Emperor leo iii the isau.., p.22
Emperor Leo III the Isaurian, page 22
Regardless, this was a challenge to Leo’s imperial rule. Therefore, once he was able, Leo reacted by turning to a member of his own household, Paul the chartularius, ‘a faithful friend and experienced in military matters.’12 Paul was promoted to both patrician13 and strategos of Sicily and dispatched from Constantinople with imperial orders for the thematic forces of Sicily and a sacra to be read to the people. Together with a band of followers, including two spatharii, Paul stole out of Constantinople in a dromon by night, making for Cyzicus. From there, this small expeditionary force travelled across both land and sea, avoiding Arab and Slav forces, to eventually arrive in Sicily. Such was the speed of his arrival that Paul and his crew achieved complete surprise with their arrival in Syracuse. Sergios was so surprised at this imperial delegation’s existence, let alone its arrival, that he fled the island, crossing over to territory that the Lombard duke of Benevento held in Calabria. Theophanes states that Sergios fled without a fight because he ‘recognised his own guilt,’14 which can be somewhat ambiguous in terms of motive – recognition, despite his own good intentions, of the official imperial representative or that his powerplay had been foiled – although ultimately either reflects a fear of execution.
Having assumed control of Syracuse, Paul read the imperial sacra to a congregation of the people and army, which informed them that Constantinople still held firm, as impregnable as ever, against the Arabs and had recently won great victories over the two relief fleets of Sufyan and Yezid. Their faith in the empire restored, the people and army of Syracuse reaffirmed their allegiance to Leo III and surrendered Basil Tiberius and his officials to Paul. The new strategos had Basil and his commander-in-chief (possibly the George mentioned by Nikephoros) beheaded; their heads sent to Leo preserved in vinegar in the care of the two spatharii. The other members of Basil’s brief regime Paul had either beaten, scourged, or their noses cut off before they were sent into exile.
Given this brutal treatment of those who had prominent roles in the attempted usurpation, it might be expected that its instigator would face the worst of it; however, Sergios managed to get away with it. Seeing the ease with which Paul had defeated his usurpation, Sergios promised to surrender himself to the chartularius on the promise of safe conduct and immunity, which was granted, his fate going unrecorded. Had he been able to explain to Paul that he had only elevated Basil because he had been told of the fall of Constantinople and acted only for the benefit of the Roman Empire? Both Theophanes and Nikephoros claimed that the subjugation of Basil Tiberius saw ‘the affairs of the West returned to peace and tranquillity;’15 however, we shall see later that Italy was far from ‘pacified’,16 with other rebellions and usurpations against the rule of Leo III.
An Attempted Return: Anastasius II
Not long after the end of the Arab siege of Constantinople,17 an attempted coup was initiated in the two major cities of the empire – Thessalonica and the imperial capital itself. Which of these two was the initial focus of the rebellion depends on which of the sources is relied upon: Theophanes or Nikephoros. On this occasion, it is Nikephoros who provides more information about the latest usurpation faced by Leo III. As it is unlikely that Nikephoros would suddenly find a different source for this one specific incident than that which he shared with Theophanes, it would seem that Theophanes has ‘deliberately condensed and altered the narrative.’18
Nikephoros has it that the rebellion of 719 originated in Thessalonica, when the deposed and tonsured emperor Anastasius II ‘attempted once again to win the empire.’19 Nothing had been heard from Anastasius II since late 715 and there is no reason to suspect that he had been an active opponent of the regime of his successor. This has not stopped there being an attempt to connect him with a conspiracy by Maurus and Kouver that is recorded, without date, in the Miracles of St Demetrius, and in turn connect this conspiracy to the attempt to reinstall Anastasius at the expense of Leo III;20 however, this has been successfully opposed,21 with this ‘Kouver’ possibly to be identified with the Bulgar tribal leader, Kuber, a son of Kubrat and therefore an uncle of Tervel, who was active around the norther Aegean some 40 years before Anastasius’ attempted imperial revival.
