Complete works of samuel.., p.277
Complete Works of Samuel Johnson, page 277
But I am too well acquainted with his candour to imagine, that he expects his assertions to be any farther regarded than they convince; or that he desires to debar others from the same freedom of reason which he has himself used. I shall therefore proceed to examine his opinion, and to show the reasons by which I am induced to differ from him.
The arguments upon which he has chiefly insisted, are the danger of hiring the troops of Hanover in any circumstances, and the impropriety of hiring them now without the previous approbation of the senate.
The danger of taking into our pay the forces of Hanover, the contrariety of this conduct to the act of settlement, and the infraction of our natural privileges, and the violation of our liberties which is threatened by it, have been asserted in very strong terms, but I think not proved with proportionate force; for we have heard no regular deduction of consequences by which this danger might be shown, nor have been informed, how the engagement of sixteen thousand Hanoverians to serve us against France for the ensuing year, can be considered as more destructive to our liberties than any other forces.
It is, indeed, insinuated, that this conduct will furnish a dangerous precedent of preference granted to Hanover above other nations; and that this preference may gradually be advanced, till in time Hanover may, by a servile ministry, be preferred to Britain itself, and that, therefore, all such partiality ought to be crushed in the beginning, and its authors pursued with indignation and abhorrence.
That to prefer the interest of Hanover to that of Britain would be in a very high degree criminal in a British ministry, I believe no man in this house will go about to deny; but if no better proof can be produced, that such preference is intended than the contract which we are now desired to ratify, it may be with reason hoped, that such atrocious treachery is yet at a great distance; for how does the hire of Hanoverian troops show any preference of Hanover to Britain?
The troops of Hanover are not hired by the ministry as braver or more skilful than those of our own country; they are not hired to command or to instruct, but to assist us; nor can I discover, supposing it possible to have raised with equal expedition the same number of forces in our own country, how the ministry can be charged with preferring the Hanoverians by exposing them to danger and fatigue.
But if it be confessed, that such numbers would not possibly be raised, or, at least, not possibly disciplined with the expedition that the queen of Hungary required, it will be found, that the Hanoverians were at most not preferred to our own nation, but to other foreigners, and for such preference reasons have been already given which I shall esteem conclusive, till I hear them confuted.
The other objection on which the honourable gentleman thought it proper to insist, was the neglect of demanding from the senate a previous approbation of the contract which is now before us; a neglect, in his opinion, so criminal, that the ministry cannot be acquitted of arbitrary government, of squandering the publick money by their own caprice, and of assuming to themselves the whole power of government.
But the proof of this enormous usurpation has not yet been produced; for it does not yet appear, that there was time to communicate their designs to the senate, or that they would not have been defeated by communication; and, therefore, it is yet not evident, but that when they are censured for not having laid their scheme before the senate, they are condemned for omitting what was not possibly to be done, or what could not have been done, without betraying their trust, and injuring their country.
It is allowed, that the senate had resolved to assist the queen of Hungary; and, therefore, nothing remained for the ministers but to execute with their utmost address the resolution that had been formed; if for the prosecution of this design they should be found to have erred in their choice of means, their mistakes, unless some ill designs may justly be suspected, are to be imputed to the frailty of human nature, and rather to be pitied, and relieved as misfortunes, than punished as crimes.
But I doubt not, that in the course of our deliberations, we shall find reason for concluding that they have acted not only with fidelity but prudence; that they have chosen the means by which the great end which the senate proposed, the succour of the queen of Hungary, and consequently the reestablishment of the balance of power, will be most easily attained; and that they have taken into the pay of this nation those troops which may be trusted with the greatest security, as they have the same prince, and the same interest.
But the honourable gentleman appears inclined to advance a new doctrine, and to insinuate, that when any vote is passed by the senate, the ministers are to suppose some conditions which are to be observed, though they were never mentioned, and without which the voice of the senate is an empty sound. In pursuance of this supposition, he calls upon us to recollect the time and circumstances in which this vote was passed; he reminds us, that the concession was made in a sudden exultation of our hearts, in the raptures of triumph, and amidst the shouts of conquest, when every man was forming expectations which have never been gratified, and planning schemes which could never be perfected.
He seems therefore to think, that our ministers insidiously took advantage of our intoxication, and betrayed us in a fit of thoughtless jollity to a promise, which when made, we hardly understood, and which we may, therefore, now retract. He concludes, that the concession which might then escape us ought not to have been snatched by our ministers, and made the foundation of their conduct, because they knew it was made upon false suppositions, and in prospect of a recompense that never would be granted.
I hope there is no necessity for declaring, that this reasoning cannot safely be admitted, since, if the vote of the senate be not a sufficient warrant for any measure, no man can undertake the administration of our affairs, and that government which no man will venture to serve must be quickly at an end.
For my part, I know not how the nation or the senate has been disappointed of any just expectations, nor can I conceive that any such disappointments vacate their votes or annul their resolutions, and therefore I cannot but think the ministry sufficiently justified, if they can show that they have not deviated from them.
