Delphi complete works of.., p.468
Delphi Complete Works of Stephen Leacock, page 468
Sir Charles Metcalfe, at the time of his coming to Canada, was fifty-eight years old. For some time previous he had been suffering from a dangerous and painful malady — a cancerous growth in the left cheek — which had occasioned his retirement from his previous position. An operation performed in England had seemed to remove all danger of a fatal termination of the disorder, and Sir Charles, in coming to Canada, hoped that he had at last recovered from his long affliction.
He was born on January 30th, 1785.
What may seem strange in connection with Metcalfe’s régime in Canada, and his attitude towards Canadian political parties, was that he was not, as far as British politics were concerned, a Tory or a friend of the royal prerogative. He was, on the contrary, to use the words of his biographer, “a Whig and something more than a Whig.” The same authority has further described him as “a statesman known to be saturated through and through with Liberal opinions.” Metcalfe himself, in a letter written shortly before his appointment, spoke of his own opinions and his political position in the following terms: “In the present predominance of Toryism among the constituencies, there is no chance for a man who is for the abolition of the Corn Laws, vote by ballot, extension of the suffrage, amelioration of the Poor Laws for the benefit of the poor, equal rights to all sects of Christians in matters of religion, and equal rights to all men in civil matters.”
J. W. Kaye, Life of Lord Metcalfe, Vol. II., .
Letter to Mr. Mangles, January 13th, 1843.
On the strength of such a declaration it might have been supposed that Metcalfe would have gravitated naturally towards the Reform party of Canada, at the basis of whose programme civil and religious equality and the doctrine of equal rights lay as a corner-stone. But the lamp of Metcalfe’s Liberalism burned dim in the colonial atmosphere. His inclinations were all on the side of the Tory party, whose fervid and ostentatious loyalty offered a cheering contrast to the stiff-necked independence of the Reformers. “It is,” he said, “the only party with which I can sympathize. I have no sympathy with the anti-British rancour of the French party or the selfish indifference towards our country of the Republican party. Yet these are the parties with which I have to coöperate.” The expression, “Republican party,” shows that the incessant accusation of disloyalty brought by the Conservative journalists against their opponents, was not without its effect upon the governor’s mind. By sheer force of iteration the Conservatives had convinced themselves that they were the one and only section of the people truly loyal to the Crown; and since the governor was the immediate and visible representative of the Crown in Canada, there was a natural temptation to construe this attitude into a declaration of personal allegiance.
But although Metcalfe might plead guilty to a spontaneous sympathy with the Tory party, he had no intention of identifying or allying himself with any of the rival factions. On the contrary, he cherished, as had his predecessors, the belief that his proper attitude and vocation should be that of the peacemaker, the wise administrator enabled by the altitude of his office to compose the differences that severed his fractious subordinates. “I dislike extremely,” he said, “the notion of governing as a supporter of any particular party. I wish to make the patronage of the government conducive to the conciliation of all parties by bringing into the public service the men of greatest merit and efficiency, without any party distinction.”
Metcalfe to Stanley, April 24th, 1843.
The governor seems, however, to have recognized that he could not disregard the fact that the party at present in power had the support of the assembly behind them. “Fettered as I am,” he wrote, “by the necessity of acting with a council brought into place by a coalition of parties, and at present in possession of a decided majority in the representative assembly, I must in some degree forego my own inclinations in those respects.” It was his intention, he told the colonial secretary, to treat the executive council with the confidence and cordiality due to the station which they occupied, but he was prepared to be on his guard against any encroachments. This last phrase touches the root of the matter. Of what nature were the “encroachments” which Metcalfe was determined not to permit? How did he interpret his own position in reference to the executive officers that were his constitutional advisers? What, in other words, was his opinion on the application of responsible government? The answer to this question can best be found by an examination of Metcalfe’s own statements as they appear in his confidential correspondence with the colonial office.
