Complete works of samuel.., p.247
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson, page 247
What has been the effect of all these considerations may easily be discovered from the present state of the continent, which is ravaged without mercy by the armies of Spain and France. Why all succours have been denied the queen of Hungary, and why the inveterate and hereditary enemies of our nation, are suffered to enlarge their dominions without resistance; why the rivals of our trade are left at full liberty to equip their squadrons, and the persecutors of our religion suffered to overrun those countries from whence only we can hope for assistance, when the hatred which the difference of opinions produces, shall threaten us with invasions and slavery, the whole world has long asked to no purpose, and, therefore, it is without prospect of receiving satisfaction that I engage in the same inquiry.
Yet, since it is our duty to judge of the state of the publick, and a true judgment can be the result only of accurate examination, I shall proceed, without being discouraged by the ill success of former attempts, to discover the motives of our late measures, and the ends intended to be produced by them.
Why the queen of Hungary was not assisted with land-forces, I shall, at present, forbear to ask; that she expected them is, indeed, evident from her solicitations; and, I suppose, it is no less apparent from treaties, that she had a right to expect them; nor am I able to conceive, why subsidies have been paid for troops which are never to be employed, or why foreign princes should be enriched with the plunder of a nation which they cannot injure, and do not defend.
But I know, my lords, how easily it may be replied, that the expenses of a land war are certain, and the event hazardous, and that it is always prudent to act with evident advantage on our side, and that the superiority of Britain consists wholly in naval armaments.
That the fleets of Britain are equal in force and number of ships to the united navies of the greatest part of the world; that our admirals are men of known bravery, and long experience, and, therefore, formidable not only for their real abilities and natural courage, but for the confidence which their presence necessarily excites in their followers, and the terrour which must always accompany success, and enervate those who are accustomed to defeats; that our sailors are a race of men distinguished by their ardour for war, and their intrepidity in danger, from the rest of the human species; that they seem beings superiour to fear, and delighted with those objects which cannot be named without filling every other breast with horrour; that they are capable of rushing upon apparent destruction without reluctance, and of standing without concern amidst the complicated terrours of a naval war, is universally known, and confessed, my lords, even by those whose interest it is to doubt or deny it.
Upon the ocean, therefore, we are allowed to be irresistible; to be able to shut up the ports of the continent, imprison the nations of Europe within the limits of their own territories, deprive them of all foreign assistance, and put a stop to the commerce of the world. It is allowed that we are placed the sentinels at the barriers of nature, and the arbiters of the intercourse of mankind.
These are appellations, my lords, which, however splendid and ostentatious, our ancestors obtained and preserved with less advantages than we possess, by whom I am afraid they are about to be forfeited. The dominion of the ocean was asserted in former times in opposition to powers far more able to contest it, than those which we have so long submissively courted, and of which we are now evidently afraid.
For that we fear them, my lords, they are sufficiently convinced; and it must be confessed, with whatsoever shame, that their opinion is well founded; for to what motive but fear can it be imputed, that we have so long supported their insolence without resentment, and their ravages without reprisals; that we have fitted out fleets without any design of dismissing them from our harbours, or sent them to the sea only to be gazed at from the shores, by those whose menaces or artifice had given occasion to their equipment, and in whom they raised no other emotions than contempt of our cowardice, or pity of our folly?
To what, my lords, can it be attributed, that the queen of Hungary has yet received no assistance from allies thus powerful; from allies whose fleets cover the sea, whose commerce extends to the remotest part of the world, and whose wealth may be justly expected to be proportionate to their commerce. To what can we ascribe the confidence with which the house of Bourbon threatens the ruin of a princess, who numbers among her allies the emperour of Britain?
Nothing is more evident, my lords, than that the queen of Hungary has been disappointed of the advantages which she expected from her friendship with this nation, only by a degree of cowardice too despicable to be mentioned without such terms, as the importance of this debate, and the dignity of this assembly, do not admit; nor is it less certain, from the conduct of her enemies, that they knew what would be our measures, and confided for security in that cowardice which has never yet deceived them.
It cannot, my lords, be asserted, that our ally, however distressed, has yet received the least assistance from our arms; neither the justice of our cause has yet been able to awaken our virtue, nor the inseparable union of her interest with our own, to excite our vigilance.
But, perhaps, my lords, we have had no opportunity of exerting our force; perhaps the situation both of our enemies and ally was such, that neither the one could be protected, nor the other opposed, by a naval power; and, therefore, our inactivity was the effect not of want of courage, but want of opportunity.
Though our ministers, my lords, have hitherto given no eminent proofs of geographical knowledge, or of very accurate acquaintance with the state of foreign countries, yet there is reason to believe that they must at some time have heard or read, that the house of Austria had territories in Italy; they must have been informed, unless their disbursements for secret service are bestowed with very little judgment, that against these dominions an army has been raised by the Spaniards; and they must have discovered, partly by the information of their correspondents, partly by the inspection of a map, and partly by the sagacity which distinguishes them from all past and present ministers, that this army was to be transported by sea from the coast of Spain to that of Italy.
