Emperor leo iii the isau.., p.12
Emperor Leo III the Isaurian, page 12
It is uncertain if Bardanes took part personally in any imperial action in Armenia – in his previous entry, Theophanes proclaimed that the new emperor was content to stay in the imperial palaces when confronted with opposition.17 The chances are that so early in his reign, Bardanes will not have looked to repeat Justinian’s mistake of leaving the capital at a time of upheaval. Any Roman campaign in Armenia, either against Arab incursion or Armenian rebellion, was likely to have been undertaken by the Armeniac strategos. These were not the only Arab attacks on Roman territory to take place during the brief reign of Bardanes. The frontier town of Sision was abandoned in around 711, along with a series of fortresses near Melitene, while Misthia and Pisidian Antioch were sacked in 712/713.18
But any plans Bardanes might have had to confront the Arab attacks on the eastern provinces in greater force were quickly scuppered by a second front opening right on his doorstep as the Bulgars advanced into Roman territory. Tervel had aided Justinian II in his restoration in 705 and been suitably rewarded with ‘many gifts,’19 and if the Battle of Anchialus had been against a separate Bulgar group,20 the alliance between Tervel and Justinian may have provided a raison de guerre for the Bulgar khan. There is also some suggestion that the Bulgar attack in 712 was caused by the failure to pay an annual tribute to the khan,21 which would make it Bardanes who had, inadvertently or intentionally, broken any Romano-Bulgar treaty. One could well understand if the new regime had overlooked such a payment in the chaos of its enthronement.
Whatever his motives, Tervel’s army struck deeply into Roman Thrace, approaching the Bosphorus by way of Philea. So sudden was their attack that many were caught out in the open celebrating weddings and hosting dinners, enabling the Bulgars to take many captives and spoils, while killing others. The invaders then made a demonstration against the walls of Constantinople, approaching the Golden Gate. Without any opposition, the Bulgars then returned home, further devastating Thrace and removing ‘innumerable cattle.’22 The lack of imperial threat to this Bulgar incursion may hint at the weakness of the empire’s Thracian and/or Constantinopolitan forces. Bardanes responded to this by transferring the Opsikon army from Asia Minor into the Balkans. This action facilitated the end of Bardanes’ reign in mid-713, but while it highlights part of the immediate military failure of the new regime, it was not the real catalyst in its removal. For that, we must look elsewhere.
In the reputed character of Bardanes, we find several flaws recorded by Theophanes and Nikephoros. He was considered profligate with imperial funds, for having ‘found a lot of money and expensive property collected by the previous emperors … through confiscations and various pretexts, and senselessly and vainly squandered it.’23 Nikephoros also records Bardanes banqueting with his friends and then sleeping until midday, although this was in celebration of the anniversary of the re-dedication of Constantinople on 11 May, so it cannot be taken as a general reflection of the emperor’s conduct,24 yet sleeping at an important time would help bring about Bardanes’ downfall. Theophanes also describes him as incompetent, disreputable, and adulterous, while Nikephoros regarded him as administering the empire ‘in an indecorous and negligent manner.’25 However, such ill-judgements of character and ability must be treated with caution, for they were almost all negatively coloured by one specific religious policy of Bardanes.