“Lord Durham’s meaning,” he wrote, “seems to have been that the governor should conduct his administration in accordance with public feeling, represented by the popular branch of the legislature, and it is obvious that without such concordance the government could not be successfully administered. There is no evidence in what manner Lord Durham would have carried out the system which he advocated, as it was not brought into effect during his administration. Lord Sydenham arranged the details by which the principle was carried into execution. In forming the executive council he made it a rule that the individuals composing it should be members of the popular branch of the legislature, to which, I believe, there was only one exception: the gentleman appointed to be president being a member of the legislative council. Lord Sydenham had apparently no intention of surrendering the government into the hands of the executive council. On the contrary, he ruled the council, and exercised great personal influence in the election of members to the representative assembly. . . . I am not aware that any great change took place during that period of the administration of Sir Charles Bagot which preceded the meeting of the legislature, but this event was instantly followed by a full development of the consequences of making the officers of the government virtually dependent for the possession of their places on the pleasure of the representative body. The two extreme parties in Upper Canada most violently opposed to one another, coalesced solely for the purpose of turning out the office-holders, or, as it is now termed, the ministry of that day, with no other bond of union, and with a mutual understanding that having accomplished that purpose, they would take the chance of the consequences, and should be at liberty to follow their respective courses. The French party also took part in this coalition, and from its compactness and internal union, formed its greatest strength. These parties together accomplished their joint purpose. They had expected to do so by a vote of the assembly, but in that were anticipated by the governor-general, who in apprehension of the threatened vote of want of confidence in members of his council, opened negotiations with the leaders of the French party, and that negotiation terminated in the resignation or removal from the council of those members who belonged to what is called by themselves the Conservative party, and in the introduction of five members of the united French and Reform parties. . . . These events were regarded by all parties in the country as establishing in full force the system of responsible government of which the practical execution had before been incomplete. From that time the tone of the members of the council and the tone of the public voice regarding responsible government has been greatly exalted. The council are now spoken of by themselves and others generally as the ‘ministers,’ the ‘administration,’ the ‘cabinet,’ the ‘government,’ and so forth. Their pretensions are according to this new nomenclature. They regard themselves as a responsible ministry, and expect that the policy and conduct of the governor shall be subservient to their views and party policy.”
Metcalfe to Stanley, April 24th, 1843. Metcalfe’s colonial despatches can be found in the Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe, (London, 1885, Ed., J. W. Kaye).
Very similar in tone is a despatch of May 12th, 1843, in which the governor declared that none of his predecessors had really been face to face with the problem of granting or withholding self-government. “Lord Durham,” he said, “had no difficulty in writing at leisure in praise of responsible government. . . Lord Sydenham put the idea in force without suffering himself to be much restrained by it. . . Sir Charles Bagot yielded to the coercive effect of Lord Sydenham’s arrangements. Now comes the tug of war, and supposing absolute submission to be out of the question, I cannot say that I see the end of the struggle if the parties alluded to really mean to maintain it.” The part that the new governor intended to play in this impending tug of war is clearly indicated in this communication to Lord Stanley. He had no intention of adapting himself to the position of a merely nominal head of the government, controlled by the advice of his ministers.
