Sunday in hell, p.45
Sunday in Hell, page 45
Maryland was the flagship for Commander Battleships, Rear Admiral William S. Anderson, and his staff of twenty-one officers. Most were on board when the raid began.
One of the first men on the Maryland to catch sight of the Val dive bombers’ attack on Ford Island was twenty-two year old Seaman First Class Leslie V. Short from Garden City, Kansas, who listed his home address as Noel, Missouri. Like all men assigned to gun crews on any ship under attack when the raid on Pearl Harbor was in progress, he was at great risk, subject to wounds or death each time a horizontal bomber, dive bomber, torpedo bomber or fighter targeted his ship, and attacked toward her bow. The swarming enemy aircraft were striking from nearly 360 degrees of the compass, low level, high level and at varying dive angles and speeds. The result was heavy casualties among gun crews and ammunition trains on ships hardest hit. Fortunately, Short survived the attack unscathed. The forward machine gunners on the Tennessee weren’t so fortunate.
Although Leslie Short hadn’t been called to his duty station, after breakfast he went to his Group “A” Machine Gun Station, forward, on the bridge superstructure, below the bridge, and just above the top of #2 turret - to write letters home and address some Christmas cards. Suddenly, he “…noticed planes diving on the Naval Air Base nearby [Ford Island].” At first he thought they were Americans “…in a mock diving practice attack.” Then he saw smoke and flames rise from a building, looked closer, and saw they weren’t American planes.
Leslie Short sprang into action. He broke out an ammunition belt from the nearby ready ammunition box, loaded the belt into his machine gun, charged the gun, glanced to his left, toward the east, and saw two Kate torpedo bombers which had just released two torpedoes apparently aimed at Oklahoma. He opened fire on the nearest plane, firing past Oklahoma’s forward superstructure, and above her forecastle, saw flames and smoke burst from the Kate, then saw it veer off to its left falling toward the Navy hospital across the harbor. He next turned his gun on the trailing Kate, saying later, “I think I also hit the second plane which I aimed at immediately after shooting at the first one but by then was so busy that I cannot say for sure.” He had opened fire on the Kates before the ship’s general quarters alarm sounded at 0752.32
When general quarters sounded, word went out immediately to set conditions Yoke and Zed and make all preparations to get underway. Preparations to get under way included instructions for the Conning Tower to take control of steering and engines as soon as possible.33
In those first fifteen to twenty-five minutes, until Oklahoma capsized at 0815, her superstructure effectively masked Maryland’s portside antiaircraft batteries located adjacent to Oklahoma’s upper deck superstructure - except for enemy aircraft approaching from high overhead, directly from the southwest and northeast, up and down the line of battleships. The portside batteries were unable to acquire and fire on targets approaching the battleships low on Oklahoma’s and Maryland’s port beam.
Ensign William O. Beach, the communications staff duty officer on the Commander Battleships Staff, had just finished breakfast and was sitting in the ward room when he heard Leslie Short’s first brief burst of machine gun fire, followed immediately by the sound of general quarters. He walked to one of the open ward room ports and looked out to see “a plane swoop up over the Oklahoma and Maryland, the plane having evidently just dropped a torpedo.” He walked aft to the Flag Office where he encountered Ensign William F. Bradway, Jr., another staff communications duty officer, getting what information he could from Radio Central and telephoning it to Flag Plot. Beach left the Flag Office and went up the ladder to the port side of the quarterdeck, saw the Oklahoma already listing, and fifty or more Japanese aircraft in bombing attacks on ships in the harbor, Ford Island and Hickam Field.
A group of men standing near #3 turret on Oklahoma’s starboard side, asked Beach for orders. He told them to dog down the open hatch leading to Oklahoma’s Officer Country, forward on the starboard side, then get below the protective deck. Beach then went forward and up to the Flag Bridge where he decided there was nothing he could do in Flag Radio, so stayed out on the bridge to take Lieutenant Commander Horne’s place as best he could, until Horne, the staff communications officer, returned to the ship. Oklahoma was moments away from capsizing.34
Commander William F. Fitzgerald, Jr., Operations Officer, Staff of Commander Battleships, was undressing, ready to take a bath, when he became aware of nearby intermittent explosions. He quickly pulled on his trousers, grabbed a hat and blouse [uniform coat], and started topside. He was hardly out of his room when general quarters sounded. He immediately proceeded to the Flag Bridge, telling all men he encountered en route to “man their battle stations and be calm.”
