Sunday in hell, p.100
Sunday in Hell, page 100
Throughout their training, the bomber crews, all volunteers, were never told of their destination, only that it was “an extremely hazardous mission.” Not until the task force was at sea did they learn their destination - Tokyo. Because Japanese picket ships discovered the presence of the task force and warned of the sighting before the carriers arrived at their planned aircraft launch point, the decision was made to launch as soon as possible, ten hours earlier and 170 miles further from the target. The earlier launch adversely affected Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle’s air tactics plan. To the bomber crews, with each airplane carrying four specially modified 500-pound bombs, including one incendiary, the decision meant a daylight attack, in single file, instead of a night raid, and Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle couldn’t proceed to their target two hours ahead of the remaining fifteen and drop incendiary bombs to light the way for a concentrated night attack on the target.
The early launch also ensured none could possibly reach their intended destination airfield in China. Admiral Halsey’s 24 April action report to Admiral Nimitz, completed while the task force was still at sea and quoted in part below, tells of the decision.
After fueling of the heavy ships on 17 April, these ships (carriers and cruisers) proceeded west without destroyers and oilers in order to permit high speed operations. Fuel conservation for destroyers was another consideration. High winds and heavy sea conditions prevailed. The destroyers rejoined the morning following the attack (19th) and the oilers (with destroyer escort) two days later (21st).
The necessity for launching the Army planes at 0820 on the 18th about 650 miles east of Tokyo was regrettable. The plan was to close to the 500 mile circle and there launch one plane to attack at dusk and this provide a target for the remaining planes which would strike about two hours later. This plan was evolved by Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle, in command of the Army flight, and was designed to inflict the greatest damage with the least risk. The remote location of the desired terminus for the flight was also a factor influencing the selection of this plan of attack. However, contacts with enemy surface vessels early in the morning compromised the secrecy of the operation, and after the third contact, at 0744, the decision was made to launch. Japanese radio traffic was intercepted indicating that the presence of the raiding force was reported. The prime consideration then was the launching of the Army planes before the arrival of Japanese bombers.
The successful launching of the 16 Army bombers from the HORNET in unfavorable wind and sea conditions reflected great credit on the Army pilots and on the Commanding Officer of the HORNET…
Captain Marc Mitscher, Hornet’s skipper, made the decision to launch. The aircraft were respotted on the Hornet’s deck to allow for engine starting and run-ups, leaving Doolittle in his lead aircraft 467 feet for takeoff distance. Despite the fact none of the B-25 pilots had ever taken off from a carrier before, all 16 aircraft launched safely between 0820 and 0919. To avoid radar detection they flew just above wave top level and began arriving over Japan about noon (Tokyo time), six hours after launch, and bombed military and industrial targets in Tokyo, two in Yokohama, and one each in Yokosuka, Nagoya, Kobe and Osaka, the latter targets all to the southwest of Tokyo. Although some B-25s encountered light antiaircraft fire and a few enemy fighters over Japan, no bomber was shot down or severely damaged. Fifteen of the 16 then proceeded southwest along the southern coast of Japan and across the East China Sea towards unoccupied areas in eastern China, where recovery bases supposedly awaited them. They faced unforeseen challenges during their flight to China: night was approaching, the aircraft were running low on fuel, and the weather was rapidly deteriorating.
Fifteen aircraft reached the China coast after thirteen hours of flight and crash-landed or the crews bailed out. One B-25, extremely low on fuel, headed instead for the closer land mass of the Soviet Union and landed 40 miles beyond Vladivostok, where their B-25 was confiscated and the crew interned until they managed to escape through Iran in 1943. The raid was the longest combat mission ever flown by the Mitchell B-25 bomber, averaging approximately 2,250 miles.
There were 10,000 Navy men in the task force. Eighty Army Air Force men took part in the raid, five men in each of the sixteen B-25s. One man, Corporal Leland Faktor, was killed on bail-out after the mission. Two men from Crew #6 drowned as a result of a crash landing in the water off the China coast: Sergeant Donald E. Fitzmaurice and Staff Sergeant William J. Dieter. The Japanese captured eight men, and all were held for a time in the Japanese police headquarters in Shanghai: Lieutenants Dean E. Hallmark, Robert J. Meder, Chase J. Nielsen, William G. Farrow, Robert L. Hite, and George Barr, and Corporals Harold A. Spatz and Jacob DeShazer. On 28 August 1942, after a mock trial the Japanese executed three by firing squad: pilots Hallmark and Farrow, and gunner Spatz. Lieutenant Meder died of beriberi and malnutrition while in prison.
