Sunday in hell, p.46
Sunday in Hell, page 46
The West Virginia’s parallel mooring and superstructure rendered some of Tennessee’s portside AA batteries useless against raiders approaching low on West Virginia’s port beam. Fires broke out on West Virginia within moments after she absorbed her first torpedo hits. After Arizona’s explosion at 0808, heavy smoke from the fires on Arizona and West Virginia combined to complicate Tennessee gun crews’ abilities to visually acquire and track enemy raiders coming from any direction, while also complicating Japanese attempts to visually acquire and attack targets obscured by the smoke.
When general quarters sounded, 17-year old Seaman Second Class J.R. Johnson from Salt Lake City, Utah, was below decks completing mess duty as a cook, cleaning up the general mess [enlisted crew’s mess hall] by 0800 hours - after providing breakfast for approximately twenty men. Assigned to Tennessee’s E Division “electrical gang,” anytime Tennessee departed or entered port, J.R. Johnson left his normal duty station, manned the ship’s degaussing gear and activated it as a routine anti-magnetic mine procedure. This day, because Tennessee was in port, at the sound of general quarters, he immediately proceeded to his normal duty station, which was also his battle station - the electrical drive station in #3 engine room. No sooner did he arrive than word was passed to “make all preparations to get underway.”
For the next one and one half hours, while gun batteries up above kept up their fire, he and many others toiled to get both plants and six boilers ready to move their ship away from berth F-6, and out of the harbor. As was the case with Maryland, other factors intervened to pin Tennessee in her berth for several days.
Early during the bombing and strafing attacks on the battleships, two bombs struck Tennessee, the first forward, splitting the hoop on the #2 turret’s center 14-inch gun, rendering the gun inoperative and in need of replacement. Though the damage wasn’t heavy, the explosion’s splinters tore into the nearby forward machine gun nest, just above the turret, and directly below the bridge, killing three men outright and wounding several others. A fourth later died as a result of his wounds, before he could be evacuated.
The second hit, a 1,765-pound bomb dropped by a Kate horizontal bomber struck aft, wrecking the catapult on top of #3 turret and penetrating five inches of armor. The second bomb could have been disastrous - but luck was with Tennessee and her crew. As the bomb descended it sheared off the starboard after yardarm of the mainmast, then entered the turret and exploded with a low order detonation, breaking up and sending pieces into the turret booth and left gun chamber. Flames from the explosion shot into the booth and into all three gun chambers. The turret crew had just manned their stations and were in the process of closing all flame-proof doors and hatches when the bomb struck. Almost immediately Tennessee’s crew entered a different kind of struggle.
Arizona’s shattering explosion rained burning powder, oil and debris on Tennessee’s and West Virginia’s quarterdecks, ignited raging oil-fed fires on the water’s surface, and rapidly exacerbated Tennessee’s predicament. Due to the pull of the outgoing tide and the east wind’s push, the surface fire swept toward Tennessee, spread around her stern, and started a fire on her port quarter. Intense heat from fires on West Virginia and Arizona, and the fire on Tennessee’s quarterdeck, began buckling Tennessee’s outer port quarter and stern shell plates and increasing fire hazards below deck - until fire broke out in the officers’ wardroom and quarters. The situation continued to deteriorate.
At first unknown to Tennessee’s crew, the combination of multiple torpedo hits, exploding on West Virginia’s port side, forcing her toward Tennessee, West Virginia’s substantial list to port before counter flooding began to right her, raised West Virginia’s starboard side until her torpedo belt could be seen through Tennessee’s portside general mess portholes. As West Virginia settled, her starboard side pressed up against the camels on Tennessee’s port side and pinned her against the quay’s on her starboard side. (A camel is a large bumper hanging over the side, between two ships moored close together, or next to docks, to keep the two ships apart or avoid direct contact with docks.) Arizona’s fire spreading on the water toward the stern of Tennessee, and in between the burning West Virginia and Tennessee, was steadily increasing the danger to Tennessee. Fire fighting parties deployed hoses and went to work below decks struggling to put out the extremely hot fires.
