The confederacys last hu.., p.46
The Confederacy's Last Hurrah, page 46
On the 13th, only a day after Biffle had gone to the right, Hood learned that he had guessed wrong. Wilson had moved from Edgefield, recrossing the Cumberland River, but instead of going upriver he had camped in the vicinity of Hood’s weakened western flank. Again Hood sought to juggle the disposition of his troops. He ordered Stewart to send Matthew D. Ector’s infantry brigade, commanded by Colonel David Coleman, to the Hardin pike to support Chalmers. On the 14th, Coleman’s Texans and North Carolinians moved into position, allowing Chalmers to shift most of his cavalrymen farther north and west, toward the Charlotte pike and the river. At last Hood was beginning to consider his increasingly vulnerable left flank.24
Inevitably, Hood had become involved in a vast juggling act, so often redeploying and changing the assignments of his troops that it appeared to his men he had lost all perspective. Bate’s infantrymen, nearly one-fourth of whom were still barefoot, upon their return to the army about December 12th had trudged across the ice-crusted ground to bolster the critical right flank under Frank Cheatham. Also, Hood continued to transfer and detach other troops for various purposes. Colonel Charles H. Olmstead’s relatively fresh brigade in Cleburne’s Division, having just convoyed a supply train to the army from Florence, Alabama—thus missing the bloodbath at Franklin—was sent on December 8th to join Forrest north of Murfreesboro. Francis M. Cockrell’s decimated brigade of Missourians was sent on December 10th with an Alabama battery from A. P. Stewart’s Corps on a long, difficult march to the mouth of the Duck River near Johnsonville. The purpose was to construct a fort along the Tennessee River to prevent Federal gunboats from operating against Hood’s line of supplies. Yet these Rebels never arrived at their intended post. After a harrowing ten days’ march through incessant rain and bottomless roads, the detachment was recalled following the Battle of Nashville. These men were thus lost in entirety to Hood’s badly depleted army at the most critical time.25
Ironically, it was Hood’s compelling need for more troops that had prompted many of his more drastic actions, from the very inception of the Nashville siege. On December 5th Hood had sent a proposal for an exchange of prisoners under a flag of truce to Nashville, but Thomas perceived Hood’s greater need for more men, and replied that he had already sent all captured Confederates north. The growing plight of the Army of Tennessee, greatly weakened by its Franklin losses, detachments, and desertions, caused Hood on December 11th to plead directly with the War Department for reinforcements. Citing the fact that 15,000 Federals were reported moving from the Mississippi River to reinforce Thomas at Nashville, Hood sought Confederate troops from the trans-Mississippi “in time for the spring campaign, if not sooner.” Unknown to Hood, Beauregard, at Montgomery, Alabama, already had learned that A. J. Smith’s troops were en route to Nashville, and on December 2d had written to Jefferson Davis, asking that Kirby Smith’s troops be sent from the trans-Mississippi to reinforce Hood. Davis had okayed the request on December 4th, but Kirby Smith, when notified of the plan in Louisiana on December 20th, was reluctant to cooperate. Sixteen days later he forwarded a negative reply, saying it was too difficult to cross the enemy-patrolled Mississippi River or advance through devastated country without supplies. Hood could expect no help from the trans-Mississippi region.26
Hood then learned on December 13th that his frequently expressed plan to replenish his army with recruits in Tennessee had been an outright failure. The army had gained only 164 recruits since entering Tennessee. Furthermore, of the 296 dismounted cavalrymen who had been assigned to Ed Johnson’s Division, all but forty-two had deserted. Hood reacted angrily and resolved “to bring into the army [by conscription] all men liable to military duty.” If recruits wouldn’t voluntarily flock to his standards, he intended to bring them in at the point of the bayonet. Noting the great resistance among the local men to join the Confederate army, Stephen D. Lee estimated that perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 men had fled the countryside ahead of Hood’s army and had gone to Nashville “to get out of the reach of conscription.”27
With an enemy attack momentarily expected and less than 25,000 troops present, Hood, on December 14th, was so desperate as to direct the brigade protecting his vital supply railroads in northern Alabama to join the army “as soon as possible,” leaving only one regiment at Decatur, Alabama.28