We have already seen how Bardanes’ rise to imperial power had been supposedly predicted by the monk from the Kallistratos monastery; however, there was another aspect to the divine deal he proposed for Bardanes – in order to have a ‘mighty and long’ reign on the throne, Bardanes had to agree, under oath, to cast down the ‘wrongly enacted’ Sixth Ecumenical Council.26 This marked the monk and Bardanes himself as followers of Monothelitism. This was a sizeable obstacle to the perceived legitimacy of Bardanes amongst the orthodox inhabitants of the empire. Heterodox emperors had ruled successfully in the past, so long as they were moderate in their religious dealings. Immediately upon his accession at a time of military instability, Bardanes would have been best suited to follow such a moderate path. He did not …
Within weeks of his accession, Bardanes made his Monothelitism central to his regime. The orthodox patriarch, Cyrus, was deposed, which in itself is not a sign of religious realignment. Cyrus had been a close partisan of Justinian II so deposition and confinement to the Chora monastery could have been seen as part of the excising of the previous regime. However, Cyrus was replaced as patriarch by John VI, a committed Monothelite. This appointment might meet with some opposition, particularly when it came to the new patriarch’s profession of faith, but it was still potentially survivable. However, Bardanes then set about keeping his oath to the Kallistratos monk by convening ‘a false assembly of bishops to cast out the holy ecumenical council.’27 Theophanes somewhat gives the impression that this attempted restoration of Monothelitism was the work of a small cadre of churchmen, along with Bardanes – patriarch John VI, Germanos of Cyzicus, Andrew of Crete, Nicholas the quaestor, the deacon Elpidios, Antiochos the chartophylax and ‘other men of the same ilk.’28 However, even though the Arab conquests had removed the Monothelite areas from the empire, Nikephoros suggests that there was pro-Monothelite feeling in Constantinople, stating that Bardanes had the support of ‘other priests and many senators’ in his rejection of the imperial orthodoxy of the ‘two wills and two energies’. Certainly, Bardanes would not have anathematised the Sixth Ecumenical Council on personal belief, the pronouncement of a single monk or a small cadre of supporters, even if it was part of a divine bargain. This suggests that there was Monothelite support within the political and military elites.29 There was likely a political aspect to this restoration of Monothelitism. As it had been a doctrine promulgated under the emperor Heraclius, Bardanes may have been looking to harken back to past glories to solidify his position,30 although looking to recall Heraclian achievements might not have been the best thing to do given how Bardanes’ usurpation had seen the end of that dynasty.
As we are relying on Theophanes and Nikephoros’ interpretation of whatever sources they were using, we are not entirely certain of the contemporary reaction to the restoration of Monothelitism. The support of the future patriarch Germanos and Andrew of Crete suggests that there was some level of support from the clergy, but even that is not necessarily the case as they were under duress from the threat of imperial reprisals. The rapidity of the restoration of the pronouncements of the Sixth Ecumenical Council after Bardanes’ deposition would suggest that the reception of Monothelitism had been lukewarm in the east. However, in Italy, the reception was openly divisive. Upon receiving the declaration of the imperial faith, Pope Constantine brought it before a council in Rome, which rejected it as heresy. Bardanes’ name was excluded from prayers, papal documents and coins, and his faith declaration and imperial portrait were sent back to Constantinople. The people of Rome reputedly even installed a cibotarea31 in St Peter’s, a Latinisation of the Greek κιβωτός, meaning ‘chest’ and used most prominently for the Ark of the Covenant, suggesting a similar ‘ark’ containing copies of the Acts of the Six Ecumenical Councils was displayed to portray their sacredness.32
But this papal rejection of Bardanes was not the end of the affair. At this time, the duchy of Rome had become vacant, and a certain Peter saw an opportunity for advancement. He is recorded sending to Ravenna for confirmation of his ducal elevation – this hints at it being the Ravennate exarch who appointed the Roman dux, but there are some issues with this. The historical record regarding the Roman dux is poor – indeed, Peter is the first known holder of the office, which could have it that the dux Romae was a relatively new position. Furthermore, at the time that Peter sent to Ravenna for confirmation of his elevation, there was no sitting exarch – the position had been vacant since the death of John III Rizocopos in 711 and is not recorded as being filled until the appointment of Scholasticus in 713.
Peter did receive imperial verification of his promotion to dux Romae;33 however, ‘once it became known that Peter had obtained his promotion in the name of the heretic emperor, the majority of the Roman people … determined not to accept him as duke.’34 It is here that the Liber Pontificalis makes mention of a certain Christopher being a ‘former duke’, which given its vicinity to the story of Peter’s accession as Roman dux may suggest that that accession had been at the expense of a papal-supporting/anti-Monothelite Christopher. Alongside Agatho and supporters, Christopher confronted Peter on the Via Sacra, sparking a ‘civil war’ (i.e. a riot). There had been over 60 deaths, with Peter’s faction having the worst of it, before Pope Constantine intervened to stop the fighting.35 Despite this defeat and what was surely the continued opposition of Christopher’s faction, Peter remained Roman dux until 725, suggesting that his faction was more ‘imperial’, imposing Constantinople’s writ rather than being out-and-out ‘defenders of the heretic’36 and that neither the pope nor Christopher had enough power to oust him.
