Emperor leo iii the isau.., p.15
Emperor Leo III the Isaurian, page 15
Several Cilician forts were captured to further secure communications through the Taurus, while the main northern road was controlled by the capture of Camacha in 711. This allowed Maslamah and his generals to launch a series of strikes between 712–714, sacking major cities like Amaseia, Tarantum, Mistheia and Pisidian Antioch, with Arab forces reaching the coasts of the Aegean Sea and the Bosphorus. It was surely this wave of repeated Umayyad success, the inability of even the largest Roman armies of the Anatolic and Armeniac themes to do much about them and on-going Roman internal strife12 that encouraged the caliph and his generals to consider the Roman Empire ripe for the picking.
On account of the frequent assumptions of imperial power and the prevalence of usurpation, the affairs of the empire and of the City were being neglected and declined; furthermore, education was being destroyed and military organisation crumbled.13
Theophanes would have it that what became the Arab expedition to conquer Constantinople in 717–718 was launched in the year 715–716 with the advance forces under Suleiman b. Mu’ad14 and al-Bakhtari b. al-Hassan15 on land and Umar b. Hubayra by sea, ahead of the main body under Maslamah. But the scale of the undertaking as will be seen in the next chapter – ‘an innumerable host of horse and foot’16 – suggests that months, if not years, of planning, organisation, recruitment, and gathering of material went into the expedition before its launch. This would mean that rather than be the brainchild of caliph Sulayman, the expedition to conquer Constantinople germinated under his predecessor, al-Walid I (705–715).
The launching of the expedition during the caliphate of Sulayman became laden with prophetic, even apocalyptic meaning. The Kitab al-Uyun has Sulayman being informed by various learned men that the caliph to capture Constantinople had to have the same name as a prophet – Sulayman (i.e. Solomon) took this as his destiny and upon returning from his Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca in 715/716, stationed himself at Dabiq in northern Syria, from where he oversaw final preparations for the expedition that was to fulfil that destiny. It will also not have escaped the attention of said learned men or the caliph that the year 100 in the Muslim calendar was fast approaching (it equates to 718–719). While Sulayman is recorded telling Maslamah that once he had approached Constantinople and put it under siege he was ‘to stay there until he either conquered the city or received Sulayman’s order to return,’17 the caliph also reportedly stated that ‘I shall not cease from the struggle with Constantinople until either I force my way into it, or I bring about the destruction of the entire dominions of the Arabs.’18 This may reflect just how tied up in these apocalyptic prophecies the caliph had become – it seemed that to him, this war between the Roman Empire and the Umayyad caliphate was now a fight to the death, with the crescendo quickly honing into view. Although it should be noted that he was not so caught up in prophetic notions as to lead the expedition in person. Ill-health, which was soon to put paid to Sulayman, saw the caliph remain at Dabiq.
It was perhaps with such existentially-laced orders ringing in his ears that Maslamah launched the vanguard of the expedition to take Constantinople. This was not to be a mad dash across Asia Minor or a rapid advance by sea to blockade the Sea of Marmara, but rather a methodical progression, aiming to neutralise points of Roman resistance, such as the thematic armies and major cities, and to establish lines of supply. This shows that for all of their preparation, the Umayyads were under no illusion of the obstacle that Constantinople, its walls and navy represented. This wariness of continued Roman ability to resist may also be seen in an Umayyad action that appears tied to the preparations or even progression of the expedition.