Anastasius may have felt that the Arab siege and the usurpation of Basil Tiberius had made the government of Leo III appear weak. It might also be remembered that the lack of chronological clarity in this era could see the rebellion of Anastasius II viewed in a similar manner to the supposed ‘loyalism’ of the revolt of Sergios and Basil Tiberius – the deposed emperor, hearing word of the siege of Constantinople set out to aid the empire, only to be too late. Anastasius may have sought loyalty not just from men in Constantinople who had previously served him, but specifically from the highest profile supposed supporters of his regime – the men he seemingly appointed as Armeniac and Anatolic strategoi: the kouroplates Artabasdos and the emperor himself, Leo III. Could Anastasius have been hoping there was some truth in Leo’s initial reasoning – support for Anastasius II – for resisting the regime of Theodosius III?
According to Nikephoros, from his Thessalonian monastic exile, Anastasius wrote to the patrician Sisinnios Rhendakios, who was in Bulgarian territory on the order of Leo looking to conclude a treaty between the khanate and empire against the Umayyad caliphate. Anastasius asked Sisinnios for help in regaining the throne and to ask the Bulgar khan to provide the military muscle. Sisinnios agreed to try. The deposed emperor also contacted several prominent individuals within Leo’s regime stationed in Constantinople: the magister officiorum Niketas Xylinites; Theoktistos the protoasekretis (principal imperial secretary); Niketas Anthrax, commander of the walls;22 and Isoes, comes Opsikon. Isoes ‘may have resented the success of the Anatolic and Armeniac troops in raising Leo to the throne.’23 He asked for their help to deliver the capital to him, reminding them of their own friendships, which suggests that the accession of Theodosius III and Leo III had not seen much disruption to the imperial hierarchy. However, these epistolary pleas were immediately revealed to the emperor, who had the recipients arrested and tortured into confessing – Xylinites and Theoktistos were executed, while Isoes and Anthrax had their property confiscated and were exiled.
As the Constantinopolitan portion of the rebellion collapsed, Anastasius had had some success in rousing support from the Bulgars through Sisinnios. He had advanced as far as Herakleia at the head of a Bulgar force, with a rudimentary fleet of monoxyla boats from Thessalonica shadowing them, possibly hinting at some Slavic involvement. This has led to the suggestion that the Bulgars Sisinnios had been negotiating with were those settled near Thessalonica, rather than those of the khanate.24 Indeed, Nikephoros does not mention Tervel or either of his potential successors in connection with Anastasius’ rebellion, although Theophanes does name Tervel.
Whomever these Bulgars were, their heart was not completely in supporting Anastasius or it was drained out of them as it became apparent that they had been lied to by Sisinnios and Anastasius about the extent of support for their cause in Constantinople. Word may have reached them about the arrest of Anastasius’ allies and a general lack of appetite to remove Leo. And when a letter arrived from the emperor offering them a peaceful retreat in return for the handing over of the rebels, they quickly acquiesced. Anastasius, the bishop of Thessalonica and others were surrendered to imperial forces, while Sisinnios was beheaded by the Bulgars (did he know too much?) before they departed home with no imperial consequences.
The rapidity of the Bulgar capitulation could suggest that they had not forsaken any peace they had with the empire. Could it even be that, rather than supporting Anastasius and Niketas, they had always planned to hand over the deposed emperor and his supporters for execution by Leo? This seems a little farfetched, particularly if these are not Tervel’s Bulgars. At best, we might suggest that these Bulgars were hedging their bets – providing Anastasius with support, but with enough plausible deniability should the rebellion fail. With the rebels now in his clutches, Leo made a public spectacle of their punishment. Anastasius and the bishop of Thessalonica were beheaded, their heads paraded around the Hippodrome on pikes as part of a large horse race. The other conspirators not yet punished were beaten, their noses mutilated, their possessions confiscated and then exiled.