Four survived 40 months of prison, most of which was in solitary confinement. Most raiders flew additional combat missions after the Tokyo raid. Four raiders became POWs of the Germans later in the war. Thirteen died later during World War II, most in action against the enemy.
Immediately following the raid, Doolittle told his crew that he believed the loss of all 16 aircraft, coupled with the relatively minor damage the aircraft had inflicted on their targets, rendered the raid a failure, and he expected a court martial after he returned to the United States. Instead, the raid bolstered American morale to the extent that President Roosevelt awarded him the Medal of Honor, he was promoted two grades to Brigadier General, skipping the rank of colonel. He went on to command the 12th Air Force in North Africa, the 15th Air Force in the Mediterranean, and the 8th Air Force in England in the next three years. Additionally, Corporal Dave Thatcher, an engineer-gunner and Lieutenant Thomas White, flight surgeon-gunner, each received the Silver Star for their brave efforts in helping several wounded crew members evade Japanese troops in China. All the remaining raiders, including Thatcher and White, were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and those who were killed, wounded or injured as a result of the raid also received the Purple Heart. Additionally, every Doolittle Raider received a decoration from the Chinese government.24
On Wednesday, 4 March 1942, while the battle for Bataan was still in progress, and planning for the Doolittle Raid was under way, President Roosevelt signed the letter posthumously awarding the Medal of Honor to Ensign Herbert C. Jones, whom Joey Border had met when he came to the Springers’ quarters in January 1941. Ensign Jones, who had been a crew member on the California at Pearl Harbor, was among fourteen men who received Medals of Honor, eleven posthumously, as a result of their actions on 7 December. Another 48 men were awarded the Navy Cross, three posthumously, and one officer, Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson from the Enterprise’s VS-6, received two Navy Crosses, the second awarded in the form of a Gold Star for sinking a Japanese submarine on 10 December 1941. The Navy also awarded 63 Silver Star Medals, while separately the Army and Army Air Force awarded a total of five Distinguished Service Crosses and 66 Silver Stars.
The Navy later named a ship after each man who posthumously received the Medal of Honor for their acts of courage and valor at Pearl Harbor. The Destroyer Escort Herbert C. Jones (DE-137), sponsored by his widow, Mrs. Herbert C. Jones of Menlo Park, California, slid down the ways at the Consolidated Steel Corporation shipbuilding division yard at 12 noon on Tuesday, 19 January 1943. In addition to Mrs. Jones’ presence, the late twenty-three year old ensign’s father, retired Navy Captain Herbert A. Jones, who once also served on the battleship California, observed the launching and spoke with pride of his son.
The Navy blue ran deep in his veins. Navy customs. Navy spirit, Navy traditions - those were his life. The only duty well done as far as he was concerned was one done beyond the call of duty. The USS Herbert C. Jones has built into her for her officers and men the soul and spirit of Ensign Herbert C. Jones.
Following the Doolittle raid and the 6 May surrender of the garrison on Corregidor, two major Naval battles, Coral Sea and Midway, turned the tide of the Pacific war and finally relieved the heavy pressure felt in Hawaii since the attack on Pearl Harbor - though more than thirty-seven months of heavy fighting were to follow the disastrous defeat suffered by the Imperial Japanese Navy at Midway.
In May 1942, while Bob and Joey Border were in Pensacola, Florida for Bob’s naval aviator training, Imperial Japan was nearing the apex of its power, with occupying forces providing a sphere of influence stretching from Burma to Java, the Bismarck Archipelago, north of New Guinea, and were threatening New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Australia, and the lengthy supply line stretching from the United States’ West Coast through Hawaii, Samoa, the Fiji Islands, and New Caledonia to Australia and New Zealand. Far to the north they were pressing across the Aleutian Island chain toward Alaska.