While the chronology of the sources upon which we rely can be questionable (Tabari mentions the following event happening in two consecutive years (AH97 and 98), so any time between September 715 and August 717), at some point, caliph Sulayman sent his son Dawud to campaign near the Arab-held city of Melitene, where he captured the Hisn al-Mar’a (‘the Woman’s Fortress’).19 This could possibly be seen as a feint to divert the attention of the Armeniac strategos to prevent him from joining up with the Anatolic strategos in resisting the overland advance of Maslamah’s forces. Certainly, we do know that these two strategoi, Leo and Artabasdos, were working closely together – Artabasdos would marry Leo’s daughter, Anna. When it is queried why these two strategoi did little to help Anastasius II against Theodosius, the answer usually given is that ‘they really did not care to aid him, preferring to wait for an opportunity that would benefit themselves;’20 however, they were faced with the daunting prospect of Maslamah’s expeditionary force. It would not be all that surprising for the strategoi to have found the situation on the frontiers of more importance to not only their own survival but also that of the empire than the struggle for the throne. Surely, withdrawing their forces from the themes back towards the capital would have been disastrous for the Roman presence in Anatolia.
‘The Game’s Afoot’ – The ‘Siege’ of Amorion
The surviving sources give little detail of the progression of the Umayyad land expedition through eastern and central Anatolia or on the Roman response to it. It may be an argument from silence, which is always dangerous, but this could suggest that Maslamah’s forces, both the main body and the vanguard, were able to make relatively serene, unhindered progress. Any diversionary aim of Dawud’s raid on the ‘Women’s Fortress’ may well have prevented Artabasdos from aiding Leo in confronting the Umayyad forces marching west, leaving Leo unable to mount any sort of substantial opposition. This could speak to the comparative weakness of the Anatolic and Armeniac armies in the face of the enormous force of Maslamah. That the capital of the Anatolic theme did not have its own garrison suggests that its thematic army was either dispersed to other positions or was deployed in the field, although as we shall see, it was not under the direct control of the Anatolic strategos when he appeared at Amorion in 716.
And it is with the arrival of the Umayyad vanguard of Suleiman and al-Bakhtari outside Amorion that the record of Theophanes about the Arab attempt on Constantinople begins in earnest. It seems from their first recorded interactions that there had already been diplomatic contact between the Umayyad hierarchy and the Anatolic strategos. Suleiman and al-Bakhtari not only knew of Amorion’s lack of a thematic garrison and its opposition to Leo’s support of Anastasius II (the Amorians reputedly did not like Leo because they saw him as a ‘Nabataean Arab’),21 they also immediately put forward the idea of supporting Leo in his own attempt to gain the imperial throne. From this position outside Amorion, they reputedly wrote to Leo, stating that ‘We know that the Roman Empire befits you. Come, therefore, to us and let us confer about peace.’22 Suleiman turned up the pressure further by putting Amorion under blockade, planning to use it as the site of his rendezvous with Maslamah and as an important base for the Umayyad supply lines.23 He also had his forces proclaim Leo emperor, and urged the Amorions to do the same. Suleiman would surely not have undertaken such a ploy without the involvement of Maslamah and Sulayman. It must have been part of the Umayyad plan to conquer Constantinople and/or in the aftermath of that success, suggesting that they recognised the difficulty of the aim and perhaps the need of some kind of client emperor post-conquest. The likes of Tabari presents the upcoming siege of Constantinople as being something of a backdrop of Maslamah and Sulayman believing that Leo ‘would deliver the land of the Byzantines (to the caliph).’24 The Kitab al-Uyun has Maslamah coming to terms with Leo, with the strategos receiving some Umayyad protection in return for information and advice on the how to capture Constantinople. The Chronicle of 1234 claims that Leo ‘had made a covenant with the Arabs, who he led to believe that he would help them to capture Constantinople.’25
Indeed, the same Chronicle makes this ‘covenant’ between Leo and Maslamah much more central to events around Amorion and interwoven with Suleiman’s later advance to Chalcedon. It has Theodosius III acting against Leo upon hearing of his agreement with the Arabs, rounding up the strategos’ relatives and confining them to Amorion. In response, Leo obtains 6,000 cavalry from Suleiman, who struck at Chalcedon with it, and then marched on Amorion to free his family. However, in speaking to the leaders of Amorion, Leo reassured them ‘that his relationship with Maslamah was a pretence, designed to save his territory from destruction.’26 There is enough different in the record of this Chronicle, as well as its chronological detachment (it is late-twelfth/early-thirteenth century, although it does use material from Theophilus of Edessa) to cast doubt. It has Leo win a victory over forces under Theodosius III’s son, after which his thematic army acclaimed Leo as emperor, and then in attributing Leo as taking ‘every possible precaution to ensure the City’s impregnability,’27 it has him undertake preparations actually made by Anastasius II and Theodosius III.