Not only does Theophanes give a more truncated version of this attempt to reinstall Anastasius II on the throne, he also gives different emphasis to the roles of certain parties involved in it. Rather than Anastasius being the driving force, Theophanes posits Niketas Xylinites as the first mover in the plot. From Constantinople, Niketas wrote to Anastasius in his Thessalonian monastery urging him to go to Tervel and ask for Bulgar backing in overthrowing Leo III. That Anastasius ‘consented’ to this gives the impression that Niketas was the man in control. There is no mention here of Sisinnios Rhendakios in negotiations with Tervel; only his execution by the Bulgars is mentioned. Indeed, the other named players in Nikephoros’ version – Isoes, Theoktistos and Niketas Anthrax – are also only mentioned by Theophanes when they are executed after the failure of the plot. It is Anastasius himself who escapes his monastic custody and travels to the Bulgar court, where he received not only armed support from Tervel, but also 50 centenaria of gold – 5,000lbs – only for the Bulgars to betray him to Leo, who ‘duly rewarded’25 them. While we might rely more on Nikephoros’ account, the possibility that Theophanes still retains extra information, such as the amount of cash the Bulgars may have provided to Anastasius cannot be dismissed out of hand – it is not the kind of trivia that Theophanes would have invented.
In Theophanes’s account, there is no hint of the Bulgars acquiescing to Leo’s plea for peace, with them only giving up the usurper and beheading Sisinnios when ‘the City did not accept [Anastasius].’26 The difference in the possible role of the Bulgars between the accounts of Theophanes and Nikephoros was perhaps due to the more heightened anti-Bulgar bias of the former, with him intentionally playing down any actions that might have benefitted the Roman Empire.27 Even if it is accepted that the Bulgars involved with Anastasius were those of the khanate and that they did actually attempt to overthrow Leo, Romano-Bulgar relations remained largely peaceful throughout most of Leo’s reign. His son Constantine V would try to take advantage of the in-fighting that broke out at the end of Tervel’s dynastic line. This led to a back-and-forth contest between the empire and khanate for dominance in the Balkans, which would continue virtually unabated until the elimination of the Bulgarian Empire in the early-eleventh century. And even that Roman conquest only lasted until the late-twelfth century, with a revived Bulgarian state playing a significant role in Balkan affairs right up to 1422.
Upon his execution, Anastasius II was permitted burial in the mausoleum of Justinian in the Church of the Holy Apostles, seemingly at the behest of his wife, Irene, who was also later buried there.28 Why might Leo have allowed this exalted final resting place for someone who had rebelled against him? He might have felt magnanimous in victory or even some personal appreciation to Anastasius himself, but Leo’s reasoning was surely much more pragmatic in nature. Treating an imperial predecessor with respect not only reflected well on Leo personally, but also on the imperial position itself. It must also not be forgotten that Leo had based a lot of his initial imperial legitimacy on his support for Anastasius II. A total demolition of Anastasius’ reputation could therefore reflect poorly on Leo in more than one way. But perhaps the more important reason for his respectful post-mortem treatment of Anastasius II is that the abortive plot to restore him had demonstrated that there was still support for the deposed emperor in the highest offices of state. So while their relationship ended with rebellion and execution, Leo III may have been careful to show respect to his predecessor for fear of damaging his own reputation or stoking opposition.
The attempt to restore Anastasius II may have been a failure, but that should not underestimate the threat that it had posed to the regime of Leo III. While it collapsed before any military confrontation, the areas from where Anastasius derived support – Bulgars, Slavs(?) and high-level officials in Thessalonica and Constantinople – could have been problematic for the emperor. The revealing of the Anastasian correspondence with Xylinites, Anthrax, Theoktistos and Isoes ultimately brought an end to the conspiracy, as it likely dissipated the Bulgar support for the endeavour. However, Leo was fortunate that Isoes’ support for the conspiracy was not reflected within the Opsikons. Their strategic position would have enabled them to block Leo’s communications with his Anatolic and Armeniac troops. Opsikon and hierarchic opposition in the city, together with Bulgar pressure outside the walls (where they might not have remained for too long if Anthrax was in command of an outer wall), could have proven a significant challenge to Leo’s still fledgling regime. As it was, the betrayal of the letters, the emperor’s rapid response, and a lack of demand for Leo’s replacing/Anastasius’ restoration retained the Isaurian’s throne.