Lord QUARENDON spoke next to the effect following: — Sir, I am so far from thinking that the past conduct or the present proposals of the ministry deserve approbation, that, in my opinion, all the arguments which have been produced in their favour are apparently fallacious, and even the positions on which they are founded, and which are laid down as uncontrovertible, are generally false.
It is first asserted, that we are indispensably obliged to assist the queen of Hungary against France, and to support her in the possession of the hereditary dominions of the Austrian house, and from thence is precipitately inferred the necessity of assembling armies, and hiring mercenaries, of exhausting our treasure, and heaping new burdens upon the publick.
That we concurred with other powers in promising to support the Pragmatick sanction is not to be denied, nor do I intend to insinuate, that the faith of treaties ought not strictly to be kept; but we are not obliged to perform more than we promised, or take upon ourselves the burden which was to be supported by the united strength of many potentates, and of which we only engaged to bear a certain part. We ought, undoubtedly, to furnish the troops which we promised, and ought to have sent them when they were first demanded; but there is no necessity that we should supply the deficiencies of every other power, and that we should determine to stand alone in defence of the Pragmatick sanction; that we should, by romantick generosity, impoverish our country, and entail upon remotest posterity poverty and taxes. We ought to be honest at all events; we are at liberty, likewise, to be generous at our own expense, but I think we have hardly a right to boast of our liberality, when we contract debts for the advantage of the house of Austria, and leave them to be paid by the industry or frugality of succeeding ages.
It is, therefore, at least, dubious, whether we ought to hazard more than we promised in defence of the house of Austria; and, consequently, the first proposition of those who have undertaken the defence of the ministry requires to be better established, before it becomes the basis of an argument.
But though it be allowed, that we ought to exceed our stipulations, and engage more deeply in this cause than we have promised, I cannot yet discover upon what principles it can be proved, that sixteen thousand Hanoverians ought to be hired. Why were not our troops sent which have been so long maintained at home only for oppression and show? Why have they not at last been shown the use of those weapons which they have so long carried, and the advantages of that exercise which they have been taught to perform with so much address? Why have they not, at length, been shown for what they had so long received their pay, and informed, that the duty of a soldier is not wholly performed by strutting at a review?
If it be urged, that so great a number could not be sent out of the kingdom without exposing it to insults and irruptions, let it be remembered how small a force was found sufficient for the defence of the kingdom in the late war, when the French were masters of a fleet which disputed, for many years, the empire of the sea; and it will appear, whether it ought to be imputed to prudence or to cowardice, that our ministers cannot now think the nation safe without thrice the number, though our fleets cover the ocean, and steer from one coast to another without an enemy.
But to show more fully the insufficiency of the vindication which has been attempted, and prove, that no concession will enable the ministry to defend their schemes, even this assertion shall be admitted. We will allow for the present, that it is necessary to garrison an island with numerous forces against an enemy that has no fleet. I will grant, that invaders may be conveyed through the air, and that the formidable, the detestable pretender may, by some subterraneous passage, enter this kingdom, and start on a sudden into the throne. Yet will not all this liberality avail our ministers, since it may be objected, that new forces might easily have been raised, and our own island have been, at once, defended, and the queen of Hungary assisted by our native troops.
Since the necessity of expedition is urged, it may reasonably be inquired, what it was that appeared so immediately necessary, or what has been brought to pass by this wonderful expedition? Was it necessary to form an army to do nothing? Could not an expedition in which nothing was performed, in which nothing was attempted, have been delayed for a short time, and might not the queen of Hungary have been preserved equally, whether the troops of her allies slept and fattened in her country or their own?
Nothing, surely, can be more ridiculous than to expatiate upon the necessity of raising with expedition an useless body of forces, which has only been a burden to the country in which it has been stationed, and for which pay is now demanded, though they have neither seen a siege nor a battle; though they have made no attempt themselves, nor hindered any that might have been made by the enemy.
To make this plea yet more contemptible, we are informed, that if we had raised an army of our countrymen, they would have been unacquainted with arms and discipline, and, therefore, they could not have done what has been done by these far-famed Hanoverians. This, indeed, I cannot understand, having never found, that the Britons needed any documents or rules to enable them to eat and drink at the expense of others, to bask in the sun, or to loiter in the street, or perform any of the wonders that may be ascribed to our new auxiliaries; and, therefore, I cannot but think, that all the actions of the four months for which those forces expect to be paid, might have been brought to pass by new-raised Britons, who might in the mean time have learned their exercise, and have been made equal to any other soldiers that had never seen a battle.
But if foreign troops were necessary, I am still at a loss to find out why those of Hanover were chosen, since it appears to me, that by hiring out his troops to Britain, our monarch only weakens one hand to strengthen the other. It might be expected, that he should have employed these troops against France without hire, since he is not less obliged, either by treaty or policy, to protect the house of Austria as elector of Hanover, than as king of Britain.
