Sunday in hell, p.77
Sunday in Hell, page 77
By nightfall on the 7th, the U.S. Navy was certain at least one, and perhaps two midget submarines slipped inside the harbor before the one was believed sunk in the Middle Loch by the destroyer Monaghan. It was believed at the time that at least one, possibly two more had been sunk outside the harbor entrance, and perhaps another near Diamond Head. Another was found beached in the surf off Bellows Field the morning of the 8th, its commander captured, while the commander of mother boat I-22, Commander Kiyoi Ageta, and the commander of the midget submarines embarked, Captain Hanku Sasaki, waited in vain for their offspring to return. The five large submarines, including the I-16, 18, 20, and 24, had been ordered to remain south of Pearl Harbor on a surveillance mission, observing American vessels leaving and entering Pearl, while waiting to return to rendezvous with their five pups. When the midgets didn’t return on schedule the evening of the 7th, the five searched all night, then returned a second, and finally a third night, before returning home empty-handed.
Undoubtedly, the Office of Naval Intelligence was able to learn much regarding midget submarine operations from Prisoner No. 1, the Japanese lieutenant and midget sub commander captured in the surf off Bellows Field - at least up to the point where the midget subs were to rendezvous with their mother boats. But he likely didn’t know the content of orders given the large cruisers’ commanders regarding operations after retrieving the midgets. Whatever the information he divulged under interrogation, it was unlikely the newest “secret weapon” the Japanese had sprung at Pearl Harbor, their only five submarines now capable of carrying five midgets, would be placed at further risk by diverting the larger boats to attacks on shipping.
After completing the air attack on Hawaii, and the carrier strike force withdrawal northward began, Admiral Nagumo released the three submarines which had been accompanying his force as the Patrol Unit, and directed them to return to the command of the Submarine Force. The Patrol Unit, composed of I-19, I-21, and I-23, was then assigned to the direct command of the 1st Submarine Group, composed of I-9, I-15, I-17, and I-25. Also on the 8th, Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, proceeding according to their war plan, ordered Admiral Nagumo to relinquish command of all the submarine forces which supported the carrier strike force, placing them under the direct command of the Combined Fleet’s Submarine Force.
The expanded 1st Submarine Group of seven submarines now lay north of Oahu, while the carrier Enterprise was preparing to enter Pearl Harbor the evening of the 8th, to refuel, take on aviation gasoline, food, water and other provisions. As Enterprise maneuvered to enter Pearl Harbor, unknown to her crew, the 3rd Submarine Group’s I-70, lying four miles south of Diamond Head reported to Admiral Mitsoyoshi, the Submarine Force commander at Kwajalein Island in the Marshalls, they had observed an enemy carrier entering Pearl. The signal received from I-70 on the 8th, had broken a puzzling silence from the boat, after it failed to respond to a message from Mitsoyoshi the night of the 7th. The message the evening of the 8th, would be the last signal ever received from I-70.13
In the meantime, U.S. Naval Intelligence and fleet commanders were confronted with the need to make a prudent set of assumptions regarding their operations. Sizable Japanese submarine forces were on station in waters around the Hawaiian Islands, along the sea lanes between Hawaii and the Philippines via Midway and Wake Islands, Hawaii and Australia, Hawaii and U.S. mainland west coast ports, and were probably on or en route to stations off key West Coast port entrances.
In the twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the attack, patrols and task forces operating in waters surrounding Hawaii, reported a substantial number of known or suspected contacts with the undersea enemy, more than confirming the presence of possibly numerous enemy submarines. In the period 7-15 December, the Enterprise and its Task Force 8, operating to the south and southwest 7-8 December, and north through the northeast of Oahu 9-15 December, recorded by far the largest number of enemy submarine contacts when compared to the Pacific Fleet’s Lexington and Saratoga carrier task forces operating during that same period.
In fact, it was no wonder that in those first days and weeks of guarding the islands and sea lanes, the green and eager sailors and young officers of Enterprise and its destroyer screens reported a dozen submarines a day where there were none or very few. To the inexperienced eye peering anxiously through binoculars, it was easy in the daytime to mistake the far off ripple of white caps or dolphin fins for a periscope moving parallel with the tops of swells. At night a playful porpoise just below the surface, coming straight at the bow of ship, with luminous phosphorescent bubbles sliding from his nose and stretching out behind him, can make the mouth of the saltiest destroyer skipper go dry for a moment, fearing he was confronting a death-dealing torpedo. And to the men manning the new submarine electronic listening devices, later known as SONAR, the return from a whale gave nearly as good an echo as a submarine, and showed about the same speed and depth.