For imperial politics, this was an early demonstration that the papacy and its allies were taking the first steps to filling the void left by the crumbling exarchate of Ravenna. But in 712, it demonstrated that Bardanes’ religious policy was not going to receive the full support of the provinces. The question could be asked as to what accelerative effects a prolonged Monothelite emperor might have had on the decline of imperial Roman Italy. The very hint of a heretic-supporting Roman dux had caused a ‘civil war’, so at the very least we might have expected more conflict between imperial and papal forces. Perhaps fortunately for Roman Italy or even the papacy, this is a question that did not need to be asked …
This was because the reign of Philippikos Bardanes fell apart after just 19 months. There is no definitive reasoning presented in the sources for the plot that deposed him. Even religiously orthodox men such as Theophanes and Nikephoros do not refer to Bardanes’ heresy in their recording of his deposition in May 713. They instead focus on the military men who carried out the plot, giving no reason for their action. Bardanes’ reign had not begun well militarily, with seeming Armenian revolt, continued Arab raids, armed discontent in Italy, and Bulgar attacks on Thrace and even the capital. There could have been some opposition within the military to Bardanes’ Monothelitism, although Christian doctrinal issues do not seem to have affected the army to any great degree yet. The Opsikons, who were the perpetrators of the deposition, may have resented their transfer from Asia to Europe to deal with Tervel’s raiders and/or their seeming loss of influence upon the overthrow of Justinian II.37 They might even have seen an opportunity ‘to establish themselves in an emperor-making or permanently ‘praetorianist’ role’38 slipping away, with their transfer to Thrace taken as evidence of them being treated like any other thematic army.
Whatever its background, by the first days of June 713, the patrician Theodore Myakios had persuaded the comes Opsikon, George Bouraphos, to send troops into Constantinople to remove Bardanes. The job was given to Rufus, the Opsikon protostrator, who led a small force of thematic soldiers to the capital. Entering through the Golden Gate, Rufus and his men made their way to the imperial palace where they found the emperor sleeping, having spent the Saturday before Pentecost enjoying an equestrian contest, bathing in the Bath of Zeuxippos and lunching with his aristocratic friends. The Opsikon plotters seized Bardanes and took him to a quiet place in the Hippodrome, where they blinded him. The fact that Rufus and his followers could take hold of the emperor in the imperial palace, spirit him away to the Hippodrome and then blind him without opposition suggests that there was little support for this Monothelite emperor of Armenian extraction who had overthrown the Heraclian dynasty. Bardanes was not executed, but not only were his 19 months as emperor up, he died before the year 713 was out, suggesting that his blinding had done for him either through its messiness, shock, or infection.39
A Slight Improvement: The 27-Month Reign of Anastasius II
It is difficult to ascertain from the sources whether or not the plot of George, Rufus and Theodore involved a plan for the succession. The rapidity of the following accession – the next day according to both Nikephoros and Theophanes – could suggest that a plan had been in place, with their imperial candidate, Artemios, in on the plot from the start. And given that Artemios held the position of protoasecretis – a senior bureaucrat responsible for writing up imperial legislation – could suggest that the plot to remove Bardanes was not purely military in origin. But these are only suggestions and not very solid ones. It could easily be almost the exact opposite: the plot was spur-of-the-moment, based entirely on an impulsive military hierarchy, with the choice of Artemios as the new emperor made because he just happened to be in the right place at the right time.
Aside from his name and bureaucratic position, nothing is known about the man who was acclaimed emperor in succession to Bardanes in Hagia Sophia on 4 June 713, the Feast of Pentecost. Even his lofty position in the imperial bureaucracy says little about him as such high office does not necessarily reflect ability, although to have made it so high without ability would suggest good connections, familial or personal. But again, this is entirely speculative. Rather than a well-connected, ruthless opportunist, Artemios could quite easily have been a conscientious and skilled bureaucrat whose skills were recognised by more than one imperial regime, allowing him to rise through the ranks and then be in and around the imperial palace on the night the plotters struck.