Since, therefore, the troops of Hanover were hired, without the consent of the senate, they have hitherto performed nothing; and since it is reasonable to expect, that without being paid by Britain they will be employed against the French, I think it expedient to discharge them from our service, and to delay the pay which is required for the last four months, till it shall appear how they have deserved it.
Mr. FOX then rose, and spoke to the following purport: — Sir, though the observations of the right honourable gentleman must be allowed to be ingenious, and though the eloquence with which he has delivered them, naturally excites attention and regard, yet I am obliged to declare, that I have received rather pleasure than conviction from his oratory; and that while I applaud his imagination and his diction, I cannot but conclude, that they have been employed in bestowing ornaments upon errour.
I shall not, indeed, attempt to confute every assertion which I think false, or detect the fallacy of every argument which appears to me sophistical, but shall leave to others the province of showing the necessity of engaging in the war on the continent, of employing a large force for the preservation of the house of Austria, and of forming that army with the utmost expedition, and of taking auxiliaries into our pay, and confine myself to this single question, whether, supposing auxiliaries necessary, it was not prudent to hire the troops of Hanover?
Nothing can be, in my opinion, more apparent, than that if the necessity of hiring troops be allowed, which surely cannot be questioned, the troops of Hanover are to be chosen before any other, and that the ministry consulted in their resolutions the real interest of their country, as well as that of our ally.
The great argument which has in all ages been used against mercenary troops, is the suspicion which may justly be entertained of their fidelity. Mercenaries, it is observed, fight only for pay, without any affection for the master whom they serve, without any zeal for the cause which they espouse, and without any prospect of advantage from success, more than empty praises, or the plunder of the field, and, therefore, have no motives to incite them against danger, nor any hopes to support them in fatigues; that they can lose nothing by flight, but plunder, nor by treachery, but honour; and that, therefore, they have nothing to throw into the balance against the love of life, or the temptations of a bribe, and will never be able to stand against men that fight for their native country under the command of generals whom they esteem and love, and whom they cannot desert or disobey, without exposing themselves to perpetual exile, or to capital punishment.
These arguments have always been of great force, and, therefore, that nation whose defence has been intrusted to foreigners, has always been thought in danger of ruin. Yet there have been conjunctures in which almost every state has been obliged to rely upon mercenaries, and in compliance with immediate necessity, to depend upon the fidelity of those who had no particular interest in supporting them. But with much greater reason may we trust the success of the present war, in some degree, to the troops of Hanover, as they are, perhaps, the only foreign forces against which the arguments already recited are of no force. They are foreigners, indeed, as they are born in another country, and governed by laws different from ours; but they are the subjects of the same prince, and, therefore, naturally fight under the same command; they have the same interest with ourselves in the present contest, they have the same hopes and the same fears, they recommend themselves equally to their sovereign by their bravery, and can neither discover cowardice nor treachery, without suffering all the punishment that can be feared by our native troops, since their conduct must be censured by the same prince of whose approbation they are equally ambitious, and of whose displeasure they are equally afraid.
As to the troops which any neutral prince might furnish, there would be reason to fear, that either for larger pay, or upon any casual dispute that might arise, they might be withdrawn from our service when they were most needed, or transferred to the enemy at a time when his distress might compel him to offer high terms, and when, therefore, there was a near prospect of an advantageous peace. But of the troops of Hanover no such suspicion can be formed, since they cannot engage against us without rebelling against their prince; for it cannot be imagined, that his majesty will fight on one side as elector of Hanover, and on the other as king of Britain; or that he will obstruct the success of his own arms, by furnishing the troops of Hanover to the enemies of this kingdom.
It, therefore, appears very evident, that we have more to hope and less to fear from the troops of Hanover, than from any other; since they have the same reason with ourselves to desire the success of the queen of Hungary, and to dread the increasing greatness of the French; and that they can be suspected neither of treachery nor desertion. It is not very consistent with that candour with which every man ought to dispute on publick affairs, to censure those measures which have been proposed, without proposing others that are more eligible; for it is the duty of every man to promote the business of the publick; nor do I know why he that employs his sagacity only to obstruct it, should imagine, that he is of any use in the national council.
I doubt not but I shall hear many objections against the use of these troops, and that upon this question, virulence and ridicule will be equally employed. But for my part, I shall be little affected either with the laughter that may be raised by some, or the indignation that may be expressed by others, but shall vote for the continuance of these measures till better shall be proposed; and shall think, that these troops ought to be retained, unless it can be shown, that any others may be had, who may be less dangerous, or of greater use.
Mr. PITT then rose up, and spoke, in substance as follows: — Sir, if the honourable gentleman determines to abandon his present sentiments as soon as any better measures are proposed, I cannot but believe, that the ministry will very quickly be deprived of one of their ablest defenders; for I think the measures which have hitherto been pursued so weak and pernicious, that scarcely any alteration can be proposed that will not be for the advantage of the nation.