The number of reported submarine contacts those first days and weeks, coupled with repeated calls to battle stations and depth charges fired, became a matter of concern to Admiral Halsey, the Task Force 8 commander. Finally, he sent a message comforting his commanders with the thought “…if all the reported torpedo wakes were real, the enemy submarines were now out of torpedoes and must return to base and reload.” He added, “…too many depth charges are being expended against neutral fish.”14
The carrier Saratoga’s getting underway from San Diego on 8 December immediately augmented the Fleet - increasing the number of American carrier task forces in the Pacific from two to three, but she reported no submarine contacts until she began operating out of Pearl Harbor.
The Saratoga, fresh out of overhaul, had just arrived in San Diego on 7 December, when the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred. She rapidly refueled, filled up with aviation gas, brought her crew and air group up to strength in men and planes; loaded ammunition, food, water and other provisions, and was underway, bound for Pearl Harbor, 0958 hours 8 December, escorted by three destroyers from Destroyer Squadron 50, the Dent, Talbot, and Waters. While the carrier Lexington, with Task Force 12, turned around and headed back toward Oahu, searching for the Japanese strike force, the Japanese were also making adjustments to war plans based on the changing situation.
On 9 December, I-69, which had been ordered to lay off Pearl Harbor to rescue midget submarine crews the night of the 8th, unsuccessfully attacked a cargo ship, then was depth charged - also unsuccessfully. Off Barbers Point, the submarine became entangled in a submarine net, and Lieutenant Commander Watanabe’s crew struggled for hours before finally breaking free. Submerged for 39 hours, all hope of I-69’s rescue ended. The incident confirmed to the Submarine Force Commander that the Americans had taken extraordinary precautions in southern Oahu, including the laying of submarine nets between Diamond Head and Barber’s Point, and Mitsoyoshi ordered the 3rd Submarine Group, already stationed south of Oahu, to move further south.
On the same day, I-6, on station in the Kaiwi Channel, between Oahu and Molokai, reported two heavy cruisers and a Lexington class aircraft carrier heading northeast. The I-6 had in fact seen the Enterprise and Task Force 8, in company with the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City (CA-25), and destroyers Fanning, Balch, Benham, McCall, and Gridley. The Submarine Force commander, Vice Admiral Mitsoyoshi, ordered the 1st Submarine Group, still north of Oahu, and the I-10 and I-26, the latter having sunk the Cynthia Olson the morning of the 7th - to track down the aircraft carrier which “…evidently was moving toward the United States.”15
On 10 December, Admiral Mitsoyoshi made another slight change in the Japanese operational plan. The Special Attack Unit came under his command, instead of the 1st Submarine Group as planned, and was ordered to abandon the search for the five midget submarines and return to Kwajalein. The 2nd and 3rd Submarine Groups were to continue observation of Hawaii. The 3rd Submarine Group, consisting of I-8, 68, 69, 70, 71,72, 73, 74, and 75, was to return to Kwajalein on or about 17 December, and the 2nd Submarine Group was to continue to observe the whole island of Oahu alone after that date.
The 1st Submarine Group, plus the I-10 and I-26 were to continue to track the enemy fleet toward the United States mainland and sink the carrier. Upon receipt of orders, the 1st Submarine Group of seven submarines, plus the I-10 and I-26 attached, surfaced and racing at flank speed, took up the chase of Enterprise and Task Force 8. During the period 7-10 December only a few Japanese submarines, including I-6, reported discovering the “enemy aircraft carrier, cruiser and destroyer and none of these achieved any direct attack results.” The chase was to no avail.
Positions of Japanese Submarines off the West Coast of the United States, December 1941.