‘Moved by Divine Zeal’: The Thematic Usurpation of Kosmas
The failure of Anastasius II demonstrates that Leo III, in his successful defence of Constantinople, had made some strides in overturning the years of ‘anarchy’ that had engulfed the imperial position. It would be several years before he was challenged again. When it did come, details are scant. Even the year it took place is unclear, with Theophanes making an error in placing it in his entry for AM6218 (725/726), but then stating that its crescendo took place on 18 April of the 10th indiction, which was in 727. It seems more likely that the latter date is correct if it is taken as read that the destruction of the Brazen House icon, a reputedly major event in the initiation of Leo III’s iconoclasm in late-summer/autumn 726, was a catalyst for the latest revolt faced by that emperor. But as will be seen later, the dates and very initiation of a Leonid iconoclasm are by no means secure. Furthermore, while Theophanes and Nikephoros posit this latest rebellion as being ‘moved by divine zeal’29 due to opposition to iconoclasm, the same dating and iconoclasm origin issues raises scepticism about the rebellion of 726/727 having a religious basis.
There are some details about this latest rebellion that generate much less scepticism. Geographically, its basis was in the Helladic theme of Greece and the Cyclades islands of the Aegean Sea. The Hellas theme was largely focused on Boeotia and Attica and offshore islands like Euboea. There was little penetration into the Greek hinterlands beyond these areas that the Roman navy could help maintain before the early-ninth century. In its foundation by Justinian II, it is possible that the Hellas theme was territory detached from the Karabisianoi with thousands of Mardaites settled in Helladic territory to provide naval manpower,30 which could have the forces of the Hellas theme heavily weighted in favour of oarsmen over land forces.31 This infers that, alongside the Cycladic forces, the revolt faced by Leo III in 726/727 had a naval basis.
In some secondary descriptions of this revolt, a Cyclades ‘theme’ is mentioned, but this is anachronistic as the Cyclades were not incorporated into a fully-fledged Aegean theme until the mid-ninth century. There is some suggestion of specific administrative reorganisation of the Late Roman province of Provincia Insularum (ἐπαρχία νήσων/eparchia nēsōn) that encompassed the Aegean islands by the early-eighth century. An apo eparchon and general kommerkiarios of the apotheke of the Aigaion Pelagos was recorded during the reign of Philippikos Bardanes (711–713), while a stratelates and general kommerkiarios of the apotheke of the Cycladic Islands may have appeared in 687.32 The Justinianic connection of the Aegean islands to the quaestor exercitus also sees the administration of the Cyclades become part of the controversy surrounding the fate of those various regions commanded by this ‘quaestor of the army’. Specific to the naval forces of the Cyclades is the argument over the possible transformation of the quaestura into the basis for the Karabisianoi ‘theme’.33 The involvement of Cycladic naval units in a rebellion may have encouraged further reorganisation of the imperial navy by Leo III, with the Cyclades becoming part of the first thema nautikon of the Kibyrrhaeots.34
There are three individuals named as part of the rebellion of 726/727: Kosmas, Stephen and Agallianos Kontoskeles. While he would be the rebellion’s imperial candidate, virtually nothing is known about Kosmas. He need not have been a prominent military commander or even a high-level civilian official. He could simply have been a public servant in Greece of middling standing thrust into imperial contention by the thematic military command as a figurehead. But even this is a supposition with no supporting evidence. We have a similar lack of information on Stephen. There is some suggestion that he was a naval commander in the Cyclades, but this is only due to the recorded involvement of those islands in the rebellion and not due to any record in the sources. Indeed, there is little reason why Kosmas was not the Cycladic representative.
The only other individual named in connection with the rebellion of 726/727 is the man about whom we are told the most, although even that is not all that much: Agallianos Kontoskeles (Agallianos the ‘short-leg’). Because he is the only one of the three named rebels to have their official position recorded, it is usually inferred that Agallianos was the leader of the rebellion. However, peculiarly, Agallianos was only a tourmarches of the Helladic theme, rather than the strategos. This could play into the arguments regarding the establishment of the Hellas theme with our source material not referring to Hellas as a theme throughout most of the eighth century, but rather a στρατηγία/strategia; they do, however, refer to a Helladic strategos as early as 695.35 Was Agallianos then a mistitled strategos? Was there no appointed Helladic strategos at this point, with the record of a Helladic strategos in 695 an anachronism? Could Kosmas have been strategos? Or was Agallianos the tourmarches also rebelling against his strategos superior? We have no answers.