Other sources make no mention of Leo directly using Arab cavalry to force Amorion’s acceptance of him; instead, they have the Umayyad blockade (not supported or enforced by Leo) and the seeming promise of peaceful treatment should they switch their allegiance to their Anatolic strategos leading the inhabitants of Amorion to accept Leo. It really had no option, for while its lack of a garrison had enabled Amorion to hold a different political allegiance to its strategos, that same lack of military presence made it vulnerable; a vulnerability that Leo, Suleiman and the Amorions themselves recognised. It may still have taken a rousing speech from Leo to bring the Amorians over to his side.
I will not rule over you except by your commands; but you have heard of my character and my valour and ability, and your affairs are in confusion, and your kingdom is sore, smitten and the civil war is raging, and this Maslamah, the son of Abd al-Malik has come close to your territory, and he will attack you. Therefore, let me in and entrust your government to me; and, if I bear myself in it in accordance with your wishes, well; but if not, turn me out and do with me what you please.28
However, if there was any notion that accepting Leo as emperor would see the pressure on Amorion lifted by Suleiman, it did not play out. Nearing Amorion, Leo felt that the city was about to fall to Suleiman and so he sent to the Arab general inquiring ‘If you want me to come to you to discuss peace, why are you besieging this town?’29 Looking to lure Leo in, Suleiman replied that he would withdraw from Amorion if Leo himself would come to his camp. The Anatolic strategos agreed, arriving at his thematic capital with just 300 cavalry, reflecting either the paucity of the forces under his command or the necessity of them being elsewhere. While Leo received a respectful welcome from Suleiman’s men, he did not camp immediately amongst them, staying half a mile away. That lack of trust might seem to have also extended to Amorion itself, for Leo did not take up residence there, with the city remaining under Arab blockade despite Leo’s arrival.
Over the next three days, the strategos and Umayyad commander conducted negotiations regarding the lifting of the blockade and some kind of compact. These negotiations went nowhere, with Leo suspecting that Suleiman was intentionally drawing them out as a stall tactic to capture him and Amorion. This suspicion was further aroused when Leo hosted the Arab commanders in his camp for dinner. Suleiman looked to surround the camp with 3,000 men. When informed, Leo confronted the Arab commanders, who claimed that their cavalry was hunting down a slave who had stolen ‘a great treasure.’30 Playing along, Leo offered aid in finding their renegade slave, but at the same time, he sent word to Amorion of this planned Arab betrayal, urging them not to capitulate, even in the face of the approaching Maslamah. The Amorions responded by sending their bishop to Leo, to whom he reiterated his advice.
Upon hearing that Leo had received a messenger from Amorion, Suleiman demanded that the bishop be handed over to him. Leo denied the presence of the bishop, while having him disguised as one of his men and join a foraging party, which allowed the bishop to escape. With Suleiman’s representatives sceptical and continuing to make threats, Leo offered to join the Arab commander in riding to meet Maslamah. This placated Suleiman, who thought that the bishop of Amorion paled in significance compared with the opportunity to apprehend the Anatolic strategos. They therefore allowed Leo to go out on a hunt with 200 men, and were seemingly unworried about his proposed moving of his camp to some meadows, which they felt was not a good idea and would not accompany him. This was surely Leo’s plan, telling his men ‘After giving us their word, they wanted to seize us and, through us, to ruin the Christians. But they will not take any of the men or horses that are left to us.’31 Leo led his men a further 10 miles away and then sent a bodyguard back to Suleiman to complain about his planned abduction – ‘you gave me safe conduct, but you want to capture me by treachery. That is why I have withdrawn.’32
Suleiman’s distraction with Leo and Amorion hindered communications with Maslamah, who he did not know had already reached Cappadocia through Germanikeia, and also spread dissatisfaction amongst his own men, which was further exacerbated by Leo’s escape. They complained ‘why are we investing the walls instead of raiding?’33 Left with no choice, Suleiman lifted his blockade of Amorion and departed from the immediate vicinity. Showing that Leo had more troops at his disposal than he initially let on, the strategos then sent 800 men into Amorion under the tourmarches Nikaias as a garrison. Given the circumstances, Nikaias felt that the city would soon be under attack again and so ordered many of the women and children to leave. In the meantime, Leo withdrew south to Pisidia.