Resigned to that fact, Admiral Mitsoyoshi designated the nine submarines as Submarine Force Detachment, and ordered them to commence operations against shipping off the west coast of the United States. The submarines’ stations would be: I-26 off Cape Flattery; I-25 off Cape Disappointment; 1-9 off Cape Blanco; I-17 off Cape Mendocino; I-15 off San Francisco; I-23 off Monterey Bay; I-21 off Estero Bay; I-19 off Los Angeles; and I-10 off San Diego. The position and track of Task Force 8, and its subsequent, frequent surface and underwater contacts with the Japanese submarines beginning the morning of the 9th, suggest more than “a few” submarines encountered Task Force 8 in the five days after Enterprise stood out of Pearl Harbor. While both forces were underway on the 10th, the Empire of Japan lost its first major submarine sunk by American fire in World War II.16
The Sinking of I-70
At 0553 that morning Enterprise and its task force, after having passed between Oahu and Molokai on the 9th, was continuing its search toward the north and northeast along the sea lane toward the mainland’s west coast, and launched her first group of planes to fly the morning search patterns. They were looking for Japanese surface ships, aircraft or submarines. It was to be a day of frequent contacts with enemy submarines, intense flight operations, sightings of submarine periscopes as well as submarines running on the surface, enemy torpedo wakes sighted tracking toward Enterprise, aggressive depth charge attacks by Enterprise’s submarine screening destroyers, a zigzagging task force, sharp changes in speed from flank speed to engines stop, and abrupt changes in direction at flank speed with the great ship heeled over twenty to thirty degrees opposite the direction of turn. The day began with a bang.
The last aircraft among the first group to launch lifted off at 0602. They were from Bombing Squadron Six, and within seventeen minutes of the first launch, one aircraft from
VB-6 sighted an enemy submarine running on the surface. At 0618 Enterprise began launching a second group, and completed the launch three minutes later. While the second launch was in progress at 0619, SBD 6-B-17, from VB-6 reported a submarine at latitude 22 degrees 30 minutes north, longitude 156 degrees 30 minutes west, course 080 degrees true - a course nearly due east. At 0630 hours, the plane’s crew reported they bombed the submarine.
The pilot, Lieutenant (jg) Edward L. Anderson, with Radioman/gunner Third Class S.J. Mason in the rear cockpit, was searching an area forty miles south of Enterprise at 300 feet altitude. In his action report of 15 December, he wrote,
…sighted a wake made by [an] enemy submarine. The vessel was close and [the] conning tower [was] sighted above water. The submarine was making a crash dive. I pulled up to 800 feet over the enemy and released a 1000 pound bomb which was seen to explode approximately 50 feet aft and somewhat to port of the submerging submarine’s conning tower. Oil appeared on water. No further evidence of submarine.17
The last aircraft airborne in the morning launch was at 0621. At 0627 hours, Ensign Clifford R. Walters, flying SBD 6-B-2 from Bombing Six, reported sighting a Japanese submarine bearing 020 degrees from point option, the point from which the squadron dispersed to begin flying search patterns. He had reached the end of the search mission’s first navigation leg, and after rendering a report and being informed that ten surface vessels he had spotted were Task Force 1, detached from Task Force 8 to meet Saratoga and escort her to Pearl Harbor, he turned toward the Enterprise. In his 13 December action report he recounted what occurred:
…While en route back to the ship, I saw a submarine on the surface. Tracking the submarine in the sun, I was able to see it was large, no flag, and traveling at about 16 knots. I decided to bomb it in a glide bomb but the higher winds pushed me into a dive bomb attack and with little flaps. I dropped the bomb at 1800 feet and was unable to pull out until about 600 feet because I was traveling at a speed of about 240 knots. The submarine submerged just before I was in firing range with the .50-caliber fixed guns. He submerged slowly and blew many bubbles on descent. The 1000 pound bomb landed about 40 feet on the starboard quarter. I believe shrapnel hit the submarine as the bomb had an instantaneous fuze. My Radioman, IVANTIC, J.J., RM3c, strafed the submarine with his .30-caliber free machine gun as we pulled out of the dive. I remained over the spot for a few minutes and the submarine did not surface again, so I returned to the ship. I saw no oil on the surface.18
Ensign Walters’ action report suggests he probably had attacked and damaged the I-70. His Imperial Majesty’s submarines I-25 and I-70, were two of the Japanese combatant’s attacked by Enterprise aircraft that morning. I-25 reported being attacked with a depth charge by a TBD-1 “Devastator” of VT-6, but dove to 130 feet, and the depth charge exploded above her, causing no damage. After waiting thirty minutes, I-25 returned to periscope depth and was attacked a second time, and again dove to 130 feet, causing the depth charge to explode above her, with no damage.19
