Chaotic neutral, p.38
Chaotic Neutral, page 38
38. Tillery Jr., A. B., “Obama’s Legacy for Race Relations,” in ed. B. A. Rockman and A. Rudalevige, The Obama Legacy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2019), 73–74.
39. Via Twitter.com, https://twitter.com/BreeNewsome/status/1415302063366496258?s=20, July 14, 2021.
40. Tillery, “Obama’s Legacy for Race Relations,” 75.
41. Selfa, L., The Democrats: A Critical History (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008), 81.
42. Selfa, The Democrats, 71.
43. See “Raising the Floor: Sharing What Works in Workplace Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” (blog), November 28, 2016, White House, President Barack Obama, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov.
CHAPTER 11: DR. NO
1. Kalman, L., “The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal,” American Historical Review 110, no. 4 (2005): 1052–1080.
2. See Pareene, A., “Nihilist in Chief,” New Republic, March 21, 2019.
3. See Blum, R. M., How the Tea Party Captured the GOP (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020) on this point. Tea Party activists routinely voiced complaints about the establishment GOP in addition, obviously, to liberals and Democrats.
4. See Berman, R., “Mitch McConnell’s Slipping Grip on the Republican Party,” Atlantic, January 4, 2021, which discusses McConnell’s limitations but, as much writing of that period did, pronounces the GOP dead prematurely.
5. See an extended discussion in Jentelson, A., Kill Switch: The Rise of the Modern Senate and the Crippling of American Democracy (New York: Liveright, 2021).
6. Uscinski, J. E., Conspiracy Theories: A Primer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020).
7. Karabell, Z., “Here’s What Happens to a Conspiracy-Driven Party,” Politico, January 30, 2021.
8. See, for example, Fisher, M., “Probing the Tea Party’s Conspiracy Theory Fringe,” Atlantic, February 11, 2010.
9. Skocpol, T., and V. Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 104–110.
10. Newport, F., and A. Dugan, “5 Ways America Changed During the Obama Years,” Gallup, January 27, 2017, news.gallup.com.
11. On this point, see extended treatment in Peck, R., Fox Populism: Branding Conservatism as Working Class (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
12. Information in this section relies on Atlas, John, Seeds of Change: The Story of ACORN, America’s Most Controversial Antipoverty Community Organizing Group (Vanderbilt University Press, 2010), and “The Fall of ACORN: A Timeline,” Week, January 8, 2015.
13. Connolly, along with Rep. Hank Johnson in the following paragraph, are both quoted in Carter, Zachary D., and Arthur Delaney, “How the ACORN Scandal Seeded Today’s Nightmare Politics,” HuffPost, April 5, 2018.
14. Dreier, Peter, and Christopher R. Martin, “How ACORN Was Framed: Political Controversy and Media Agenda Setting.” Perspectives on Politics 8.3 (2010): 761–792.
15. See Cooper, R., “The Tyranny of the Congressional Budget Office,” Week, May 18, 2020
16. For a discussion of latent biases in the CBO’s methods, see DiVito, E., and M. Konczal, “Five Reasons Why the CBO Underestimates Federal Investment.” Roosevelt Institute, June 7, 2021.
17. Pareene, A., “The Real-Life Victims of Democrats’ Irrational Deficit Paranoia,” New Republic, May 5, 2021.
18. Levitz, E., “Dems Nix Anti-Recession Policy After Learning It Would Help Too Many People,” New York Magazine, May 14, 2020.
19. Drew, E., On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Touchstone Books, 1995), 87.
CHAPTER 12: IF YOU’RE WAITING FOR A SIGN, THIS IS IT
1. A comprehensive discussion of gender and the 2016 election is provided in Heldman, C., M. Conroy, and A. Ackerman, Sex and Gender in the 2016 Presidential Election (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2018).
2. Frank, T., The People, No (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020).
3. For example, Alexander, M., “Why Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Deserve the Black Vote,” Nation, February 10, 2016.
4. Lauter, D., “Why Did Trump Win? Democrats Stayed Home,” Los Angeles Times, November 11, 2016.
5. “Hillary Clinton’s Cynical Race Appeals: The Revenge of Neoliberal Identity Politics,” Salon, February 19, 2016.
