Complete works of samuel.., p.293
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson, page 293
It has, indeed, been almost asserted, that the fatal hour is now arrived, and that it is to no purpose that we endeavour to raise any farther opposition to the universal monarchy projected by France. We are told, that the nation is exhausted and dispirited; that we have neither influence, nor riches, nor courage remaining; that we shall be left to stand alone against the united house of Bourbon; that the Austrians cannot, and that the Dutch will not, assist us; that the king of Sardinia will desert his alliance; that the king of Prussia has declared against us; and, therefore, that by engaging in the support of the Pragmatick sanction, we are about to draw upon ourselves that ruin which every other power has foreseen and shunned.
I am far from denying, my lords, that the power of France is great and dangerous; but can draw no consequence from that position, but that this force is to be opposed before it is still greater, and this danger to be obviated while it is yet surmountable, and surmountable I still believe it by unanimity and courage.
If our wealth, my lords, is diminished, it is time to confine the commerce of that nation by which we have been driven out of the markets of the continent, by destroying their shipping, and intercepting their merchants. If our courage is depressed, it is depressed not by any change in the nature of the inhabitants of this island, but by a long course of inglorious compliance with the demands, and of mean submission to the insults, of other nations, to which it is necessary to put an end by vigorous resolutions.
If our allies are timorous and wavering, it is necessary to encourage them by vigorous measures; for as fear, so courage, is produced by example: the bravery of a single man may withhold an army from flight, and other nations will be ashamed to discover any dread of that power which France along sets at defiance. They will be less afraid to declare their intentions, when they are convinced that we intend to support them; and if there be, in reality, any prince who does not favour our design, he will be at least less inclined to obstruct it, as he finds the opposition, which he must encounter, more formidable.
For this reason, my lords, I am far from discovering the justness of the opinion which has prevailed very much in the nation, on this occasion, that we are not to act without allies, because allies are most easily to be procured by acting, and because it is reasonable and necessary for us to perform our part, however other powers may neglect theirs.
The advice which the senate has often repeated to his majesty, has been to oppose the progress of France; and though it should be allowed, that he has been advised to proceed in concert with his allies, yet it must be understood to suppose such allies as may be found to have courage and honesty enough to concur with him. It cannot be intended, that he should delay his assistance till corruption is reclaimed, or till cowardice is animated; for to promise the queen of Hungary assistance on such terms, would be to insult her calamities, and to withhold our succours till she was irrecoverably ruined. The senate could not insist that we should stand neuter, till all those, who were engaged by treaty to support the Pragmatick sanction, should appear willing to fulfil their stipulations; for even France is to be numbered among those who have promised to support the house of Austria in its possessions, however she may now endeavour to take them away.
Even with regard to that power from which most assistance may be reasonably expected, nothing would be more imprudent than to declare that we determine not to act without them; for what then would be necessary, but that the French influence one town in their provinces, or one deputy in their assemblies, and ruin the house of Austria in security and at leisure, without any other expense than that of a bribe.
It was, therefore, necessary to transport our troops into Flanders, to show the world that we were no longer inclined to stand idle spectators of the troubles of Europe; that we no longer intended to amuse ourselves, or our confederates, with negotiations which might produce no treaties, or with treaties which might be broken whenever the violation of them afforded any prospect of that advantage; we were now resolved to sacrifice the pleasures of neutrality, and the profits of peaceful traffick, to the security of the liberties of Europe, and the observation of publick faith.
This necessity was so generally allowed, that when the first body of troops was sent over, no objection was made by those who found themselves inclined to censure the conduct of our affairs, but that they were not sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and would be taken prisoners by a French detachment; the ministry were therefore asked, why they did not send a larger force, why they engaged in hostilities, which could only raise the laughter of our enemies, and why, if they intended war, they did not raise an army sufficient to prosecute it?
An army, my lords, an army truly formidable, is now raised, and assembled on the frontiers of France, ready to assist our ally, and to put a stop to the violence of invasions. We now see ourselves once again united with the house of Austria, and may hope once more to drive the oppressors of mankind before us. But now, my lords, a clamour is propagated through the nation, that these measures, which have been so long desired, are pernicious and treacherous; that we are armed, not against France, but against ourselves; that our armies are sent over either not to fight, or to fight in a quarrel in which we have no concern; to gain victories from which this nation will receive no advantage, or to bring new dishonour upon their country by a shameful inactivity.
This clamour, which if it had been confined to the vulgar, had been, perhaps, of no great importance, nor could have promoted any of the designs of those by whom it was raised, has been mentioned in this house as an argument in favour of the motion which is now under the consideration of your lordships; and it has been urged that these measures cannot be proper, because all measures, by which his majesty’s government is made unpopular, must in the end be destructive to the nation.