Hood’s plight was so great he even modified his battle orders in order to better protect his rear and flank. On December 10th, when Lee’s and Stewart’s Corps withdrew their lines for convenience in cutting trees to burn for fuel, Hood considered that this provided for “a better left flank.” Specifically, he anticipated being able to more quickly move many of his troops to any threatened point. Hood expected an imminent attack on his fortifications, and his circular to the army of the 10th announced that “it [is] highly probable that we will fight a battle before the close of the present year.”29
Basic to Hood’s defensive concept were “self supporting detached works”—small enclosed redoubts capable of holding seventy-five to a hundred men, built of logs and earth, with embrasures for artillery. These redoubts were intended to be independent but mutually supporting, allowing a minimum of defenders to hold their ground against greater numbers of attacking troops. Artillery was ordered positioned so as to fire in any direction, and the men were instructed to hold these redoubts “at all hazard, and not to surrender under any circumstances.” Generally, these small forts were to be positioned in the rear of each corps’ right and left flank, allowing for maximum flexibility in defense. The importance Hood placed on these structures was evident when he directed the corps commanders, in person, to superintend their construction, “not leaving them either to subordinate commanders or engineer officers.”30
In all, Hood, perhaps the most aggressive, assault-oriented commander in the Confederate army, was putting his reliance upon defensive works in order to beat Thomas. It was quite a psychological about-face for the man who had ordered the all-out frontal assault at Franklin only two weeks earlier.
In Hood’s mind the question was not so much would Thomas attack, but where he might strike. With only about 23,000 men positioned across a limited front and surrounded by rolling hills and many valleys, Hood knew he was vulnerable to a flank attack. He thus paid particular attention to reports from his scouts and spies, and to Federal troop movements along his front. Hood probably learned through a spy of the Federal cavalry’s recrossing of the Cumberland on December 12th. Yet by the end of the second week in December, Hood could only guess as to where Thomas might strike.31
Finally, on December 13th, there was a clue. That afternoon two brigades of Federal troops, Colonel Adam Malloy’s and Colonel Charles R. Thompson’s, probably 3,000 men combined, marched out the Murfreesboro pike toward the Rains farm. Advancing in line of battle, Malloy’s and Thompson’s men began a lively skirmish with some of Frank Cheatham’s men. Thompson’s men were blacks, many of whom were under fire for the first time, yet the Confederate skirmish lines were soon driven back to the main line. The protracted fight continued at a distance until nearly dark, when the Federals withdrew. Malloy suffered only ten casualties, Thompson about a dozen, and the men seemed to consider the whole affair a useless fight. “We should almost have … cut steps in the icy covering of the hillside to get to them [enemy].… I should have got along gaily on skates today,” wrote an officer of Thompson’s command.32
This Federal reconnaissance had been of nominal value; it only confirmed that the Confederates remained in force along the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad. Yet to Hood, looking for evidence of Thomas’s intentions, it seemed significant. That day the men of Granbury’s Brigade were ordered to build a redoubt on the north side of the railroad cut capable of holding 300 men. Also, Federal pickets observed the Confederates moving artillery into position. A Federal officer considered these developments and wondered about the effect among the enemy’s commanders. Was it possible that the series of probes and reconnaissances toward Hood’s right flank, which seemed unnecessary and fruitless, actually may have given Hood the impression that this was the point selected for the main assault?33
The answer was yes, and decidedly so. This sudden activity along his right flank seemed to convince Hood that an enemy buildup was under way in this sector. If Thomas was going to the rescue of Murfreesboro, as Hood envisioned, inevitably he must attack along the eastern flank.
Of course, Thomas was not considering the relief of Murfreesboro. His only objective continued to be the destruction of Hood’s army. The essential questions thus were posed: Would Thomas strike where the Confederate army was the most vulnerable? Could Thomas’s massive assault avoid a Franklinlike disaster in attacking Hood’s defensive fortifications? Would Thomas even be retained in command so as to conduct an attack?