6. See, just for starters, Ditonto, T., “Direct and Indirect Effects of Prejudice: Sexism, Information, and Voting Behavior in Political Campaigns,” Politics, Groups, and Identities 7, no. 3 (2019); and the collected work of Prof. Carol Heldman on unconscious sexism.
7. Reich, R., “The Democratic Party Needs to Clean House,” Newsweek, November 10, 2016.
8. Devine, C., “What if Hillary Clinton Had Gone to Wisconsin? Presidential Campaign Visits and Vote Choice in the 2016 Election,” Forum 16, no. 2 (2018).
9. Parenti, C., “Garbage In, Garbage Out,” Jacobin, November 17, 2016.
10. Morrill, J., and F. Clasen-Kelly, “Hillary Clinton Fighting ‘Enthusiasm Gap’ Among Some Black Voters,” Charlotte Observer, September 7, 2016.
11. Murphy, P., “Democrats Worry About Hillary Clinton’s Ground Game,” Daily Beast, October 17, 2016.
12. On the question of race and turnout in 2016 see Fraga, B. L., et al., “Why Did Trump Win? More Whites—and Fewer Blacks—Actually Voted,” Washington Post, May 8, 2017; and Green, J., and S. McElwee, “The Differential Effects of Economic Conditions and Racial Attitudes in the Election of Donald Trump,” Perspectives on Politics 17, no. 2 (2019): 358–379.
13. Farley, J., “Five Decisive States: Examining How and Why Donald Trump Won the 2016 Election,” Sociological Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2019): 337–353.
14. Monnat, S., and D. Brown, “More Than a Rural Revolt: Landscapes of Despair and the 2016 Presidential Election,” Journal of Rural Studies 55 (2017).
15. Mutz, D., “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 19 (2018): E4330–E4339.
16. Grimmer, J., and W. Marble, “Who Put Trump in the White House? Explaining the Contribution of Voting Blocs to Trump’s Victory,” working paper under review (2019): 3, https://williammarble.co/docs/vb.pdf.
17. Research shows definitively that voters changing their vote preference from one election to the next is less influential to electoral outcomes than changes in turnout from one election to the next. In other words, who does or does not show up to vote explains two different election outcomes better than the theory that certain voters changed their minds from one to the next. See Hill, S., “Changing Votes or Changing Voters? How Candidates and Election Context Swing Voters and Mobilize the Base,” Electoral Studies 48 (2017); and Fraga, B., The Turnout Gap: Race, Ethnicity, and Political Inequality in a Diversifying America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018). This does not imply that changing minds is irrelevant, though; see Hill, S., D. Hopkins, and G. Huber, “Not by Turnout Alone: Measuring the Sources of Electoral Change, 2012 to 2016,” Science Advances 7, no. 17 (2021).
18. Hopkins, D., and S. Washington, “The Rise of Trump, the Fall of Prejudice? Tracking White Americans’ Racial Attitudes via a Panel Survey, 2008–2018,” Public Opinion Quarterly 84, no. 1 (2020): 119–140.
19. Representative of the many published papers on this topic are, for sexism: Cassese, E., and M. Holman, “Playing the Woman Card: Ambivalent Sexism in the 2016 US Presidential Race,” Political Psychology 40, no. 1 (2019): 55–74; and for racism: Pettigrew, T., “Social Psychological Perspectives on Trump Supporters,” Journal of Social and Political Psychology 5, no. 1 (2017): 107–116. For an overview of both: Schaffner, B., M. MacWilliams, and T. Nteta, “Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism,” Political Science Quarterly 133, no. 1 (2018): 9–34.
20. Morgan, S., “Status Threat, Material Interests, and the 2016 Presidential Vote,” Socius 4 (2018).
21. See for example Sides, J., M. Tesler, and L. Vavreck, Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).
22. Sharp, L., “Branding Hillary,” Baffler, May 2021.
23. Sullivan, J., “The New Old Democrats,” Democracy, June 20, 2018.
24. Carnes, N., and N. Lupu, “It’s Time to Bust the Myth: Most Trump Voters Were Not Working Class,” Washington Post, June 5, 2017.