Lieutenant Commander Adams directed that some fire hoses be turned toward West Virginia, to aid in pushing the fire forward and rescue men from the stricken ship. During the bombing, Tennessee’s #3 motor boat was sunk, and #2 motor launch burned and sank when caught in the oil fire from Arizona. Like Maryland, however, Tennessee’s troubles were just beginning, and the enemy’s second wave was yet to come.41
While the battle raged in the Southeast Loch, and men were struggling in the Middle Loch to save Raleigh and men trapped in the capsized Utah, another kind of battle was erupting on the west side of Ford Island.
Battle in the Middle Loch: The Sinking of a Midget Submarine
At 0726, while the USS Ward’s report of depth charging a submarine outside the harbor entrance was still winding its way through the Pacific Fleet’s staff, the 1,850-ton destroyer Helm (DD-388) departed Berth X-7 bound for a buoy in the West Loch, preparatory to deperming. All hands were at special sea detail stations, and both her boats were manned and in the water, with instructions to follow the ship to the West Loch, which was past the Middle Loch on further toward the harbor entrance.
Deperming was called degaussing on the battleships, which, to defend against magnetic mines, had degaussing system’s designed into the ships’ architecture to reduce the magnetic charges on steel hulls traveling through water. Battleships’ crews activated degaussing systems each time they entered and departed a harbor, and as needed in other areas where the mine threat was elevated.
The smaller, lighter combatants, such as destroyers, “depermed” using an external system, in which electrical coils were, on a scheduled basis, wrapped at intervals around the beam of the ship, and activated to reduce the built-up electrical charge. It was standard procedure to remove magnetic compasses and electric chronometers when ships were scheduled into deperm, and this day Helm’s crew left those units aboard the destroyer Blue, moored next to Helm near Aiea Bay.
By 0755 the Helm had passed the Middle Loch, proceeded down the main channel south of Ford Island, turned to starboard, into the West Loch channel, and headed toward the deperming bouys.42
Moored at berth X-14 in the northern most area of the harbor, approximately 900 yards east of the Pearl City peninsula in a nest of four ships in Destroyer Division Two, was the destroyer Monaghan (DD-354), her bow on a heading of 025 degrees. The 1,500-ton Monaghan, designated the Division’s “Ready Duty Destroyer,” was fully manned, on one-hour notice to get underway. Moored close to her starboard side, left to right, were three more destroyers in the Farragut class, the Aylwin (DD-355), Farragut (DD-348), and Dale (DD-353).
At 0751 the watch [duty] signalman on Monaghan’s bridge received a visual message from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, “PROCEED IMMEDIATELY AND CONTACT WARD IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.” He transcribed the message, and handed it to the communications messenger, who delivered it to the radioman on watch in Main Radio, on the bridge. At approximately 0755, the radio messenger delivered a rough copy to the communications officer, Ensign John W. Gilpin, who was in the wardroom finishing breakfast. Receipted and logged in Main Radio at 0752, the message was the command’s response to the Ward’s report of its attack on a submarine in the defensive sea area just outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor.
On receiving the dispatch, Gilpin noted the time group for message dispatch was 0248 local, and hurried to the bridge to find out why it had not been sent down sooner. The signalman assured him it had just been received, the time of dispatch an apparent error. Gilpin looked again at the message, agreed with the signalman’s conclusion, turned to go below and encountered the executive officer, Lieutenant Harry J. Verhoye. The executive officer immediately ordered, “Make all preparations to get underway,” and passed the message to Monaghan’s captain, Commander William P. “Bill” Burford, who was in his cabin. Ensign Gilpin went below to obtain the confidential chart and books preparatory to getting underway, and stopped by the “radio shack” to ensure they used the right harbor radio frequencies during departure. Just after he arrived one of the radio strikers burst in and incredulously asked if “it was a drill or air raid.” Gilpin stepped outside and went to the outboard door, which faced west - just as the general alarm sounded. He saw two torpedo planes coming in from the northwest, toward Ford Island, but continued below to get the charts and books.
At 0755, as Ensign Gilpin was receiving the message in the wardroom, an excited crew member reported to Burford that Japanese planes were in Pearl Harbor. Burford stepped out onto the portside deck, looked to the north, northwest and saw a large cloud of dense black smoke rising from the vicinity of Schofield Barracks, turned to look south across the harbor, and saw a Kate torpedo bomber attack the Utah. At 0800 the general alarm sounded and word came on the speaker system to go to general quarters, while the engineer officer in the engine room responded to orders to get up steam on all boilers for emergency sortie.