What we do know is that when Artemios was crowned emperor, he took the regnal name of Anastasius. There could be several reasons why he chose such a name. While he had been a Miaphysite heretic, Anastasius I was a court bureaucrat who had given the empire 27 years of solid (and in financial terms, spectacular) rule. This choice of name may also contain some reaction to the reputed squandering of the imperial treasury by Bardanes. It should also be said that ‘Anastasius’ can also mean ‘resurrection’, something that the empire desperately needed in 713. As Anastasius II’s acclamation took place in the Hagia Sophia, he was almost certainly publicly crowned by the patriarch of Constantinople, who was still John VI, despite his Monothelitism. Indeed, he would remain patriarch for another two years, suggesting that the plot against the regime of Bardanes was not necessarily a violent insurrection against his restoration of Monothelite heresy.
Perhaps John VI had had a change of heart? He would not have been the only one. The man who would succeed him as patriarch in 715, Germanos, bishop of Cyzicus, had given overt support to the Monothelite restoration of Bardanes. And yet, by the time of his elevation to patriarch, Germanos received the support of not just the emperor, but also the church, Senate and people of Constantinople, numerous other bishops and priests, and the papal legate.40 The turnaround must have been convincing. And it may have been quicker than usually proposed, for it has been suggested that Germanos became patriarch in 714, with Theophanes recording the appointment happening on 11 August of the second year of Anastasius’ reign, and that by August 715, the emperor was in Nicaea and the capital was under siege by a rebel fleet.41 The naval actions of that period may not equate to a full blockade or siege, so a physical translation in August 715 would not have been impossible. Unfortunately, the record is lacking on why John VI needed to be replaced – had he died or had he been deposed, possibly because he had been unable to fully turn away from Monothelitism or at least shake that association? Even his proposed tenure of three years does not help the chronology, for if he became patriarch in 711, counting inclusively would see his patriarchate end in 713, rather than 714 or 715.
The year-long delay in replacing John VI does not mean that Anastasius was in any way slow ‘to restore Chalcedon orthodoxy and rehabilitate the sixth council.’42 In the first few months of his reign, Anastasius interjected in Italian politics, where his declaration of orthodoxy was met with ‘great exultation, while the day of darkness came down on all the heretics.’43 With his reign the product of a military revolt, Anastasius II will have needed as much legitimacy and support as he could get and the acceptance of his declaration of orthodoxy by the pope will have been much welcomed. Anastasius also appointed a new exarch – the imperial chamberlain and patrician, Scholasticus. One could well imagine that during his visit to Rome – it was he who delivered Anastasius’ declaration of orthodoxy – Scholasticus consulted the pope over the position of Peter and perhaps in a reflection of his pro-imperial rather than pro-Monothelite stance, Peter was kept on as dux Romae on the proviso that ‘he would not attempt to create any opposition.’44
Anastasius II was also quick to stamp his political authority. Within a fortnight he targeted the men he owed his new position to. Both Theodore Myakios and George Bouraphos were blinded and exiled to Thessalonica. It is not recorded whether Rufus was similarly punished or if he was at the side of Anastasius II during this cull. He was in a position to inform the emperor of who had ordered the removal of Bardanes (if Anastasius had not already been in on the plot). If he had shown loyalty and support for the new emperor, Rufus could have been promoted, possibly even replacing his former commander as comes Opsikon. But it is just as likely that because Anastasius was removing those who had been powerful enough to plot successfully against his imperial predecessor, Rufus faced a similar fate to George and Theodore. Owing his throne to the military leaders around the capital could have been a double-edged sword for Anastasius – it could have brought strong support from the Opsikon, but it could also have brought overweening military influence on imperial policies. Eliminating those responsible for the removal of Bardanes would have been seen as making Anastasius’ position stronger and safer by removing this undue military influence and discouraging future rebellion. At least that might have been the aim … Anastasius may also have been attempting to clear himself ‘of any popular stigma for the mutilation of his predecessor.’45