Still reeling from a long series of humiliating defeats, the Allies were just beginning to develop the skills and gather the resources needed to survive, protect the supply line and sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand, and eventually roll back the enemy’s territorial gains. Allied strategy at this time was focused on a defensive buildup of the United States Army and Marine Corps strength on New Caledonia - well to the south, southeast of the Solomon Islands - and Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force units in the south and east of the Australian Territory of New Guinea, just north of Australia.
On 12 March the Japanese Prime Minister, General Hideki Tojo had said, “Australia and New Zealand are now threatened by the might of the imperial forces, and both them know that any resistance is futile. If the Australian government does not modify her present attitude, their continent will suffer the same fate as the Dutch East Indies.”
In April, after the Doolittle raid, when the Japanese realized the homeland was vulnerable to air attack, and were still convinced of their invincibility, the Japanese forces chose to expand their perimeter instead of rapidly consolidating its defenses. A major expedition would be launched against Midway to draw the American Fleet into battle and destroy it. As a diversion, a smaller Japanese force would seize Attu and Kiska in the western Aleutians, making its strike one day ahead of the main force. Later, once the Japanese had established bases at Port Moresby on the south coast of New Guinea and the island of Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, further operations could be launched to isolate Australia and New Zealand by capturing New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa.
Japanese forces left their new stronghold of Rabaul, on the island of New Britain, just north of New Guinea, to launch a two-pronged campaign: an amphibious assault against Port Moresby (Operation “MO”), on New Guinea, and another against Tulagi, the latter with the intent to establish seaplane bases at Tulagi and in the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern tip of New Guinea. To accomplish their Port Moresby objective, guard their invasion force, and engage any Allied naval warships that approached to contest the invasion force, the Japanese assembled a large force split into several elements, consisting of two heavy aircraft carriers, the Shokaku and Zuikaku, both of which were veterans of Pearl Harbor; a smaller carrier, Shoho, a seaplane tender, nine cruisers and thirteen destroyers. The smaller carrier and its force were to support and cover the troop transports. Intercepted radio messages and the previously broken Japanese code warned the Allies of the move of Japanese land-based bombers south, and that an offensive operation was impending.
In the Allied forces as they converged in the Coral Sea were three main groups. Task Force 17 centered around the carrier Yorktown, led by Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who would later take command of the three task forces and reorganize them into five task groups. In Task Force 11, led by Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch, was the carrier Lexington which on 4 May had launched a damaging, surprise series of four air strikes on the enemy’s Tulagi forces. Task Force 11 had 69 planes, two heavy cruisers, and six destroyers while TF-17 had 67 planes, three heavy cruisers, six destroyers, and two fleet oilers. The third was Task Force 44, a group of Allied warships, including the two Australian ships, heavy cruiser HMAS Australia and the light cruiser HMAS Hobart, commanded by Australian Rear Admiral John Crace. In TF-44 with Australia and Hobart, were the American cruiser Chicago, and destroyers Perkins, Farragut, and Walke.
When Admiral Fletcher took command of the combined Task Force 17, the re-designated and reorganized order of battle was: Task Group 17.2 (Attack Group), commanded by Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, composed of the cruisers Minneapolis, New Orleans, Astoria, Chester, and Portland; and the destroyers Phelps, Dewey, Farragut, Aylwin, and Monaghan. The cruiser New Orleans, with its growing legend of “…pass the ammunition,” was at Pearl Harbor, as were all five destroyers, including Monaghan, which had rammed, depth charged and sunk the midget submarine inside the harbor that morning.
Task Group 17.3 (Support Group), commanded by Australian Rear Admiral Crace, was all the combatants in TF-44, less the destroyer Farragut, now in the Attack Group.
Task Group 17.5 (Carrier Group), commanded by Admiral Fitch, included the Lexington and Yorktown, and destroyers Anderson, Hammann, Russell and Morris – the destroyer Bob Border had been ordered to ride back to Pearl Harbor to return to the Tennessee after he proposed to Joey in February 1941.
In Task Group 17.6 (Fueling Group), commanded by Captain John S. Phillips on his oiler and Pearl Harbor veteran, Neosho, was a second oiler, the Tippecanoe, with destroyers Sims and Worden - another Pearl Harbor veteran. Task Group 17.9 (Search Group) was one ship, the seaplane tender Tangier with 12 PBY-5 Catalina flying boats. Tangier, too, was a Pearl Harbor veteran, having been moored aft of the capsized Utah with its still-entombed 47 crewmembers. Tangier now had a new skipper, Commander George H. DeBaun.