III
On the evening of December 13th, George H. Thomas, trying to sound optimistic, wrote to Chief of Staff Henry Halleck in Washington, “At length there are indications of a favorable change in the weather, and as soon as there is I shall move against the enemy, as everything is ready and [I am] prepared to assume the offensive.” That day there had been a shifting of the wind to the east and southeast, bringing more moderate temperatures. Yet the day was still very cold, and the snow in the fields melted very slowly. During the night warmer winds prevailed, so that on the foggy morning of December 14th it seemed actually warm, with a misty rain falling. By 7:00 A.M. the snow and ice had rapidly melted, and again there was only bare ground visible. Under cloudy skies the men tried the footing and found that there now was a new impediment—mud. A Michigan cavalryman discovered that in Nashville “the streets which so lately were covered with ice are today a vast sea of mud.”34
To George H. Thomas, however, the break in the freezing weather must have seemed like the onset of summer. Despite the thick fog, which as late as 11:00 A.M. prevented the enemy’s works from being seen, Thomas was busy on December 14th with his preparations for battle. By midday he sent word to his corps commanders to prepare for operations per previous arrangements. At 3:00 P.M. he conducted a meeting at the St. Cloud Hotel where the final dispositions were made.35
By 6:00 P.M. formal orders had been drawn up, it having been decided to attack early the following morning, “if not too foggy.” By 8:00 P.M. Thomas sent word to a navy gunboat commander that an attack was imminent, and “if you can drop down the river and engage their batteries on the river bank, it will be excellent cooperation.”36
Thomas then returned to his correspondence. On hand was a newly arrived, openly threatening telegram from Halleck, dated at 12:30 P.M. that day. Halleck wasted few words. It was seriously feared that while Hood with part of his forces “held you in check near Nashville,” other portions of the enemy’s force would operate against other vulnerable points, wrote Halleck. Hence, Grant was most upset and anxious, since Federal forces along the Mississippi River had to protect Memphis and Vicksburg, instead of cooperating with William Tecumseh Sherman’s march by threatening various Rebel positions. “Every day’s delay on your part, therefore, seriously interferes with General Grant’s plans,” warned the crusty chief of staff.37
Thomas, now much relieved about the situation, wired Halleck in reply at 8:00 P.M., “The ice having melted away today, the enemy will be attacked tomorrow morning. Much as I regret the apparent delay in attacking the enemy, it could not have been done before with any reasonable hope of success.”38
Already word of a pending fight had spread through the army. In the 125th Ohio of Opdycke’s brigade, a soldier wrote in his diary, “It is common talk that we are to fight Hood tomorrow.” Another private noted that evening how many of the men were writing letters home, knowing that perhaps before the sun set on the morrow they might be dead. In his tent that night James H. Wilson wrote to an officer of Grant’s staff, “Everybody else has made his last will and testament, or written to his wife or sweetheart, but, having nothing to dispose of, and neither wife or sweetheart to write to, I give you about four minutes before preparing myself four or five hours of sleep. All arrangements are made for battle in the morning, and much seems in our favor. If we are ordinarily successful, and Hood ordinarily complacent, we shall have but little time for letter writing during the next two weeks.”39
Another Federal officer, Captain Job Aldrich of the 17th U.S. Colored Troops, had a bad feeling about the coming fight. He seemed convinced that he would die, and gave his money, watch, and personal belongings to his brother-in-law’s wife, who was visiting in Nashville at the time. Aldrich then wrote an emotional letter to his wife, “the most affecting I ever read,” later said his brother-in-law, Colonel William R. Shafter. Aldrich’s letter concluded: “The clock strikes one, good night. At five the dance of death begins around Nashville. Who shall be partners in the dance? God only knows. Echo alone answers who? Farewell.”40
*According to Wilson and several others, this meeting occurred December 9th or 10th. These were recollections based on the writing of memoirs many years later. The best evidence of the actual date is in Fourth Corps Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Fullerton’s contemporary journal. Also, for Schofield’s version of the meeting, see his Forty-Six Years in the Army, 237ff.