The I-70 was less fortunate. She had been damaged by a bomb released by an SBD in the early morning attack, damage that forced Commander Sano’s decision to surface, and continue running on the surface. Considerably smaller and carrying less firepower than the Type C.1 cruiser subs that carried the midgets launched into Pearl Harbor, the Type 6A submarine built in 1934 was 336 feet long, 27 feet abeam, with a hull depth of 15 feet; displaced 1,400 tons normal, 1,785 full, and 2,440 tons maximum submerged; carried a 4-inch instead of a 5.5-inch gun; six instead of eight torpedo tubes; and 14 instead of 20 torpedoes.20
Japanese submarine I-70, after sustaining damage in a pre-war collision. IJN
The end came in the early afternoon 121 miles northeast of Cape Halava, Molokai, Hawaiian Islands, at latitude 23 degrees, forty-five minutes north, longitude 155 degrees, thirty-five minutes west. Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson, the pilot who had, himself, been shot down by swarming Japanese fighters over Oahu the morning of 7 December - costing the life of his radioman/gunner - had his opportunity for payback, and succeeded. He struck with one dive bomb pass, and the submarine sank, leaving four sailors in the water who later perished.21
Lieutenant Dickinson, writing in his 1942 book, The Flying Guns, had no way of knowing the identity of the submarine he and his Radioman/gunner sunk that day, but vividly recalled the sequence of events leading to I-70’s destruction.
…the morning scouting flight picked up three or four submarines on the surface. Three or four seen in the area covered by the scouting flight logically meant that there were an awful lot of Jap submarines around. So, about 11:30 in the morning of December 10, Admiral Halsey decided to send three planes to each place where a submarine had been sighted. I was detailed to make this flight.
At that time no one had been assigned to me in place of Miller, [my radioman-gunner killed over Oahu the morning of 7 December.] So I took a lad named [Thomas E.] Merritt, about twenty-one; very nice looking. This young man turned out to be an extremely reliable radioman and gunner, one of the best in the squadron. But this was going to be his first chance for revenge.
The submarine I was to hunt for was supposed to be about 125 miles north of Pearl Harbor. However, when I had flown about 75 miles south I wasn’t expecting to find the submarine waiting for me; that was only my starting point, really. It had been seen at six o’clock approximately where I was by a half hour past noon. Where could it have gone in the Pacific Ocean in six and a half hours? I decided the best thing to do was to fly a rectangular course around the position where the sub had been last sighted and give emphasis to the north and east. I went twenty miles south, then traveled thirty miles on a leg to the east, then began the leg forty miles north. I had left the carrier at noon. It was now about half past one. Nothing but sky and water anywhere in sight.
The wind was blowing pretty much of a gale. There were white-capped waves, but visibility was excellent. I could see twenty-five miles in any direction, possibly thirty miles. Just as I reached the north corner of my rectangle, lo and behold! Way over to the northeast about fifteen or eighteen miles away there was a great big submarine running on the surface. It was pushing to the northeast just as fast as it could go. It was obviously a submarine but it looked to me to be the biggest I had ever seen. I talked to the carrier immediately.
“This is Sail Four…Have sighted submarine. Am attacking.”
The carrier acknowledged my message. I was already heading toward the sub. I was about 800 feet off the water then and to make a good dive bombing attack I would have to climb up to 5,000 or 6,000 feet at least. So I started climbing. I suppose I was climbing while I was talking with the ship. Now, to go straight ahead fifteen to eighteen miles in a scout bomber is one thing, but it is something else to go a mile up while you are going eighteen miles ahead; moreover I was flying right into a heavy wind. It would probably take six or eight minutes for me to get into position to do my job. I had certain chores to do in connection with my craft of bombing. I had to “arm” the bomb mechanically before I dropped it. I had to do certain things to it that would make it explode on contact. Threaded through the fuse of that 500-pound bomb I was carrying were what we call “arming wires.” These arming wires have to be pulled out of the fuse before the bomb is dropped, else it will fall as a dud. When the wires are pulled out, two parts of the fuse move into position, the “vanes” on the fuse rotate properly and on contact the bomb explodes. Consequently the height of futility in bombing is to neglect to arm your bomb. The arming of the bomb is the pilot’s job, but to make sure that none of us forgets in the excitement of the attack, it has been made a part of the gunner’s duty to check with the pilot just as your partner checks you against a possible renege in a bridge game when you fail to follow suit by asking politely, “No spades?”