On this occasion, my lords, it is necessary to consider the nature of popularity, and to inquire how far it is to be considered in the administration of publick affairs. If by popularity is meant only a sudden shout of applause, obtained by a compliance with the present inclination of the people, however excited, or of whatsoever tendency, I shall without scruple declare, that popularity is to be despised; it is to be despised, my lords, because it cannot be preserved without abandoning much more valuable considerations. The inclinations of the people have, in all ages, been too variable for regard. But if by popularity be meant that settled confidence and lasting esteem, which a good government may justly claim from the subject, I am far from denying that it is truly desirable; and that no wise man ever disregarded it. But this popularity, my lords, is very consistent with contempt of riotous clamours, and of mistaken complaints; and is often only to be obtained by an opposition, to the reigning opinions, and a neglect of temporary discontents; opinions which may be inculcated without difficulty by favourite orators, and discontents which the eloquence of seditious writers may easily produce on ignorance and inconstancy.
How easily the opinions of the vulgar may be regulated by those who have obtained, by whatever methods, their esteem, the debate of this day, my lords, may inform us; since, if the measures against which this motion is intended, be really unpopular, as they have been represented, it is evident that there has been lately a very remarkable change in the sentiments of the nation; for it is yet a very little time since the repression of the insolence of France, and the relief of the queen of Hungary was so generally wished, and so importunately demanded, that had measures like these been then formed, it is not improbable that they might have reconciled the publick to that man whom the united voice of the nation has long laboured to overbear.
It is, indeed, urged with a degree of confidence, which ought, in my opinion, to proceed from stronger proof than has yet been produced, that no hostilities are intended; that our armaments on the continent are an idle show, an inoffensive ostentation, and that the troops of Hanover have been hired only to enrich the electorate, under the appearance of assisting the queen of Hungary, whom in reality they cannot succour without drawing upon their country the imperial interdict.
It has been alleged, my lords,-that these measures have been concerted wholly/or the advantage of Hanover; that this kingdom is to be sacrificed to the electorate, and that we are in reality intended to be made tributaries to a petty power.
In confirmation of these suggestions, advantage has been taken from every circumstance that could admit of misrepresentation. The constitution of the empire has been falsely quoted, to prove that they cannot act against the emperour, and their inactivity in Flanders has been produced as a proof, that they do not intend to enter Germany.
Whoever shall consult the constituent and fundamental pact by which the German form of government is established, will find, my lords, that it is not in the power of the emperour alone to lay any of the states of Germany under the ban; and that the electors are independent in their own dominions, so far as that they may enter into alliances with foreign powers, and make war upon each other.
It appears, therefore, my lords, that no law prohibits the elector of Hanover to send his troops to the assistance of the queen of Hungary; he may, in consequence of treaties, march into Germany, and attack the confederates of the emperour, or what is not now intended, even the emperour himself, without any dread of the severities of the ban.
Nor does the continuance of the forces in Flanders show any unwillingness to begin hostilities, or any dread of the power of either Prussia, whose prohibition is merely imaginary, or of France, who is not less perplexed by the neighbourhood of our army than by any other method that could have been taken of attacking her; for being obliged to have an equal force always in readiness to observe their motions, she has not been able to send a new army against the Austrians, but has been obliged to leave the emperour at their mercy, and suffer them to recover Bohemia without bloodshed, and establish themselves at leisure in Bavaria.
Nor is this, my lords, the only advantage which has been gained by their residence in Flanders; for the United Provinces have been animated to a concurrence in the common cause, and have consented so far to depart from their darling neutrality, as to send twenty thousand of their forces to garrison the barrier. Of which no man, I suppose, will say that it is not of great importance to the queen of Hungary, since it sets her free from the necessity of distracting her views, and dividing her forces for the defence of the most distant parts of her dominions at once; nor will it be affirmed, that this advantage could have probably been gained, without convincing our allies of our sincerity, by sending an army into the continent.
If it be asked, what is farther to be expected from these troops? it ought to be remembered, my lords, with how little propriety our ministers can be required to make publick a scheme of hostile operations, and how much we should expose ourselves to our enemies, should a precedent be established by which our generals would be incapacitated to form any private designs, and an end would be for ever put to military secrecy.
What necessity there can be for proposing arguments like these, I am not, indeed, able to discover, since the objections which have been made seem to proceed rather from obstinacy than conviction; and the reflections that have been vented seem rather the product of wit irritated by malevolence, than of reason enlightened by calm consideration. The ministers have been reproached with Hanoverian measures, without any proof that Hanover is to receive the least advantage; and have been charged with betraying their country by those who cannot show how their country is injured, nor can prove either that interest or faith would allow us to sit inactive in the present disturbance of Europe, or that we could have acted in any other manner with equal efficacy.