“I am required,” he wrote, “to give myself up entirely to the council; to submit absolutely to their dictation; to have no judgment of my own; to bestow the patronage of the government exclusively on their partisans; to proscribe their opponents; and to make some public and unequivocal declaration of my adhesion to these conditions — including the complete nullification of Her Majesty’s government — a course which he [Mr. LaFontaine], under self-deception, denominates Sir Charles Bagot’s policy, although it is very certain that Sir Charles Bagot meant no such thing. Failing of submission to these stipulations, I am threatened with the resignation of Mr. LaFontaine for one, and both he and I are fully aware of the serious consequences likely to follow the execution of that menace, from the blindness with which the French-Canadian party follow their leader. . . . The sole question is, to describe it without disguise, whether the governor shall be wholly and completely a tool in the hands of the council, or whether he shall have any exercise of his own judgment in the administration of the government. Such a question has not come forward as a matter of discussion, but there is no doubt the leader of the French party speaks the sentiments of others of his council beside himself. . . . As I cannot possibly adopt them, I must be prepared for the consequences of a rupture with the council, or at least the most influential portion of it. It would be very imprudent on my part to hasten such an event, or to allow it to take place under present circumstances, if it can be avoided — but I must expect it, for I cannot consent to be the tool of a party. . . . Government by a majority is the explanation of responsible government given by the leader in this movement, and government without a majority must be admitted to be ultimately impracticable. But the present question, the one which is coming on for trial in my administration, is not whether the governor shall so conduct his government as to meet the wants and wishes of the people, and obtain their suffrages by promoting their welfare and happiness — nor whether he shall be responsible for his measures to the people, through their representatives — but whether he shall, or shall not, have a voice in his own council. . . . The tendency and object of this movement is to throw off the government of the mother country in internal affairs entirely — but to be maintained and supported at her expense, and to have all the advantages of connection, as long as it may suit the majority of the people of Canada to endure it. This is a very intelligible and very convenient policy for a Canadian aiming at independence, but the part that the representative of the mother country is required to perform in it is by no means fascinating.”
The tenor of Sir Charles Metcalfe’s correspondence cited above, which belongs to the period between his assumption of the government and the meeting of the parliament, shows that the difficulties which were presently to culminate in the “Metcalfe Crisis” were already appearing on the horizon. Meantime the new governor was made the recipient of flattering addresses from all parts of the country and from citizens of all shades of opinion. The difficulties of Metcalfe’s position can be better understood when one considers the varied nature of these addresses and the conflicting sentiments expressed. Some were sent up from Reform constituencies whose citizens expressed the wish that he might continue to tread in the path marked out by his predecessor. Others were from “loyal and constitutional societies” whose prayer it was that he might resist the designing encroachments of his anti-British advisers. The people of the township of Pelham, for example, declared that they “had learned with unfeigned sorrow that unusual efforts had been made to weaken His Excellency’s opinion of Messrs. Baldwin and LaFontaine and the other members of his cabinet.” The Constitutional Society of Orillia begged to “state their decided disapproval of the policy pursued by our late governor-general.” “We have not the slightest wish,” they said, “to dictate to your Excellency, but, conscientiously believing that it would tend to the real good, happiness, and prosperity of the country, we in all humility venture to recommend the dismissal of the following members from your councils: The Hon. Messrs. Harrison, LaFontaine, Baldwin, Hincks and Small.” In some cases rival addresses, breathing entirely opposed sentiments were sent up from the same place. It is small wonder that Metcalfe became deeply impressed by the bitterness of party faction existing in Canada.
For example the addresses from the Talbot district.
“The violence of party spirit,” he wrote to Lord Stanley, “forces itself on one’s notice immediately on arrival in the colony; and threatens to be the source of all the difficulties which are likely to impede the successful administration of the government for the welfare and happiness of the country.” In this statement may be found the basis for such defense as can be made for Metcalfe’s conduct in Canada. He was honestly convinced that the antipathy between the rival factions was assuming dangerous proportions, and that it threatened to culminate in a renewal of civil strife. In this position of affairs it seemed to him his evident duty to alleviate the situation by using such influence and power as he considered to be lawfully entrusted to him, to counteract the intensity of the party struggle. In particular it seemed to him that his right of making appointments to government offices ought to be exercised with a view to general harmony, and not at the dictates and in the interests of any special political group. “I wish,” he wrote, “to make the patronage of the government conducive to the conciliation of all parties, by bringing into the public service the men of greatest merit and efficiency, without any party distinction.”
April 25th, 1843.