In Task Force “MO” confronting the Allied force, was the Carrier Striking Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi, with the carriers Shokau and Zuikaku; the cruisers Myoko and Haguro; two Division 7 destroyers, Ushio and Akebono; four Division 27 destroyers, Ariake, Yugure, Shiratsuyu, and Shigure; and the oiler Toho Maru.
The Port Moresby Invasion Group, commanded by Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka, included the cruiser Yubari; destroyers Oite, Asanagi, Uziuki, Mutsuki, Mochizuki, and Yayoi, plus the transport unit commanded by Rear Admiral Koso Abe. The invasion Support Group, commanded by Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo, was composed of the cruisers Tenryu and Tatusta; the Kamikawa Maru; and three gunboats, the Keijo Maru, Seikai Maru, and Nikkai Maru. The Covering Group, commanded by Rear Admiral Goto, was composed of the carrier Shoho; the cruisers Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa, and Furutaka, and the destroyer Sazanami. The submarine force was commanded by Captain Noburu Ishizaki.
The Tulagi Invasion Group, which had come and gone - except for some supporting ships - when Lexington launched her four strikes on 4 May, was commanded by Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima, and was composed of the minelayers Ikinoshima and Koei Maru; the transport Azumasan Maru, and destroyers Kikuzuki and Yuzuki.
On 6 May, after the Port Moresby invasion and carrier support forces had been sighted heading toward New Guinea by American B-17 bombers which fruitlessly attempted to bomb them, the battle was joined. Admiral Fletcher, mindful his role was to protect Port Moresby, and concerned about separating his carrier forces in the face of possibly three Japanese carriers, made the difficult decision to split his surface forces instead, sending Admiral Crace’s TG-17.3 to block the invasion force. Both he and Crace were aware of the lessons learned from the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse when they were without air cover to defend against land-based bombers. Their fears were nearly realized when the cruisers were spotted and came under intense air attack from a squadron of torpedo bombers the afternoon of 7 May. The ships escaped with a few casualties and little damage. Only a few minutes after the Japanese raid, Crace’s force was inadvertently attacked by friendly B-17s, and the Perkins and Farragut once again had to endure near misses.
The complex, maneuvering battle, which occurred southwest of the Island of Guadalcanal in the Coral Sea, 7-8 May 1942, became the first of six major battles in the war in which the two contending fleets never fired a gun directly at one another, but fought at a distance beyond gun range, with exchanges of air strikes. The weapons were torpedoes, bombs and machine gun bullets dropped and fired at ships by aircraft.
When the battle ended, the Japanese had lost 77 aircraft, 1,074 men, the smaller carrier Shoho, several auxiliaries, and a destroyer; suffered damage to the Shokaku so that she couldn’t launch or recover aircraft and took six months to repair. The Shoho was small by carrier standards, but the laconic phrase “scratch one flattop” radioed back to Lexington, announced the first major Allied naval success of the Pacific War. Zuikaku suffered slight damage and had only 40 aircraft left. She, too, had to return to Japan for repairs and replenishment.
The Americans lost the Lexington, hit by both bombs and torpedoes, the oiler Neosho, which had managed to escape destruction at Pearl Harbor, and one of Neosho’s escorts, the destroyer Sims. Although the larger of the two carriers, the slower Lexington, survived the immediate damage and was thought to be repairable, leaking aviation fuel exploded over an hour later. She had to be abandoned and scuttled to prevent her capture.
The Americans lost 66 aircraft and 543 men killed or wounded. The Yorktown, struck by one bomb which started a fire on the hangar deck and believed to be sufficiently damaged to require a 90-day refitting, returned to Pearl Harbor and was turned around, ready to fight, in an astounding three days.
Though the Japanese achieved a narrow tactical victory, with the loss of one small carrier, a large carrier severely damaged with the other lightly damaged, and a destroyer sunk, compared with the Americans’ loss of a large carrier and significant damage to another, plus the loss of a destroyer and the oiler Neosho, in strategic terms the Japanese suffered a defeat that substantially affected the course of the war and the morale of both sides.