When Fitzgerald arrived topside, about 0800, he noticed smoke, flame and many explosions throughout the harbor. He could hear machine gun fire from the Maryland, and Oklahoma was still upright, but listing perceptibly to port. His first glance didn’t tell him she was going to roll over. Heavy explosions continued. Upon arriving on the Flag Bridge, he immediately checked with Captain Donald C. Godwin, Maryland’s commander, to see if he was making all preparations to get underway. Godwin replied he was.
Shortly after Fitzgerald arrived on the Flag Bridge, Captain Worral R. Carter, Chief of Staff, said, “We can’t do much good up here. Let’s go down to the guns and give them a hand.” Both proceeded to the 5-inch AA batteries and split up, each one doing what he could to assist in organizing the gun crews, ammunition parties, and assigning stations to men not otherwise engaged. During all this time the flame, smoke and noise were unending. There was some 5-inch gunfire on the Maryland when he arrived at the guns, but it was impossible to tell just who was firing. He then concentrated on getting guns in action that hadn’t yet opened fire. Time was approximately 0810.
He noticed Lieutenant (j.g.) Robert S. Mandelkorn, the staff assistant material [supply] officer and gave him a series of directives such as “…organize a party to obtain steel helmets for all men topside, get [compressed] air to the batteries and spare tools for the guns…” By 0815, just as the Oklahoma rolled on her port side, there was sufficient air pressure to use the power rammers on Maryland’s starboard battery, but not until an appreciable interval afterwards did the port battery obtain sufficient air. In the meantime the port battery fired by hand power. Numerous men from Oklahoma swam to the Maryland and upon coming aboard, Fitzgerald immediately assigned them to gun stations or the ammunition party.35
Captain Godwin, Maryland’s commander, wrote of his crew’s and Leslie Short’s actions in an 11 December report to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, “Though the conduct of all hands aboard this vessel during the air raid on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941 could be classified as meritorious, outstanding was the action of Leslie Vernon Short…Short, a machine gun striker 22 years old, truly demonstrated the spirit of men behind the Navy guns…”
Captain Godwin’s comments were valid in every respect. Both Maryland and Tennessee opened fire within five minutes after the attack began. Because the two ships suffered no serious degradation of their abilities to generate steam and electrical power, their AA batteries continued heavy defensive fire through the second wave attacks whenever raiders appeared in range through the heavy clouds of smoke intermittently obscuring visibility.36
With forward machine guns already in action, the remaining gun crews scrambled to their batteries, and others went to their stations in Central Control. Ship Fitter First Class Andrew J. Geiser was among the first arriving at his battle station in Central Station, and quickly recognized the gravity of the situation. On his own initiative he took action to avoid a possible disaster by immediately ordering the aviation gasoline stowage compartment flooded. It was well he did. Later, a bomb struck Maryland’s forecastle directly above the gasoline stowage, and his initiative prevented a probable catastrophic explosion and fire.37
By 0803, a torpedo had struck Nevada, one had passed beneath Vestal and torn into the bottom of Arizona, and three or more each had already slashed into West Virginia and Oklahoma. Across the harbor to the east, another torpedo had zipped beneath Oglala into the cruiser Helena. On the west side of Ford Island, Utah was nine minutes from capsizing, and the Raleigh’s crew - their ship struck by one torpedo at virtually the same instant Utah was struck by two - was beginning the struggle to avoid capsizing.
