Stimson wired Curtis that he needed to make this policy clear to the leaders of the revolt.39 He found the situation in El Salvador “critical” and instructed Curtis to ascertain how General Martinez believed “a regime which can be recognized can be brought into office.”40
Nonrecognition placed the United States in a difficult position. Martínez had the support of both the military and the oligarchy and thus the power to defy American wishes and remain in power. Without the threat of military intervention, clearly out of the question given Stimson’s position regarding Japan’s actions in Manchuria, his efforts to withdraw American forces from Nicaragua, and the publication of the Clark Memorandum, how could the United States effectively influence events in El Salvador? The problem could be solved only through a change in policy.
In his first effort to resolve this problem and arrange a government in El Salvador that the United States could recognize, Stimson sent Jefferson Caffery to San Salvador on December 19, 1931, as a special representative of the Department of State. Caffery, who was currently the U.S. Minister to Colombia, was a former minister to El Salvador and enjoyed Stimson’s confidence. Despite protests that the United States had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of El Salvador, the Caffery mission was designed to obtain Martínez’s removal and the creation of a new government headed by somebody, civilian or military, who could be recognized by the United States under the terms of the treaty.
Caffery immediately sought Martínez’s resignation. He told the general directly that “under no circumstances could [the United States] recognize him.”41 His initial meetings, however, brought no movement by the president. Caffery informed Stimson that “unfortunately the better elements here are now supporting General Martinez because he offers for the moment a stable government.”42 With Martinez refusing to step down, Caffery realized that further efforts designed to secure a voluntary resignation were futile; he turned his attention instead to the young officers who had organized the December 2 revolt. Caffery sought, in effect, another coup to remove Martinez and replace him with somebody who was not associated with Araujo’s government and was, therefore, eligible for U.S. recognition. Caffery was able, so he believed, to persuade the officers to “force Martinez out and replace him with someone” who was eligible under the treaty.43 He informed the officers that the “Department of State would be glad to recognize anyone not debarred by the treaty.” Responding to the “tactfully” expressed concern relating to the “well known charges regarding the United States forcing its will on the smaller Latin American countries,” Caffery assured them that the United States “had not the slightest desire of doing anything of the kind; ‘we are backing no candidates.’”44