One minute earlier the Helm logged, “First enemy plane sighted in shallow dive over Ford Island, headed northwest. Observed first bomb hit on hangar at southwest end of Ford Island. Called crew to general quarters. Executive Officer went below to assist in opening magazines and getting ammunition to guns.” Almost simultaneously Helm’s crew sighted torpedo planes approaching from the direction of Barbers Point.
They came in low, passed over the West Loch channel, and several of their radiomen-gunners, facing aft in the Kates, strafed Helm as they passed - a greeting other Kate gunners administered to a liberty boat returning from Pearl City to the light minelayer Montgomery, in the Middle Loch. All the Japanese gunners’ rounds missed the Helm by a few feet. As with other ships in the Middle and West Lochs, Helm’s gunners hadn’t time to react. Her forward machine guns, the only guns that could bear on the approaching Kates, were coated with grease and had to be cleaned before they could fire.
Helm’s skipper, Commander Chester E. Carroll, Jr., immediately ordered “Back engines,” and began maneuvering the ship out of the loch to head for the channel entrance. At 0805 her after machine guns opened fire at planes over the main channel, followed shortly by the forward machine guns firing at passing torpedo planes, and at 0807, the 5-inch battery - all with no hits. At 0810 she was in the main channel steaming toward the harbor entrance, when the port machine gun, manned by Gunner’s Mate Second Class W.C. Huff, hit a plane approaching from the south. The plane veered sharply, caught fire, and crashed behind trees near Hickam Field. Commander Carroll ordered all boilers lighted off, and at 0813 Helm steamed past the gate vessel, accelerating toward 25 knots.
At 0817 Helm’s crew sighted the conning tower of a submarine to the right of channel, northward of Buoy #1, and Carroll ordered open fire, “pointer fire,” but the submarine submerged before guns could swing and aim at the target.43
On board the destroyer Monaghan at 0800, Commander Burford inquired of the status of officers in the other ships in the nest of four destroyers and issued orders to commence firing from all ships as soon as they were capable - as well as orders to send boats ashore for their officers. Monaghan’s First Lieutenant and Torpedo Officer, Ensign Paul W. Gill, immediately sent a man below to bring up the firing locks for the guns, then sent repair party men forward and aft on the 341-foot ship to break the locks on all magazines, while he started organizing ammunition transfer.
He then placed Ensign Raleigh C. Christian in charge of “extra men” - those not assigned a battle station, while others were detailed to take charge and perform necessary tasks to get the destroyer underway as soon as possible. Gill was sent by Ensign George V. Rogers to belt .50-caliber ammunition, while Chief Boatswain Mate Jones took repair men and part of Gun #3 crew to take in the motor whaleboat and gangway. Two repair-party men were sent forward and aft in charge of petty officers to stand by and take in forward and after lines with the help of Guns #1 and #5. Boatswain Mate Second Class Meadows and the Gun Captain of Gun #3 were placed in charge of the ammunition train for that gun. Guns #1, #2, and #4 had ammunition on the way up. Guns #1 and #2 had no power on the hoist, and an electrician’s mate was sent forward to solve the problem. Coxswain I.C. Switzer was placed in charge of bringing up Gun #5 ammunition, while Ensign Christian brought up .50-caliber ammunition and belted it.
At 0808, by radio and visual signal, the commander, Destroyer Flotilla 1, ordered Destroyer Division Two, which included all the destroyers in Monaghan’s nest, to establish the Offshore Patrol. Responding to the radically changed circumstances, the command’s order revised the direction previously given Monaghan’s commander - to assist the Ward.43
At 0814 ships in the nest began firing on the enemy horizontal bombers with both machine guns and 5-inch batteries. There was not yet electrical power to Monaghan’s guns or ammunition hoists. Crews operated guns by manual control and brought ammunition up by hand and manual hoisting, until steam was up. In response to a flag hoist on the cruiser Detroit, she was underway at 0827, backing from her mooring. After backing clear of the nest, she moved ahead in a starboard turn toward the south, accelerating to ten knots and maneuvering to sortie from Pearl Harbor via the North Channel.44
As Val dive bombers launched their first attacks on Ford Island at 0755, at virtually the same minute sixteen Kate torpedo bombers from Soryu and Hiryu were fanning out, approaching their target areas, low from the west and northwest, across the harbor between Pearl City and Ford Island. Five from Soryu pressed toward Utah, Raleigh, Detroit and the seaplane tender Tangier (AV-8), all moored on the west side of Ford Island. They were the torpedo bombers seen by Commander Burford, Monaghan’s skipper, and Ensign Gilpin, the communications officer on Monaghan.