At 0805, as two torpedoes were slamming into California, and the forward and aft .50-caliber machine guns were already in action on Maryland, her 1.1-inch AA and 5-inch batteries opened up on the enemy - but, in the case of the 1.1s, not without the initiative of Ensign William J. Manning. There were no ready ammunition boxes installed to support the recently installed, four-gun, 1.1-inch antiaircraft batteries, which could put out a high volume of devastating AA fire. Manning raced to the 1.1-inch ammunition magazines below decks, broke the magazine lock, set up and started an ammunition train of men not assigned AA gun stations, and began passing ammunition to the guns by hand.38
Captain Godwin, Maryland’s commander, praised the two senior staff officers on duty aboard Maryland, Captain W.R. Carter and Commander W.F. Fitzgerald, Jr., who hurried to assist the crew in rapidly opening fire on the enemy, helping to activate the 5-inch AA battery. He also wrote words of praise in behalf of Coxswain Charles G. Anderson and Gunners’ Mate Third Class Raymond A. Heitzman, of whom Commander Fitzgerald had said, “The actions of these two men were outstanding in every respect.” Captain Godwin stated they “were cool, intelligent and efficient” under fire, promptly organizing and operating their 5-inch gun. In his report, he claimed Maryland gunners downed seven enemy planes, four being quite definitely confirmed.39
At 0808, while Utah was four minutes from capsizing on the west side of Ford Island, Arizona’s forward magazine violently exploded, showering Vestal’s, West Virginia’s and Tennessee’s after decks with burning powder, oil, and debris, and igniting an inferno on Arizona which rapidly spread in the water around the stricken battleship. The fires started on Arizona and West Virginia sent heavy palls of smoke skyward that helped intermittently obscure all four ships from the eyes of enemy raiders, while degrading the ability of gunners to see and defend against attackers swirling overhead.
At 0815, while the topside battle was being waged, Maryland’s Conning Tower took steering and engine control while preparations continued to get under way. At the same time, with the Oklahoma capsizing to port, the situation on West Virginia, off Maryland’s port stern approximately eighty-five feet, was deteriorating rapidly, with her captain dying, the ship settling, fires raging out of control, and counter flooding initiated to keep from capsizing.
Though Maryland’s crew had received the same 0810 signal to get under way, as had Nevada, California, and other ships in the harbor - and by 0838 was standing by all lines to cast off - getting underway had become a virtual impossibility. Maryland was rendering badly needed assistance to desperate men from the capsized Oklahoma, and Admiral Kimmel would issue a countermanding instruction to battleships before Maryland could sortie. In Nevada’s sortie, and the enemy’s swarming attacks on her, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet realized she, or any other battleship, could be sunk in the channel and possibly block the entire harbor.
Later, in a 15 December confidential mailgram to Admiral Kimmel, Captain Godwin described what Maryland’s crew had observed throughout the morning of 7 December:
…FIRST ATTACK WAS DIVE BOMBING OF HANGARS ON FORD ISLAND AT ZERO SEVEN FIFTY X SIX PLANES FROM SE PASSED DIRECTLY OVER SHIP AT AN ALTITUDE OF ABOUT TWO THOUSAND FEET X RISING SUN INSIGNIA CLEARLY VISIBLE X DIVING ANGLE TWENTY TO THIRTY DEGREES PULLING OUT AT ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED FEET X SECOND WAS TORPEDO ATTACK ON BATTLESHIPS FROM PORT BEAM AT ZERO SEVEN FIFTY-FIVE X NO ACCURATE OBSERVATIONS ON NUMBER OR METHOD DUE TO POSITION OF SHIP INBOARD OF OKLAHOMA X APPEARS THAT OKLAHOMA WAS HIT FIRST AND CALIFORNIA LAST X DIVE BOMBING AND STRAFING ATTACKS BY FORTY TO FIFTY PLANES ON ALL SHIPS UNTIL ABOUT ZERO EIGHT THIRTY X DIVE ANGLE APPROXIMATELY FORTY DEGREES X ATTACKS WERE MADE BY INDIVIDUAL PLANES FROM VARIOUS DIRECTIONS X AFTER LULL OF TEN TO FIFTEEN MINUTES CONTINUED TO UNTIL ABOUT ZERO NINE THIRTY X BOMBS FROM DIVE BOMBERS SMALL OR INTERMEDIATE CALIBER X AT ABOUT ZERO NINE HUNDRED HORIZONTAL BOMBING ATTACK CAME CONSISTING OF TWO GROUPS OF SIX PLANES EACH AT ALTITUDE OF ABOUT ELEVEN THOUSAND FEET X ONE GROUP CAME FROM ABOUT TWO HUNDRED DEGREES TRUE OTHER FROM ABOUT ONE FIFTY TRUE X BOMBS DROPPED WERE HEAVY CALIBER X HOLES INDICATE STRAFERS USED FIFTY CALIBER AND THIRTY CALIBER X NO EVIDENCE OF HITS BY LARGE GALIBER BUT OBSERVERS CLAIM FIRE FROM SOME PLANES INDICATE LARGER CALIBERS USED X OCCASIONAL DEFLECTION OF TRACER FROM PLANE SHOT AT INDICATES POSSIBLE ARMORING OF VULNERABLE PARTS.40
A massive rescue operation was already in progress among the battleships and elsewhere - and the protective cover of Maryland’s undamaged AA batteries would prove vital, as Japanese planes continued attempts to strafe the hull of the capsized Oklahoma, motor launches engaged in rescue, and other ships along the east side of Ford Island. She had plenty of ammunition to offer, yet more trouble was ahead for the Maryland, including requesting more ammunition, while Tennessee, from the outset, had entered a more difficult circumstance.