CHAPTER XXVIII
Matters of Some Embarrassment
I
Ulysses S. Grant still had reservations. Sending John A. Logan to relieve Thomas at Nashville had been a spur-of-the-moment decision. Logan was not a West Point professional, and Grant didn’t want to cause further divisiveness among the Nashville army’s generals. On the afternoon of December 14th he suddenly decided to go in person to Nashville. That evening Grant left his headquarters at City Point, Virginia, and journeyed by steamboat to Washington, D.C., where he arrived early the following afternoon. Upon his arrival at the capital Grant found that the telegraph wires to Nashville had been down since about 5:00 P.M. on the 14th and nothing had been heard from Thomas since his “no change” telegram of the 13th.1
Grant, on the afternoon of the 15th, met in a tense and climactic conference with Halleck, Stanton, and Lincoln. At one point Major Thomas T. Eckert of the telegraph office was called in, and he confirmed that no new information had been received from Thomas. Although Lincoln and Stanton had misgivings, Grant obtained their reluctant approval for Thomas’s removal due to his failure to act. Grant wrote out the formal order and handed it to Major Eckert to transmit once the lines were reopened. He then went back to Willard’s Hotel to prepare for his departure to Nashville, while Eckert trudged off to the telegraph office.2
II
Thursday, December 15, 1864, dawned warm and cloudy at Nashville. The ground continued to be soft and muddy, but what dominated the attention of all was the vast blanket of dense fog. This misty gray vapor, accentuated by the smoldering campfires of the troops, so obscured the light that every object seemed enveloped in a cloud even at a few feet. Although Thomas’s entire army had arisen at 4:00 A.M. to prepare for active operations at 6:00 A.M., the fog so engulfed the camps that it was impossible to see sufficiently to manage the mass movement of troops. The order to move was arbitrarily suspended by some commanders. Full daylight brought little relief. At 7:00 A.M. the fog continued to hover over the ground in a dense blanket. Another half hour passed, and still the fog lingered.3
George H. Thomas was observed checking out of the St. Cloud Hotel as if some ordinary traveler. “There was no haughtiness nor ostentatious [show]” in his appearance, noticed a soldier, and he seemed to have an unmistakable “air of business about him.” Although Thomas had anticipated a delay, his entire plan was contingent on the timely and coordinated execution of his operational orders. Thomas intended to sweep around Hood’s western flank and attack the exposed works defended by A. P. Stewart’s Corps. His main tactical maneuver would be the wide wheeling movement by three divisions of Wilson’s cavalry along the westernmost roads to envelop Hood’s flank. Because much of the cavalry would be mounted, good visibility and sufficient footing were important to their advance. Without the cavalry’s help the infantry would remain vulnerable to counterattack beyond their exposed flank. With the weather warm, no rain expected, and all operational planning developed, Thomas decided to simply wait out the fog.4
By Thomas’s design his primary offensive punch would be supplied by the relatively fresh troops of A. J. Smith. “Smith’s Guerrillas,” as they liked to fancy themselves, were organized into three divisions of infantry and had been directed to wheel southwest against A. P. Stewart’s exposed flank. For supports they would have Wilson’s cavalry on their right and Thomas J. Wood’s Fourth Corps on their left. Wood’s men would stay in close support of Smith’s columns, while threatening Montgomery Hill in front and flank. In order to prevent an enemy sortie against Nashville, James B. Steedman, in charge of reserve troops, had been ordered to occupy the interior lines with the post garrison, quartermaster’s units, and his own provisional brigades of recruits, furloughed soldiers, and other unassigned volunteers.5
All but left out of Thomas’s plans had been John M. Schofield, his next ranking subordinate and the former commander of the Franklin forces. Schofield’s only assignment was to form his troops for use as a general reserve. In fact, Thomas told Schofield to put most of his men in the trenches to replace a portion of the Fourth Corps, and with the remainder of his troops to “co-operate” with Wood by protecting that general’s flank. Schofield took immediate offense. During the night of the 14th he had visited A. J. Smith, and then Wood, suggesting a modification in Thomas’s plans. Having obtained Wood’s support, Schofield confronted Thomas and “explained to him” that due to the extent of the ground to be covered the 11,000 men of the Twenty-third Corps could better be used on the far Federal right, where the main attack was to occur. Although Thomas approved, Schofield later reflected that “General Thomas did not possess in a high degree the activity of mind necessary to foresee and provide for all the exigencies of military operations, nor the mathematical talent required to estimate ‘the relations of time, space, motion, and force.’” Despite the change, Thomas refused to assign Schofield any major operational responsibility in the attack. He decreed that Schofield should advance only as a general reserve to Smith’s, rather than Wood’s troops.6