CHAPTER 13: LESSONS LEARNED
1. Masket, S., Learning from Loss: The Democrats 2016–2020 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 61.
2. To cite but a few examples: “Health Care Powered Democratic Wins in 2018,” New York Times, September 2, 2020; “Democrats Ran and Won on Health Care; Now What?,” CNN, November 17, 2018; and “The One Issue That’s Really Driving the Midterm Elections,” Atlantic, November 2, 2018.
3. Hall, C., and J. Tolbert, “Health Care and the Candidates in the 2018 Midterm Elections: Key Issues in Races,” Kaiser Family Foundation, October 22, 2018.
4. Scott, D., “What the New Democratic House Majority Might Actually Pass on Health Care,” Vox, November 12, 2018.
5. Cauterucci, C., J. Craven, and R. Hampton, “There’s Something Icky About the Internet’s Ecstatic Stacey Abrams Worship,” Slate, January 7, 2021.
6. See Third Way, Collective PAC, and Latino Victory, “2020 Post-Election Analysis,” ThirdWay.org.
7. Ghitis, F., “What Democrats Need to Learn from Trump’s Better-Than-Expected Showing,” CNN, November 4, 2020.
8. Burns, A., “Democratic Report Raises 2022 Alarms on Messaging and Voter Outreach,” New York Times, June 6, 2021.
9. Lewis, C. M., “Third Way to Nowhere,” Baffler, June 30, 2021.
10. Giridharadas, A., “Welcome to the New Progressive Era,” Atlantic, April 14, 2021.
11. Krugman, P., “How Democrats Learned to Seize the Day,” New York Times, February 8, 2021.
12. Levitz, E., “Biden’s COVID-Relief Bill Is a Big F**king Deal,” New York Magazine, March 9, 2021.
13. Benen, S., “The Democrats’ Preoccupation in 2021: Learning Lessons from 2009,” MSNBC, February 1, 2021.
14. Pareene, A., “Have Democrats Learned Their Lesson?,” New Republic, March 11, 2021.
15. Milbank, D., “‘Moderate’ Joe Biden Has Become the Most Progressive Nominee in History,” Washington Post, October 27, 2020.
16. Zhou, L., “Progressives’ Biggest Fear About the Build Back Better Act Has Come to Pass,” Vox, December 19, 2021.
17. Karson, K., and M. Khan, “Pelosi Backs Kennedy over Markey in Contentious Massachusetts Senate Race,” ABC News online, August 20, 2020.
CHAPTER 14: THE LAST CHAPTER PROBLEM
1. Greenberg, D., “Why Last Chapters Disappoint,” New York Times, March 18, 2011.
2. See, for example, Moncrief, G., and J. A. Thompson, “On the Outside Looking In: Lobbyists’ Perspectives on the Effects of State Legislative Term Limits,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 1, no. 4 (2001): 394–411.
3. Olson, M. P., and J. C. Rogowski, “Legislative Term Limits and Polarization,” Journal of Politics 82, no. 2 (2020): 572–586.
4. For just one exploration of this issue, see Wootson Jr., C., “New Generation of Activists, Deeply Skeptical of Democratic Party, Resists Calls to Channel Energy into the 2020 Campaign,” Washington Post, June 13, 2020.
5. Illing, S., “Wokeness Is a Problem and We All Know It,” Vox, April 27, 2021.
6. For example, Boch, A., “Increasing American Political Tolerance: A Framework Excluding Hate Speech,” Socius 6 (2020); or Rosenfeld, M., “Moving a Mountain: The Extraordinary Trajectory of Same-Sex Marriage Approval in the United States,” Socius 3 (2017).
7. Geismer, L., and M. Lassiter, “Stop Worrying About Upper-Class Suburbanites,” Jacobin, January 1, 2021.
8. Klingelhöfer, J., “The Swing Voters’ Blessing,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 174 (2020).
9. Quirk, P., and W. Cunion, “Clinton’s Domestic Policy: The Lessons of a ‘New Democrat’,” in ed. C. Campbell and B. Rockman, The Clinton Legacy (London: Chatham House, 2000), 225.
10. Cook, C., “Just Who Are These Undecided Voters, Anyway?,” Cook Political Report, September 10, 2019.
11. Burmila, E., “To Beat the NRA, Think Like the NRA,” Washington Post, February 18, 2018.
12. See the excellent background in Newirth, M., “Death Travels West, Watch Him Go,” Baffler, April 2001.
Ed Burmila, Chaotic Neutral