This knowledge, my lords, however attained, might have furnished minds, which have always been found so fruitful of expedients, with a method of hindering the descent of the Spanish troops, for which nothing more was necessary than that they should have ordered admiral Haddock, instead of retiring before the Spanish fleet of war, and watching them only that they might escape, to lie still before Barcelona, where the transports were stationed, with a convoy of only three men of war, and hinder their departure.
I hope it will be observed by your lordships, that though the road of Barcelona is open and indefensible, though the fleet was unprotected by ships of force, and though they lay, as I am informed, beyond the reach of the guns on the fortifications upon the shore, I do not require that Haddock should have destroyed the army and the ships.
I am too well acquainted, my lords, with the lenity of our ministers to the enemies of their country, and am too well convinced of the prudence and tenderness of the restrictions by which the power of our admirals is limited, to expect that our guns should be ever used but in salutations of respect, or exultations on the conclusion of a peace. I am convinced, that our ministers would shudder at the name of bloodshed and destruction, and that they had rather hear that a thousand merchants were made bankrupts by privateers, or all our allies deprived of their dominions, than that one Spanish ship was sunk or burnt by the navies of Britain.
But, my lords, though they are willing to spare the blood of their enemies, yet surely they might have obstructed their enterprises; they might have withheld those whom they were unwilling to strike, and have endeavoured to fright those whom they determined never to hurt.
To speak in terms more adapted to the subject before us: that the fleet of Spain, a fleet of transports with such a convoy, should lie three weeks in an open road, professedly fitted out against an ally united to us by every tie of nature, and of policy, by the solemnity of treaties, and conformity of interest; that it should lie undisturbed almost within sight of a British navy; that it should lie there not only without danger, but without apprehension of danger, has raised the astonishment of every nation in Europe, has blasted the reputation of our arms, impaired the influence of our counsels, and weakened the credit of our publick faith.
There may be some, my lords, that will impute this absurdity of our conduct, this disregard of our interest, this desertion of our alliances, and this neglect of the most apparent opportunities of success, not to cowardice, but treachery; a cause more detestable, as more atrociously criminal.
This opinion, my lords, I think it not necessary to oppose, both because it cannot be charged with improbability, and because I think it may be easily reconciled with my own assertions; for cowardice abroad produces treachery at home, and they become traitors to their country who are hindered by cowardice from the prosecution of her interest, and the opposition of her enemies.
It may however be proper to declare, my lords, that I do not impute this fatal cowardice to those who are intrusted with the command of our navies, but to those from whom they are obliged to receive their instructions, and upon whom they unhappily depend for the advancement of their fortunes.
It is at least reasonable to impute miscarriages rather to those, who are known to have given, formerly, such orders as a brave admiral perished under the ignominious necessity of observing, than to those of whom it cannot be said that any former part of their lives has been stained with the reproach of cowardice; at least it is necessary to suspend our judgment, till the truth shall be made apparent by a rigid inquiry; and it is, therefore, proper to offer an address in general terms, by which neither the actions or counsels of any man shall be condemned nor approved.
It would be more unreasonable to charge our soldiers or our sailors with cowardice, because they have shown, even in those actions which have failed of success, that they miscarried rather through temerity than fear; and that whenever they are suffered to attack their enemies, they are ready to march forward even where there is no possibility of returning, and that they are only to be withheld from conquest by obstacles which human prowess cannot surmount.
Such, my lords, was the state of those heroes who died under the walls of Carthagena; that died in an enterprise so ill concerted, that I ventured, with no great skill in war, and without the least pretence to prescience, to foretell in this house that it would miscarry.
That it would, that it must miscarry; that it was even intended only to amuse the nation with the appearance of an expedition, without any design of weakening our enemies, was easily discovered; for why else, my lords, was the army composed of men newly drawn from the shop, and from the plough, unacquainted with the use of arms, and ignorant of the very terms of military discipline, when we had among us large bodies of troops long kept up under the appearance of a regular establishment; troops of whom we have long felt the expense, but of which the time is not, it seems, yet come, that we are to know the use.
These men, my lords, who have so long practised the motions of battle, and who have given in the park so many proofs of their dexterity and activity, who have at least learned to distinguish the different sounds of the drum, and know the faces and voices of the subaltern officers, at least, might have been imagined better qualified for an attempt upon a foreign kingdom, than those who were necessarily strangers to every part of the military operations, and might have been sent upon our first declaration of war, while the new-raised forces acquired at home the same arts under the same inspection.