This sentiment is no doubt, as a sentiment, very admirable. But what Metcalfe did not realize was that it was equivalent to saying that he intended to distribute the patronage of the government as he thought advisable, and not as the ministry, representing the voice of a majority of the people, might think advisable. Metcalfe seems to have been aware from the outset that his views on this matter would not be readily endorsed by his ministers. He spoke of the question of the patronage as “the point on which he most proximately expected to incur a difference with them.” Indeed it may be asserted that Metcalfe was convinced that he must, sooner or later, come to open antagonism with his cabinet. As early as June, 1843, he wrote to Stanley: “Although I see no reason now to apprehend an immediate rupture, I am sensible that it may happen at any time. If all [of the ministers] were of the same mind with three or four it would be more certain. But there are moderate men among them, and they are not all united in the same unwarrantable expectations.”
It is not difficult to infer from what has gone before that Metcalfe had but little personal sympathy with the two leaders of his cabinet. In his published correspondence we have no direct personal estimate of LaFontaine and Baldwin. But the account given by his “official” biographer of the two Canadian statesmen undoubtedly reflects opinion gathered from the governor-general’s correspondence, and is of interest in the present connection. “The two foremost men in the council,” writes Kaye, “[were] Mr. LaFontaine and Mr. Baldwin, the attorneys-general for Lower and Upper Canada. The former was a French-Canadian and the leader of his party in the colonial legislature. . . . All his better qualities were natural to him; his worse were the growth of circumstances. Cradled, as he and his people had been, in wrong, smarting for long years under the oppressive exclusiveness of the dominant race, he had become mistrustful and suspicious; and the doubts which were continually floating in his mind had naturally engendered there indecision and infirmity of purpose.” How little real justification there was for this last expression of opinion may be gathered from the comments thereupon published by Francis Hincks in later years. “I can hardly believe that there is a single individual in the ranks of either party,” he says “who would admit that Kaye was correct in attributing to [Sir] Louis LaFontaine ‘indecision and infirmity of purpose.’ I can declare for my own part that I never met a man less open to such an imputation.” Metcalfe’s biographer saw fit, however, to qualify his strictures of LaFontaine by stating that he was a “just and honourable man” and that “his motives were above suspicion.”
Kaye’s Life of Lord Metcalfe was written at the request of Metcalfe’s trustee. Many thousand letters, written to and by Metcalfe, were put in the hands of his biographer.
Political History of Canada, .
A still less flattering portrait is drawn by the same author when he goes on to speak of Robert Baldwin. “Baldwin’s father,” says Kaye, “had quarrelled with his party, and, with the characteristic bitterness of a renegade, had brought up his son in extremest hatred of his old associates, and had instilled into him the most liberal (sic) opinions. Robert Baldwin was an apt pupil; and there was much in the circumstances by which he was surrounded, — in the atrocious misgovernment of his country . . . — to rivet him in the extreme opinions he had imbibed in his youth. So he grew up to be an enthusiast, almost a fanatic. He was thoroughly in earnest; thoroughly conscientious; but he was to the last degree uncompromising and intolerant. He seemed to delight in strife. The might of mildness he laughed to scorn. It was said of him that he was not satisfied with a victory unless it was gained by violence — that concessions were valueless to him unless he wrenched them with a strong hand from his opponent. Of an unbounded arrogance and self-conceit, he made no allowances for others, and sought none for himself. There was a sort of sublime egotism about him — a magnificent self-esteem, which caused him to look upon himself as a patriot, whilst he was serving his own ends by the promotion of his ambition, the gratification of his vanity or spite. His strong passions and his uncompromising spirit made him a mischievous party leader and a dangerous opponent. His influence was very great. He was not a mean man: he was above corruption: and there were many who accepted his estimate of himself and believed him to be the only pure patriot in the country. During the illness of Sir Charles Bagot he had usurped the government. The activity of Sir Charles Metcalfe, who did everything for himself, and exerted himself to keep every one in his proper place, was extremely distasteful to him.” It is an old saying that there is no witness whose testimony is so valid as that of an unwilling witness: and it is possible to read between the lines of this biased estimate a truer picture of the man. “In this dark photograph,” says the author of The Irishman in Canada, “the impartial eye recognizes the statesman, the patriot, the great party leader, who was not to be turned away by fear or favour from the work before him.”