It is so far from being either evident or true, my lords, that Britain is sacrificed to Hanover, that Hanover is evidently hazarded by her union with Britain. Had this electorate now any other sovereign than the king of Great Britain, it might have been secure by a neutrality, and have looked upon the miseries of the neighbouring provinces without any diminution of its people, or disturbance of its tranquillity; nor could any danger be dreaded, or any inconvenience be felt, but from an open declaration in favour of the Pragmatick sanction.
Why the hire of the troops of any particular country should be considered as an act of submission to it, or of dependency upon it, I cannot discover; nor can I conceive for what reason the troops of Hanover should be more dangerous, or less popular, at this than at any former time, or why the employment of them should be considered as any particular regard. If any addition of dominion had been to be purchased for the electorate by the united arms of the confederate army, I should, perhaps, be inclined to censure the scheme, as contrary to the interest of my native country; nor shall any lord more warmly oppose designs that may tend to aggrandize another nation at the expense of this. But to hire foreigners, of whatever country, only to save the blood of Britons, is, in my opinion, an instance of preference which ought to produce rather acknowledgments of gratitude than sallies of indignation.
Upon the most exact survey of this debate, I will boldly affirm, that I never heard in this house a question so untenable in itself, so obstinately or so warmly debated; but hope that the sophistries which have been used, however artful, and the declamations which have been pronounced, however pathetick, will have no effect upon your lordships. I hope, that as the other house has already agreed to support the auxiliaries which have been retained, and which have been proved in this debate to be retained for the strongest reasons, and the most important purposes, your lordships will show, by rejecting this motion, that you are not less willing to concur in the support of publick faith, and that you will not suffer posterity to charge you with the exaltation of France, and the ruin of Europe.
[The question was then put, and determined in the negative, by 90 against 35.]
After the conclusion of this long debate, the ministry did not yet think their victory in repelling this censure sufficiently apparent, unless a motion was admitted, which might imply a full and unlimited approbation of their measures; and therefore the earl of SCARBOROUGH rose, and spoke to the following effect: — My lords, it has been justly observed in the debate of this day, that the opinions of the people of Britain are regulated in a great measure by the determinations of this house; that they consider this as the place where truth and reason obtain a candid audience; as a place sacred to justice and to honour; into which, passion, partiality, and faction have been very rarely known to intrude; and that they, therefore, watch our decisions as the great rules of policy, and standing maxims of right, and readily believe these measures necessary in which we concur, and that conduct unblameable which has gained our approbation.
This reputation, my lords, we ought diligently to preserve, by an unwearied vigilance for the happiness of our fellow-subjects; and while we possess it, we ought likewise to employ its influence to beneficial purposes, that the cause and the effect may reciprocally produce each other; that the people, when the prosperity which they enjoy by our care, inclines them to repose in us an implicit confidence, may find that confidence a new source of felicity; that they may reverence us, because they are secure and happy; and be secure and happy, because they reverence us.
This great end, my lords, it will not be very difficult to attain; the foundation of this exalted authority may easily be laid, and the superstructure raised in a short time; the one may be laid too deep to be undermined, and the other built too firmly to be shaken; at least they can be impaired only by ourselves, and may set all external violence at defiance.
To preserve the confidence of the people, and, consequently, to govern them without force, and without opposition, it is only necessary that we never willingly deceive them; that we expose the publick affairs to their view, so far as they ought to be made publick in their true state; that we never suffer false reports to circulate under the sanction of our authority, nor give the nation reason to think we are satisfied, when we are, in reality, suspicious of illegal designs, or that we suspect those measures of latent mischiefs with which we are, in reality, completely satisfied.
But it is not sufficient, my lords, that we publish ourselves no fallacious representations of our counsels; it is necessary, likewise, that we do not permit them to be published, that we obviate every falsehood in its rise, and propagate truth with our utmost diligence. For if we suffer the nation to be deceived, we are not much less criminal than those who deceive it; at least we must be confessed no longer to act as the guardians of the publick happiness, if we suffer it to be interrupted by the dispersion of reports which we know to be at once false and pernicious.
Of these principles, which I suppose will not be contested, an easy application may be made to the business of the present day. A question has been debated with great address, great ardour, and great obstinacy, which is in itself, though not doubtful, yet very much diffused; complicated with a great number of circumstances, and extended to a multitude of relations; and is, therefore, a subject upon which sophistry may very safely practise her arts, and which may be shown in very different views to those whose intellectual light is too much contracted to receive the whole object at once. It may easily be asserted, by those who have long been accustomed to affirm, without scruple, whatever they desire to obtain belief, that the arguments in favour of the motion, which has now been rejected by your lordships, were unanswerable; and it will be no hard task to lay before their audience such reasons as, though they have been easily confuted by the penetration and experience of your lordships, may, to men unacquainted with politicks, and remote from the sources of intelligence, appear very formidable.