Deal or No Deal? Leo the Isaurian and Maslamah b. Abd al-Malik
As Maslamah entered Cappadocia at the head of his large expeditionary force, he ordered his men not to inflict any damage on the territories loyal to Leo, suggesting that there had been an Umayyad ploy to use Leo to gain control of Constantinople and the empire as a whole. Hearing of these Cappadocian developments, Leo contacted Maslamah, complaining of Suleiman’s attempt to capture him and using it as a reason not to meet the Arab general. Maslamah refused to believe much of what Leo’s men were telling him, feeling that Leo was lying about the entire Amorion episode as part of the developing political game. At length though, Leo’s representative convinced Maslamah of Suleiman’s actions and Leo’s control of Amorion, its garrisoning with up to 1,000 men and the defensive preparations it was undertaking. This failure by Suleiman angered Maslamah to such a degree that he initially determined to mount an all-out assault on Amorion before the winter. But having then calmed himself, Maslamah again wrote to Leo, looking to re-establish diplomatic relations and whatever ‘peace’ agreement they might have had between them.
Leo continued to play a shrewd game, recognising that Maslamah’s large army, while still advancing west, could not stay in one place for any significant time and in around five days, it would have traversed the provinces loyal to him. Still fearful of being captured, Leo attempted a further delaying tactic. He sent an embassy of two honorary consuls to Maslamah asking that not only his person but also the valuables, resources, and soldiers in his personal force would be vouched safe for by the Arab general. Maslamah saw what Leo was doing, but if he still wanted the strategos’ cooperation, not to mention an opportunity to capture him, he too had to play along.
As the consular representatives returned to Leo with a written pledge of Maslamah’s willingness to undertake the safe conduct of the strategos and his thematic army, everything fell into place for Leo. Maslamah’s large army was on the move again, arriving at Akroinon. This is the first identifiable location along Maslamah’s route after emerging from the Taurus Mountains, possibly through Germanikeia, into Cappadocia. Theophanes does record his presence at Masalaios and Theodosiana, but these are unknown. The position of Akroinon further west of Amorion suggests that the Arab general had given up on attacking the Anatolic thematic capital that year, likely through the agreement with Leo.
Certainly, it was at this point, following this agreement, that Leo detached himself from the Amorion theatre and travelled north to Nicomedia, where his serendipitous capture of Theodosius III’s son initiated his rapid acceptance as emperor in Constantinople. It might be expected that Maslamah and his expeditionary force had gone beyond land loyal to the Anatolic strategos, but Akroinon is usually thought to be in the Anatolic theme. This could demonstrate the lack of firm definition in thematic provincial boundaries. The western extent of the Anatolic theme was initially thought to reach both the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts of what is now Turkey; however, the Thrakesian theme was in existence by at least 711, if not by 687. And even if Akroinon was part of the Anatolic theme, Maslamah did not rest there long, moving further west into territory more definitively not in the Anatolic theme. He wintered in ‘Asia’ (the Arab fleet under Umar returned to Cilicia), which could refer to the ancient Roman province of ‘Asia Province’, which took in lands covered largely by the Thrakesian and western half of the Opsikon themes. And the two places Maslamah is recorded as being active after his dealings with Leo and before his final advance towards Constantinople – Pergamon and Sardis34 – were in the Thrakesian theme.