But, my lords, whether it was imagined that new forces would be long before they learned the implicit obedience necessary to a soldier; whether it was imagined that it would not be easy on a sudden to collect troops of men so tall and well proportioned, or so well skilled in the martial arts of curling and powdering their hair; or whether it would have been dangerous to have deprived the other house of the counsels and votes of many worthy members, who had at the same time a seat in the senate, and a commission in the army, it was thought necessary to send out raw forces to attack our enemies, and to keep our disciplined troops at home to awe the nation.
Nor did the minister, my lords, think it sufficient to obstruct the expedition to America by employing new-raised troops, unless they were likewise placed under the command of a man, who, though of undoubted courage, was, with respect to the conduct of an army, as ignorant as themselves. It was therefore determined, my lords, that all those officers who had gained experience in former wars, and purchased military knowledge by personal danger, should be disappointed and rejected for the sake of advancing a man, who, as he had less skill, was less likely to be successful, and was, therefore, more proper to direct an expedition proposed only to intimidate the British nation.
That the event was such as might be expected from the means, your lordships need not to be informed, nor can it be questioned with what intentions these means were contrived.
I am very far, my lords, from charging our ministers with ignorance, or upbraiding them with mistakes on this occasion, for their whole conduct has been uniform, and all their schemes consistent with each other: nor do I doubt their knowledge of the consequence of their measures, so far as it was to be foreseen by human prudence.
Whether they have carried on negotiations, or made war; whether they have conducted our own affairs, or those of our ally the queen of Hungary, they have still discovered the same intention, and promoted it by the same means. They have suffered the Spanish fleets to sail first for supplies from one port to another, and then from the coasts of Spain to those of America. They have permitted the Spaniards, without opposition, to land in Italy, when it was not necessary even to withhold them from it by any actual violence; for had the fleet, my lords, been under my command, I would have only sent the Spanish admiral a prohibition to sail, and am sure it would have been observed.
They have neglected to purchase the friendship of the king of Prussia, which might, perhaps, have been obtained upon easy terms, but which they ought to have gained at whatever rate; and, to conclude, we have been lately informed that the neutrality is signed.
Such, my lords, is the conduct of the ministry, by which it cannot be denied that we are involved in many difficulties, and exposed to great contempt; but from this contempt we may recover, and disentangle ourselves from these difficulties, by a vigorous prosecution of measures opposite to those by which we have been reduced to our present state.
If we consider, without that confusion which fear naturally produces, the circumstances of our affairs, it will appear that we have opportunities in our hands of recovering our losses, and reestablishing our reputation; those losses which have been suffered while we had two hundred ships of war at sea, which have permitted three hundred merchant-ships to be taken; and that reputation which has been destroyed when there was no temptation either to a compliance with our enemies, or to a desertion of our friends.
It is well known, my lords, that we make war at present rather with the queen than the people of Spain; and it is reasonable to conclude, that a war carried on contrary to the general good, and against the general opinion, cannot be lasting.
It is certain that the Spaniards, whenever they have been attacked by men acquainted with the science of war, and furnished with necessary stores for hostile attempts, have discovered either ignorance or cowardice, and have either fled meanly, or resisted unskilfully.
It is, therefore, probable, my lords, that either our enemies will desist from the prosecution of a war, which few of them approve; or that we shall, by vigorous descents upon their coasts, and their colonies, the interruption of their trade, and the diminution of their forces, soon compel them to receive peace upon our own terms.
But these advantages, my lords, are only to be expected from a change of conduct, which change can never be produced by a seeming approbation of the past measures. I am therefore of opinion, that we ought to address the throne in general terms, according to the ancient practice of this house.
In considering the address proposed, I cannot but conclude that it is too much diffused, and that it would be more forcible if it was more concise: to shorten it will be no difficult task, by the omission of all the clauses that correspond with particular parts of his majesty’s speech, which I cannot discover the necessity of repeating.
In the congratulation to his majesty upon his return to his once glorious dominions, no lord shall concur more readily or more zealously than myself; nor shall I even deny to extend my compliments to the ministry, when it shall appear that they deserve them; but I am never willing to be lavish of praise, because it becomes less valuable by being prodigally bestowed; and on occasions so important as this, I can never consent to praise before I have examined, because inquiry comes too late after approbation.
Lord CHOLMONDELEY rose next, and spoke to this effect: — My lords, if the dangers that threaten our happiness and our safety be such as they have been represented; if ambition has extended her power almost beyond a possibility of resistance, and oppression, elated with success, begins to design no less than the universal slavery of mankind; if the powers of Europe stand aghast at the calamities which hang over them, and listen with helpless confusion to that storm which they can neither avoid nor resist, how ought our conduct to be influenced by this uncommon state of affairs? Ought we not to catch the alarm while it is possible to make preparation against the danger? Ought we not to improve, with the utmost diligence, the important interval? to unite our counsels for the protection of liberty, and exert all our influence against the common enemies of society, the unwearied disturbers of the tranquillity of mankind?