Further south, a smaller number of Kate torpedo bombers from Hiryu swept low over the water just west of Pearl City, then across the water on the west side of the Middle Loch, down the channel and around the south end of Ford Island toward 1010 Dock. En route they flew low near the seaplane tender Curtiss (AV-4) moored at Berth X-22, the repair ship Medusa (AR-1), moored at Berth X-23 approximately 400 yards northwest of Curtiss, and a nest of four high-speed minesweepers moored further northwest of Medusa less than 100 yards. The bows of all six ships pointed northeast, roughly the same direction as the destroyers in the nest with Monaghan. From starboard to port at Buoys D-7 and D-7-S, the four minesweepers were: the Perry (DMS-17) nearest Medusa, Zane (DMS-14), Wasmuth (DMS-15), and Trever (DMS-16). As the Kates crossed the water just to the west of Pearl City one or more radio operator-gunners facing aft in the Kates had strafed a liberty boat returning from Pearl City to the light minelayer Montgomery (DM-17).
Moored to Buoy D-3 in a nest of four more ships approximately 500 yard further west of Trever, also bows to the northeast toward Pearl City, were from right to left, the light minelayers Ramsay (DM-16), Breese (DM-18), the Montgomery, and Gamble (DM-15).45
The Kate torpedo bombers flew past the ten ships on the west side of the Middle Loch channel while the ships’ crews’ attention was first drawn to the dive bomb attacks on Ford Island - to the east - and passed too quickly for any of the ships’ antiaircraft batteries to react. Unlike Captain Clifton A.F. Sprague on Tangier, and consistent with direction from the fleet’s Commander-in-Chief, the other nine commanders had dutifully ordered ammunition be removed from ready boxes and stored in magazines. The silence of the ships’ guns on the west side of the Middle Loch would end in approximately four minutes, while adjacent to Ford Island, gun crews on the seaplane tender Tangier saw the Kates coming, and were the first to fire on them.46
At 0755, the 11,760-ton Tangier (AV-8) was berthed at F-10 on the west side of the island, with her bow pointing 230 degrees true - roughly the same direction as the battleships on the other side of the island. Directly astern of the 492-foot ship, at Berth F-11, was Utah, oriented stern to stern with Tangier. Tangier had arrived at Pearl Harbor with her complement of 1,075 officers and men on 3 November, assigned to Patrol Wing TWO, with the mission of servicing the Wing’s flying boats. Her crew routinely serviced approximately twenty of the long range patrol aircraft, providing gas, oil, machine gun ammunition and 500-pound bombs. Using cranes the Tangier could hoist the big, two-engine, Catalina PBY Flying Boats on deck for maintenance or overhaul, then return them to operation.
At 0758 Tangier’s klaxan sounded general quarters, and shortly before 0800 all guns that could be brought to bear on airborne targets, opened fire. Among the targets were three Kate torpedo bombers closing in on Utah, Raleigh, and Detroit, logged at 0803, a startlingly rapid response that was no accident. Captain Sprague, Tangier’s commander, was a hard-boiled, proud naval aviator, and in his 2 January 1942 report to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, wrote, “…the first of the Japanese planes passed along port [east] side of ship headed to Ewa, at about 400 feet, its orange insignia clear, leaving no uncertainty that this was a real attack…It was [my] impression that this ship was the first to open fire, or surely among the first.”
When the order came early in the week of 1 December, for the Battle Fleet to be ready for Admirals’ Inspection beginning 8 December, with ammunition taken from the ready boxes locked in the ships’ magazines, Sprague told his gunners’ mates to keep the ammunition in the ready boxes. He had “come out here to fight a war!” If one of the brass hats came to visit his ship the admiral would have to signal the ship first for side boys at the gangway, then he - Sprague - and the crew would hide all the ammunition before the admiral came on board.47