When the attack came, the Tennessee was moored starboard side to interrupted quay F-6, with two wire hausers and seven manila lines, with West Virginia tied to Tennessee’s portside with one wire hauser and seven manila lines. Boiler #1 was steaming for auxiliary purposes. While Tennessee was fortunate in that she was shielded from torpedo attacks by West Virginia’s portside mooring, other factors quickly conspired to nearly victimize her along with her five less fortunate sister ships. One particularly searing point had become evident on all the battleships, and indeed on all the ships in the harbor.
All the at-sea drills, various training exercises against simulated aircraft and submarine attacks, task force formation maneuvering, and gunfire training under centralized control, was of little help in this enemy onslaught. The defenders were caught moored, frozen in place, unable to move, with insufficient steam up to quickly get underway. Stationary targets rather than at sea, where they could otherwise maneuver to spoil tracking solutions, evade bomb and torpedo hits, would be able to zigzag, weave, make hard turns, and change speeds.
To make matters worse, ships like the Pennsylvania, San Francisco, Honolulu, and numerous destroyers were undergoing overhaul, had no boilers lit; were dependent upon electrical power, water and telephone from the docks - which were quickly lost; and as a result their antiaircraft defenses were in various states of degradation, a condition aggravated by the engineering activities in progress during overhaul. For ships not undergoing overhaul, normally only one boiler was kept in operation for auxiliary purposes, and a single hit in the wrong area could quickly cause the temporary or permanent loss of electrical power, and the immediate degradation of antiaircraft defenses because of the shift to manual operation of guns and turrets.
The primary offsetting factor was ships’ antiaircraft gunners’ tracking and firing solutions were less complex because they were on an essentially stable gun platform taking the enemy under fire, rather than at sea on a pitching, rolling, and maneuvering platform - which probably would have lowered the cost to the enemy.
The Tennessee’s Officer of the Deck, Ensign Donald N. Kable, was nearing the end of his 0400 to 0800 tour of duty when the Val dive bombers first struck Ford Island. As a result of repetitive enemy strafing attacks, before the morning ended, Kable was carried below for medical treatment, the only officer aboard Tennessee seriously wounded.
Tennessee’s commander, Captain Charles E. Reordan, wasn’t aboard when the attack began. Neither were the Executive Officer nor First Lieutenant, Commanders Colin Campbell and Joyce A. Ralph. Lieutenant Commander John W. Adams, Jr., the gunnery officer, assumed temporary command of the ship. Ralph, third in line to assume command in an emergency, when at his battle station was Damage Control Officer, but this day, in his absence, Lieutenant Robert R. Moore took responsibility as the acting DCO.
Lieutenant Commander Adams wasn’t on the bridge when the first indications of the attack came over the loud-speaker system, “All hands to general quarters.” While proceeding topside a messenger informed him Japanese planes were bombing the fleet. As he ran to the bridge, he shouted to the officer-of-the-deck to get the ship in condition Zed as quickly as possible. When he arrived in Conn I [primary control], on the bridge, he found the interior communication circuit talkers were at, or manning their stations. He directed main control to get underway as soon as possible, and also directed central station to pass the word over the loud-speakers to get the ship in condition Zed as fast as possible. The direction went out over all fire control battle circuits. By this time he was able to establish communication with air defense, and received a report that that the antiaircraft batteries were fully manned and engaging the enemy planes.
From that time until the executive officer and captain returned to the ship he received various reports over the interior communication system, and various directives from higher authority, which he coordinated to all departments as the reports and circumstances indicated at the time.
After ensuring general quarters was sounded and instructions issued to set Condition Zed, Ensign Kable rushed to his battle station, where he was the Control Officer on the .50-caliber machine guns. Within five minutes Tennessee’s antiaircraft batteries opened fire, but ran into the same difficulties first encountered on Maryland.
